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Abstract 
 
This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for 
Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the LIBE Committee, 
analyses the Schengen area in the wake of the European ‘refugee crisis’ and other 
recent developments. With several Member States reintroducing temporary internal 
border controls over recent months, the study assesses compliance with the 
Schengen governance framework in this context. Despite suggestions that the end 
of Schengen is nigh or arguments that there is a need to get ‘back to Schengen’, 
the research demonstrates that Schengen is alive and well and that border controls 
have, at least formally, complied with the legal framework. Nonetheless, better 
monitoring and democratic accountability are necessary. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The events of 2015-2016, which have been referred to as ‘the European refugee crisis’1, have 
shown the limits of European migration, border and asylum policies and have placed their 
foundations under strain. Some EU Member States (MS) reacted to the increase in entries by 
asylum seekers by re-introducing internal border controls. On 12 May 2016 the Council 
adopted a decision allowing five Member States - Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden - to continue internal border checks on the basis of structural and “serious 
deficiencies” in the external border management system in Greece, which “put at risk the 
overall functioning of the area without internal border control”. These developments have 
fuelled discussions about Schengen being ‘in crisis’, with some voices even referring to ‘the 
end of Schengen’ or calling for the scrapping of the border-free area. 
 
Against this backdrop, the current study examines the following questions:  
• Is this rhetoric justified? Is the current Schengen governance system crisis-proof?  
• Is Schengen’s legal framework being effectively implemented and how could it be 
improved?  
• Is legislative reform needed? 
• How can we ensure more effective supervision, evaluation and democratic 
accountability of Schengen standards? 
 
The study focuses on the implementation dynamics and challenges experienced in the 
operability of the post-2013 Schengen governance framework in the light of the above-
mentioned developments. The study provides a legal assessment of its implementation and 
sets out concrete policy recommendations to improve Schengen governance.  
 
How did the 2013 Schengen governance reform come about?  
It was a 2011 dispute between France and Italy that demonstrated the need for a 
strengthened Community method in the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism 
and the use of exceptions. The previous intergovernmental governance framework had 
proved ineffective in addressing the  2011 Franco-Italian affair and guaranteeing the 
protection of ‘the spirit of Schengen’. After the reform of 2013, the European Commission 
gained more scrutiny powers in assessing MS’ compliance with the Schengen Borders Code 
as well as in assessing the proportionality, necessity and impact of the reintroduction of 
internal borders on fundamental rights and freedom of movement. The European Parliament 
acquired access to the results of Schengen evaluations and some scrutiny powers in both 
Schengen evaluations and the reintroduction of internal border checks procedures. (See 
Section 2 of this Study)  
 
What were the main innovations of the Schengen governance framework?  
The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) procedures under Articles 26-29, which permit the re-
introduction of internal border controls in exceptional circumstances, had been carefully 
crafted to delineate their application. With the 2013 reform, the SBC acquired more detailed 
rules on the  criteria and time limits for temporary border checks (Articles 25 and 26). In 
addition, the new SBC increased accountability by including ex-post reporting obligations and 
the bi-annual reports from the Commission to the Council and Parliament. However, the main 
innovation of the new SBC was Article 29, which allowed the reintroduction of internal border 
controls for up to two years where ‘serious deficiencies’ at the external borders are detected.  
 
                                           
1 The authors of this study are critical about the widely used term “refugee crisis” as it does not indicate the roots 
of the crisis, though this discussion is out of the scope of the current study.  
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The Schengen evaluation and monitoring (SEM) mechanism  shifted from being very 
intergovernmental towards being more European. Now, the Commission (namely, DG HOME) 
is in the driving seat of for the SEM mechanism, and not the Council. Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) can access the findings of evaluations under the new 
confidentiality rules, though practical arrangements limit parliamentary scrutiny. In addition, 
there is a lack of transparency on how individual MS influence the final output of the Schengen 
evaluations. The new SEM entered into force only in 2015. (See Section 3) 
 
When and how was the Schengen governance reform applied in 2015/2016? 
The European refugee crisis has put the 2013 Schengen Governance reform to the test. In 
March 2016, the Commission outlined its “Back to Schengen“ plan, which referred to the 
possibility of using Article 29 of the SBC for prolonging internal border controls. The proposal 
came about at a time of huge political pressure, with the maximum eight-month period 
provided for under the combined procedures of Articles 28 and 27 of the SBC about to expire 
in the five MS applying temporary internal border controls (Austria, Germany, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden), and with a set of new Commission legislative and policy iniatives in 
response to the asylum challenge entering inter-institutional negitiations or being applied on 
the ground. (See Section 1) 
 
Schengen Borders Code: formally respected, but not respected ‘in spirit’ 
All the MS have reintroduced internal border controls within the scope of the SBC rules. 
However, if assessed carefully, none of the notifications satisfy the simple criterion in Article 
26 of making an assessment “regarding likely impacts of any threats to public policy and 
internal security”. The European Commission has shied away from consistently applying the 
proportionality assessment to MS justifications, and checking their arguments against 
evidence. Member States, in their official notifications, cited two main reasons or sources of 
threat justifying derogations from the border-free area - ‘mass migration’/‘refugee 
movements’ and the ‘risk of terrorism’. As regards these grounds, this study demonstrates 
that there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU 
Member States. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing 
borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducting border 
checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.  
 
Furthermore, it is striking that the main complaint in the MS notifications was, in essenece, 
that Greece had not prevented refugees from arriving in the first instance, and subsequently 
that Greece had failed to keep them within its territory. The majority of refugees who arrived 
in 2015/16 were entitled to asylum, and could not be ‘Dublinised’ to Greece due to serious 
deficiencies in the asylum system following the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
decision in MSS v. Belgium and Greece. Given these refugee arrivals, the MS opted to apply 
the Schengen governance framework instead of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). The current application of the SBC leaves open the question of how the reintroduction 
of internal borders addresses the shortcomings of national asylum and reception systems in 
the EU.  (See Sub-Section 4.2) 
 
If we look at the threat of ‘terrorism’ justification put forward by Malta and France,  it remains 
unclear whether and how the reintroduction of border controls at internal EU borders would 
help in dismantling terrorist networks. (See Sub-Section 4.3)  
 
What is the role of Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring mechanism? 
The SEM evaluation was the main source of information triggering Article 29 of the SBC. The 
Council Implementing Decision of 12 May 2016 mainly relied on the findings of the 
unannounced on-site visit by the Schengen Evaluation Team of Experts on the 10-13 
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November 2015. In mid-May 2016, however, the situation was different from the one at the 
peak of the crisis - the EU-Turkey Statement had been concluded and the so-called ‘Balkan 
route‘blocked. Thus, very few refugees were in fact reaching the five MS that wanted to 
continue their internal border controls.  For these MS, the main reason for the prolongation 
of internal border controls was the ‘fear’ of ‘secondary movements’ of refugees from Greece 
and the unclear destiny of the EU-Turkey Statement. This study argues that if the ‘fears’ of 
‘secondary movements‘, without any factual basis, were to be accepted as proportionate and 
legitimate reasons, it would undermine the very legal foundations of Schengen. (See Sub-
section 4.7. and Section 5) 
 
Where is the line between ‘border controls’ and legitimate ‘police checks’?   
In addition to the above, several EU Member States have used internal police checks in border 
areas for ‘migration control’ purposes, which seems to be contrary to Article 23 of the SBC 
and recital 26 of the SBC. This study demonstrates that the line between ‘police checks’ and 
‘border controls’ is often unclear both in law and in practice. Youth organisations have raised 
concerns that reinforced police checks in the border areas are becoming systematic and 
discriminatory. (See Sub-Sections 4.8., 4.9. and Annex 4). 
 
In addition, police ‘function creep’ is seen in the classification of ‘asylum seekers’ as ‘irregular 
immigrants’ and the fact that they are subsequently subjected to policing measures, such 
registration in the Schengen Information System (SIS). Asylum seekers are instead to be 
registered to EURODAC and subject to the CEAS, the UN 1951 Geneva Convention and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The study shows that, with a growing 
tendency to use internal police checks by some EU MS, these actions should be subject to 
greater scrutiny and evaluation to ensure that they are not tantamount to border checks.  
 
The study concludes that, despite the developments of 2015-2016, Schengen is ‘fit for 
purpose’ and here to stay, though many gaps and open questions still need to be addressed. 
The following recommendations are made with the aim of addressing them: 
 
• The Schengen acquis was applied throughout the crisis. Thus, we do not really need 
to get “back to Schengen“ as we never abandoned it.  
• Recent developments do not justify new legislative reforms of the SBC or the SEM, as 
both instruments are too recent. This would negatively affect legal certainty. 
• The Commission should better verify and scrutinise Member States’ justifications 
against the  proportionality and free movement/fundamental rights test. The 
Commission should play its role as guardian of EU law and the treaties and not 
mediate among the competing interests of Member States – this is the role of the 
Council.  
• The European Parliament and national parliaments should have better access to 
information and play their role in scrutinising Member State actions, in particular those 
affecting fundamental rights.  
• The SEM should not creep into the area of the CEAS. A separate evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism on asylum issues should thus be established in accordance 
with Article 70 TFEU. 
• Member States should inform the Commission and the Parliament about internal police 
checks in border areas. There should be clear guidelines from the Commission in this 
area. 
• Upcoming SIS II amendments should include the possibility for an independent 
Commission assessment, checking against databases used at internal border areas to 
detect ‘systematic police checks’ at internal borders. 
Policy Department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional Affairs 
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• The relationship between the current Frontex risk analysis, the European Border and 
Coast Guard vulnerability assessment and the SEM should be better clarified; 
• To ensure fundamental rights compliance and further reporting to the Parliament, as 
provided for in recital 14 of the SEM, the FRA should be become a permanent observer 
to all SEM missions, including on intenral borders. 
• The role of civil society should be strengthened in the SEM, by allowing independent 
shadow reporting.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background: Refugee crisis in 2015/16  
The large number of asylum seekers and the lack of European solidarity at the EU’s external 
borders have been said to put the Schengen Area at risk.2 The continuation of the regional 
wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and particularly in Syria - where the conflict in in its sixth year and 
has seen the devastation of whole cities - has resulted in a bulge in the number of people 
seeking asylum in the EU. Against this backdrop, EUROSTAT3 reports that, in 2015, 1.2 
million people applied for asylum in the EU, which is about double the 2014 number (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Asylum Applications EU-28 1998-2015 
 
Source: Authors.4   
 
The top three nationalities to seek asylum were Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis.5 The distribution 
of asylum seekers across the Member States was a matter of some political salience, resulting 
in two Council decisions on the relocation of 160,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece.6 
However, these decisions concerned only those asylum seekers with a nationality with a 
recognition rate of 75% or over, basically  Syria, Eritrea and Iraq. These two decisionshave 
not resulted in particularly successful shifts of state responsibility. Indeed, the Commission 
indicates that less than 1,600 asylum seekers had been relocated by April 2016 (see Figure 
2 below).  
 
 
 
                                           
2 Guild, E., Brouwer, E., Groenendijk, K. and Carrera, S. (2015), “What is happening to the Schengen borders?” 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 86, December 2015.  
3 EUROSTAT (2016), Asylum Statistics, Official website.  
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics. 
4 Guild, E.and Carrera S. (2016), “Rethinking asylum distribution in the EU: Shall we start with the facts?,” in CEPS 
Commentary, 17.06.2016. 
5 EUROSTAT (2016), Asylum Statistics, Op.cit. 
6 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015 and Council (2015), Council 
Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ L 248, 24.9.2015.  
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Figure 2: Total Relocation of Asylum Seekers Oct 2015 – mid-May 2016 
 
Source: Authors.7  
 
One of the most contested questions is where these people first sought asylum. Eurostat 
data indicates that over the 12-month period, there were 1,256,000 first-time asylum 
applications in the EU 28. As Eurostat data indicates, Germany received 441,800 asylum 
applications, Hungary 174,435 and Sweden a total of 156,110. During the period between 
October and December 2015 (Q4) alone Germany received 162,540 applications, 
corresponding to 38% of the total across EU Member States. There were surprisingly low 
numbers of asylum applications among the bigger Member States. For instance, France only 
received 70,570 applications, Italy 83,245 and the UK 38,370. According to Eurostat, five 
Member States accounted for 75% of all applications – Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy and 
France.  
 
With the EU offering no legal avenues for protection seekers to reach the EU and access the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), refugees arrived by and large irregularly on 
unseaworthy little boats from Turkey to Greece, instead of arriving in an orderly way in the 
EU to seek asylum. Then, although these people were within the Schengen area, on account 
of a lack of documentation, they were unable to move on rapidly to seek asylum in Member 
States with properly-functioning asylum systems. Instead, an extraordinary series of ad hoc 
responses came into place, resulting in the opening of a fairly safe route, known as the 
‘Balkan route’ from Greece to northern Europe, from about September onwards until it was 
firmly shut in January 2016. By the end of December 2015, the numbers of applicants had 
already started to decrease (see Figure 3). 
 
  
                                           
7 Guild, E.and Carrera S. (2016), “Rethinking asylum distribution in the EU: Shall we start with the facts?,” Op.cit.,  
based on: European Commission (2015), ANNEX to the Communication Third report on relocation and resettlement, 
Annex 1, Relocations from Greece by 13 May 2016, COM(2016) 360 final, Brussels, 18.5.2016; and European 
Commission (2015), ANNEX to the Communication Third report on relocation and resettlement, Annex 2, Relocations 
from Italy by 13 May 2016, COM(2016) 360 final, Brussels, 18.5.2016. 
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Figure 3: First-Time Asylum Applications EU-28 (January 2014 – December 2015) 
 
Source: Eurostat (migr_asyappctzm), 2016.  
 
The Balkan route revealed the incomplete nature of the Schengen area. According to the 
design of the Schengen border-control-free area, asylum seekers arriving in Greece should 
have been able to purchase cheap flights to anywhere in Schengen and go there without any 
further identity control. 
 
As an area without internal controls on the movement of persons, Schengen did not deliver 
for these asylum seekers. Refugees coming were unable to catch cheap flights to and within 
the EU because of the application of identity checks and the threats of carrier sanctions 
against airlines carrying people.8 Airlines and other transport companies feared boarding 
people who had no valid travel documentation or had not been subject to checks from Greece 
or from elsewhere coming into the Schengen area. This incoherence within the Schengen 
system became even more noticeable when the Greek authorities began to issue certificates 
of registration to asylum seekers in order to facilitate their movement across the Balkan 
route, which permitted asylum seekers to move from Greece by land into Macedonia and 
then northwards, but were not sufficient for these same people to catch a (much cheaper) 
flight to their end destination. These developments were later compared to shutting down 
the Balkan route.9 
 
Thus the intersection of the arrival of refugees in larger numbers than anticipated and the 
perception of unreasonable pressure on the intra-Schengen borders is evident. The most 
substantial issue was the reaction to refugee arrivals not via the CEAS, but by the 
reintroduction of internal borders, a move designed to regulate movements of third country 
nationals, but one which should not be applied to refugees. 
                                           
8 Peers, S. (2015), “The Refugee Crisis: What should the EU do next?” EU Law Analysis, 08.09.2015, at : 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/09/the-refugee-crisis-what-should-eu-do.html. 
9 European Commission (2015), Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
follow-up to the Leaders' Meeting on refugee flows along the Western Balkans Route, COM(2015) 676, Strasbourg, 
15.12.2015. 
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1.2. Reaction to the refugee crisis: Reintroduction of internal borders 
After September 2015, several Schengen countries - Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary10, 
Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Belgium - reintroduced internal border controls due to an 
alleged “big influx of persons seeking international protection” or “unexpected migratory 
flow”11 (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Schengen Internal Borders: Developments September 2015 – March 2016 
 
* - Malta and France introduced internal border controls to counter the “threat of terrorism” under the 
procedure of Article 27 (former Article 24) of the Schengen Borders Code (foreseeable events); 
** In October, 2015 Hungary started to build internal fences on its border with Slovenia, though it 
abandoned the measure quickly.  
Source: Authors.  
 
All of the above-mentioned countries (except Hungary) initially invoked the procedure under 
Article 28 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC), which allows Member States to 
reintroduce internal border controls for unforeseen circumstances that pose a “serious threat 
to public policy or internal security”.  
 
                                           
10 Hungary started to build internal fences on its border with Slovenia, though it abandoned the measure quickly.  
Interview with Slovenian Permanent Representation, 30.05.2016. 
11 European Commission (2015), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,  
Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 10 December 2015, COM(2015) 675 final, 
Strasbourg, 15.12.2015; European Commission Website, “Member States’ notifications of the temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders pursuant to Article 23 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code”, 
2016 at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-
border-control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf); European Commission (2016), 
ANNEX 1 to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council, Back to Schengen - A roadmap, COM(2016) 120, Brussels, 4.3.2016.  
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Hungary started to install a barbed-wire fence on internal Schengen border with Slovenia at 
the end of September.12  The issue was controversially settled and the construction works 
were quickly stoped under a bilateral agreement with Slovenia.13 Nevertheless, since 2015 
July Hungary has managed tobuild the fence on the external Schengen border with Serbia14 
and  Schengen accession country Croatia15 and even planned to extend the fence to 
Romania.16 Slovenia  notified the Council about its internal  border controls in mid-
September 2015 and revoked its internal border controls as soon as mid-October 2015 (see 
Sub-Section 4.5).  Subsequently, however, Slovenia  followed the Hungarian authorities in 
building a fence with Croatia.17 (See Sub-sections 4.5. and 4.8.3.).  
 
Belgium was the last country to re-introduce internal borders (23 February 2016) under 
Article 28, fearing the arrival of refugees from the Calais refugee camp. After April 2016, 
Belgium did not prolong its internal border controls.   
 
Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Norway subsequently invoked the Article 27 
of the SBC, which allows a Member State to prevent foreseeable threats.  
 
In addition, two other Member States – France and Malta - reintroduced internal border 
controls in line with the procedure under Article 27 of the SBC, which can be used to 
prevent a foreseeable “serious threat to public policy or internal security”. Both Member 
States initiated border controls due to important international events (COP 21 – Paris Climate 
Conference and the Valletta Summit, respectively) and associated these events with a 
terrorist threat. Nevertheless, France, from January 1 2016, has continued its border 
controls after the Paris attacks due to the subsequent ‘state of emergency’ and big sporting 
events, such as the Tour de France and the European Football Championship (see Section 4 
for further discussion). 
 
Following the unannounced on-site Schengen evaluation on Greek external borders in  
November 2015, the Council Implementing Decision of 12 February found ‘serious 
deficiencies at external borders’.18 Subsequent rounds of recommendations to address the 
deficiencies followed (see Annex 5). Nevertheless, on 12 of May 2016, another Council 
Implementing Decision19 trigerred Article 29 of the SBC, which allowed the prolongation of 
                                           
12 Novinite (Sofia News Agency), “Hungary Starts Building Razor-Wire Fence along Border with Slovenia,” 
September 24, 2015. URL: http://www.novinite.com/articles/170976/Hungary+Starts+Building+Razor-
Wire+Fence+along+Border+with+Slovenia.  
13 Interview with Slovenian Permament Representation, 31.05.2015. 
14 Associated Press, "Hungary Begins Building Serbia Border Fence to Curb Migrants." Wall Street Journal, 
13.07.2015. URL : http://www.wsj.com/articles/hungary-begins-building-serbia-border-fence-to-curb-migrants-
1436799052.  
15 "Hungary starts building fence on Croatian border". Deutsche Welle. 18.09.2015.  
URL: http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-starts-building-fence-on-croatian-border/a-18721670.  
16 “Hungary preparing to extend border fence towards Romania.” Reuters.com. 15.09.2015, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-romania-idUSKCN0RF1JW20150915 
17 Barbara Surknov, “Slovenia Builds Border Fence to Stem Flow of Migrants,” November 11, 2015 in New York 
Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/world/europe/slovenia-border-fence-migrants-
refugees.html?_r=0; Simon Tomlinson, “Will a fence halt the human tide flowing into Slovenia? Country becomes 
latest to build barriers along its borders as 47,500 migrants arrive in just a few days,” 23 October 2015 in Daily 
Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3286365/Slovenia-latest-country-resort-building-fences-borders-47-
500-migrants-enter-overwhelmed-nation-days.html.  
18 Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation on ddressing the serious 
deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of management 
of the external borders by Greece, Council document 5985/16, Brussels, 12.02.2016. 
19 Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation for temporary internal border 
control in an exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, 8835/16, 
Brussels, 12.05.2016. 
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checks for an additional six months in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark  and Norway 
(see Sub-section 4.7. and Sub-section 5.1.1.).  
1.3. Political context 
As regards the political context, the decision to apply Article 29 came in a highly politicised 
environment. According to the Commission’s Proposal underpinning the Council 
Recommendation (emphasis added):20 
 
“Border control should only take place during the time necessary to remedy all the serious 
deficiencies in the management of the Union's external border. Several legislative initiatives 
and actions undertaken by the Union in order to reinforce its external border management 
(European Coast and Border Guard, return to a full application of EU asylum law 
provisions by the Hellenic Republic, stepping up of the implementation of the emergency 
relocation scheme, the EU-Turkey Statement) should also be in place and fully operational 
without delay and thus further contribute to a substantial reduction in the secondary 
movements of irregular migrants.” 
 
As indicated above, these policy and legislative initiatives had been presented by the 
Commission in response to the so-called European refugee crisis. The key target of these 
initiatives seems to be a “substantial reduction in the secondary movements of irregular 
migrants”. As previously identified in this study, the actual extent of these ‘movements’ is 
unclear, as is the extent to which these may be putting ‘internal security’ and ‘public policy’ 
at risk. Secondly, it is neither clear how initiatives such as the European Border and Coast 
Guard (EBCG), the temporary relocation scheme (including in its new guise under the 
‘corrective mechanism’ in the latest Dublin system re-cast proposal) or the EU-Turkey 
Statement would be capable of preventing people from moving within the Schengen Area, in 
particular if they have the legitimate aim to do so. Thirdly, if we speak about numbers of 
asylum seekers, Eurostat shows that the numbers of first-time asylum applicants have 
dropped significantly since December 2016 (see Figure 3). This has been especially so since 
April when the EU-Turkey Statement came into effect and the ‘Balkans route’ was closed off 
completely. Despite such evidence of a ‘substantial reduction’ in the numbers of people 
arriving, MS have acknowledged in their own notifications that they continued internal border 
controls due to ‘fears of secondary movements’. Such unsubstantiated fears have so far gone 
unchallenged by the Commission’s proportionality assessment. Thus, it is not clear whether 
and how “Back to Schengen” agenda, that made its success conditional on the adoption and 
implementation of these EU plans, is capable of addressing the ‘fears of the MS’. 
1.4. Methodology 
This study assesses whether the 2016 Schengen governance area is crisis-proof. It aims to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the implementation dynamics and challenges 
affecting the current Schengen governance framework in light of recent developments and 
in response to the European refugee crisis.  
The legal analysis focuses on appropriate, proportionate and effective implementation of the 
SBC provisions on the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls by Member States 
and the proper functioning of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism. The study 
aims to: 
1. Provide a brief account of the legal, social, political and economic developments that 
led to the reintroduction of the EU’s internal borders. 
                                           
20 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for 
temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area 
at risk, COM(2016) 275 final, Brussels, 4.5.2016.  
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2. Identify and map the main changes in the Schengen governance framework due to 
the 2013 Schengen governance reform. 
3. Analyse the implementation of the Schengen governance framework and to give an 
account of the current state-of-play, including Member State compliance and non-
compliance with the Schengen Borders Code.  
4. Assess whether the current Schengen governance framework, which encompasses the 
Schengen Borders Code and Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism, is ‘fit 
for purpose’ and ‘crisis proof’. 
5. Suggest concrete policy recommendations to improve and amend the legal, policy and 
political methods of Schengen governance. 
In order to meet these objectives, this study has adopted a legal and policy analysis approach 
that comprises desk research of relevant primary and secondary sources. This analysis has 
been combined with a set of semi-structured interviews with a selection of EU policymakers 
in Brussels, comprising representatives from all relevant European institutions, a selection of 
EU Member State representatives and EU agencies. The interviews were of particular 
importance in the context of the rapid development of related policies. Moreover, the findings 
of the study were verified in a stakeholders’ discussion organised by the European Citizens 
Action Service (ECAS). The discussion added additional dimensions on EU citizens’ concern, 
mainly youth concerns, on free movement guarantees when border controls are reintroduced 
at internal borders (see Annex 4). 
1.5. Structure of the study 
This study sets out to provide a better understanding of the legal implications of the 
reintroduction of internal borders in the EU and explores the policy processes underlying 
Member States’ and EU institutions’ actions in this context, and the legality of them. It aims 
to explore the options for strengthening the role of the European Parliament (EP) in ensuring 
democratic accountability at a time when the application of the SBC is in question. 
Section 2 aims to explain how The Franco-Italian affair in 2011 opened up important 
discussions for ensuring  ‘more Europe’ in Schengen governance.21 This led to the Schengen 
governance reform in 2013, which was tested in the 2015/16 European refugee crisis. 
Section 3 maps the main innovations introduced in the 2013 Schengen governance reform. 
The 2013 legislative reform positioned the European Commission at the centre of the 
Schengen evaluation system and included ‘more EU’ in the monitoring and scrutiny powers. 
The Schengen Evaluation Mechanism (SEM) moved beyond the previous inter-governmental 
system. For example, the new SBC included amendments concerning the conditions for 
reintroducing internal border checks and deterrence mechanism – Article 29.22 A new 
consolidated version of the SBC was recently published on 23 March 2016.23 Finally, the 
section points out that, whereas greater parliamentary scrutiny is to be regarded an 
achievement and, under the new confidentiality rules MEPs can access relevant evaluation 
documents, practical arrangements  still limit parliamentary scrutiny.24 
                                           
21 Peers, S. (2013), The Future of the Schengen System. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, (SIEPS), 
Report No. 6, Stockholm, November 2013.  
22 European Union (2013),  Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and 
monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive 
Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of 
Schengen, OJ L 295, p. 27–37, Brussels, 6.11.2013. (Further - SEM). 
23 European Union (2016), Regulation 2016/339 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification), OJ L 77, Brussels, 23.3.2016. (Further - SBC).  
24 European Parliament and Council (2014), Interinstitutional agreement of 12 March 2014 between the European 
Parliament and the Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified 
information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign and security policy, 
OJ C 95, Brussels, 01.04.2014, p. 1 – 51.; European Parliament and European Commission (2010), ANNEX II, 
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Sections 4 and 5 provide a legal analysis of the practical application of the SBC and SEM. 
Section 4 analyses the consistency and proportionality of the grounds invoked by the Member 
States (MS) that have reintroduced internal border controls. Thus, Section 4 assesses 
Member States’ compliance with the SBC and the legality of exceptions to the internal border-
free area. Detailed Member State notifications and subsequent reporting can be found in 
Annex 3. Section 4 also analyses the MS responses beyond the scope of the SBC, such as 
fences at internal borders or informal practices of ‘systematic police checks’ in border areas. 
 
Section 5 provides a detailed overview of the application of the SEM mechanism on internal 
and external borders and it also sheds light on infringement procedures initiated by the 
Commission against MS. Equally, the Section maps out the important agencies involved in 
the SEM mechanism and touches upon recent developments, such as the move to entrust a 
‘vulnerability assessment’ to the future European Borders Coast Guard (EBCG) and the new 
initiatives regarding the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The Section also stresses 
the role of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) when evaluating internal and external 
borders. 
 
Section 6 of the study concludes that Schengen is fit for purpose and here to stay, though 
many gaps and open questions still need to be addressed. Recommendations are made as to 
how to go about dealing with the deficiencies identified.  
 
                                           
Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ L 304/47, 
Brussels, 20.11.2010. 
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2. SCHENGEN AND ‘CRISES’: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The temporary reintroduction of internal border checks has been used on several 
occasions by EU Member States in the past.  
• During the 2010-2011 Arab Spring and the 2015-2016 European refugee crisis, the 
reintroduction of internal border controls was related to the arrival of asylum seekers, 
on both occasions raising concerns about the future of Schengen 
• Following the Franco-Italian affair in 2011, the Schengen Governance Package was 
adopted in order to move beyond the previous inter-governmental methods and 
ensure a more Community-based approach in the implementation and evaluation of 
Schengen rules by EU Member States.  
• The European Parliament gained important scrutiny powers over the results of 
Schengen evaluations as a result of the so-called “Schengen freeze”. 
 
This Section provides a brief overview of the development of the Schengen Area, followed by 
an overview of earlier reintroductions of internal Schengen border checks. Finally, the section 
provides the background to the 2013 legislative reform of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC). 
Particular attention is paid to the Franco-Italian Affair in 2011 that related to the arrival of 
Tunisian migrants in the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. The 2013 Schengen Governance 
Package was the main EU policy response to settle the Franco-Italian controversy by injecting 
‘more EU’ into the evaluation of the Schengen system and the monitoring of the 
reintroduction of internal border checks by national governments. The corresponding 
legislation was adopted in October 2013, but not until a dispute over the role of the European 
Parliament in the adoption and monitoring of the Schengen evaluation mechanism had been 
settled. 25  
2.1. Brief overview of  the Schengen Area 
The free movement of persons is one of the four fundamental freedoms of the European 
Union, part of the original treaties and enhanced in the 1987 Single European Act. The 
abolition of border controls on the movement of persons among the Member States of the EU 
was determined to be an integral part of the completion of the internal market, a part of 
Jacques Delors’ 1992 project. However, a number of Member States have been reluctant to 
abolish intra-EU Member State controls and, from the adoption of the Single European Act it 
was clear that there would be difficulties with implementation. Two Member States in 
particular - Ireland and the UK - stood in opposition to the abolition of intra-Member State 
border controls.  
 
Five of the six original Member States of the EU (the outlier was Italy) addressed the issue of 
intra-Member State border controls in a bold move outside the EU framework - the 1985 
Schengen Agreement. This agreement laid the foundations for the abolition of border controls 
on persons moving among those five states, independently of the EU internal market. The 
Schengen Agreement was primarily a response to industrial action by lorry drivers on the 
Franco-German border, but the security implications were quickly picked up by the Ministries 
of the Interior (MoI). The latter became centrally involved. One of the key issues to be 
                                           
25 European Union (2013), Regulation (EU) No 1051/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, OJ L 295, p. 1 -10, Brussels, 
6.11.2013. 
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resolved were the compensating measures for the abolition of border controls. These included 
common rules on the external border, common rules on visas and the countries to which they 
applied, a wide range of measures in policing and a database.  
 
The Schengen Agreement was supplemented by the Schengen Implementing Convention 
in 1990, which set out the nuts and bolts of the system and paved the way for the lifting 
of intra-participating state border controls on persons on 25 March 1995 (with an 
exception for France which was still concerned about the Dutch soft drugs policy). In the 
meantime, the completion of the internal market and the abolition of border controls 
among Member States for the free movement of persons was stalled, not least as a result 
of a conflict between the UK and Spain over the status of Gibraltar. However, all the 
Member States, other than the UK and Ireland, ultimately joined the Schengen system, 
creating a complicated and uncertain legal system between the EU and an agreement 
among many Member States covering the same territory as the EU treaties.  
 
This was resolved by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 when the Schengen acquis was 
incorporated into the EU treaties and a lengthy procedure of transition took place to bring 
Schengen into the core of EU law. One of the issues that would trouble the system was 
the status of CISA - did this agreement have a continuing legal life after the incorporation 
of 'Schengen' into EU law or had its value been exhausted? This uncertainty would give 
rise to conflict between France and Italy in 2011, which will be discussed below. That 
source of friction was resolved by the 2013 changes to the Schengen rules on intra-
Member State controls on persons, which is discussed later in this study. 
  
The close connection of intra-Member State border controls on persons and security has 
always been a major concern of the interior ministries of a number of Member States. 
The apparent loss of control over the movement of persons has often been presented as 
a source of instability for some Member States, hampering the proper operation of their 
activities to protect the state and its citizens. This has not been the position of all Member 
States by any means but it does represent a current in the Schengen debate, which must 
be acknowledged. The refugee crisis in 2015-16 and the decision of some Member States 
to reintroduce internal border controls  in response, is part of that long tale of security 
concerns about the border-control-free area. This study seeks to examine those moves 
and practices in light of the relevant legal requirements and place them in context for 
critical appreciation. 
  
Table 1: Categories of the Countries in the Schengen Area 
Schengen 
Area (26) 
EU Schengen States (22) Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden  
Non-EU Schengen states (4) Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein 
Non- 
Schengen, 
but EU (6) 
Schengen candidate countries 
(4) 
Croatia*, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus** 
Non-Schengen EU States (2) UK and Ireland 
* Croatia – is still considered as a newcomer thus not fully integrated, for example, in the SIS II system;  
**Cyprus applies Schengen aquis with the exceptions of  SIS and absence of internal border controls and visas. 
Source: Authors based on the Commissions’ official information.26  
 
                                           
26 See European Commission Website, “Schengen Area” at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm.  
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The Schengen Area is now composed of 26 EU and non-EU Schengen States, while some of 
the EU states have either opted out intentionally or are in the process of accession to the 
Schengen Area (see Table 1 above).  
The Schengen Are countries are bound by the rules of  the SBC. The former SBC was codified 
already in 2006,27 though only in March, 2016 the consolidated version appeared.28 The table 
below indicates how the numbering of the relevant articles has changed. The later in this 
study references are made to the newest version.29   
 
Table 2. Relevant Schengen Borders Code articles for re-instating internal border 
controls 
New Article 
(Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399) 
Former Article  
(Regulation 
(EC) 562/2006)  
Procedures and measures  Duration of controls  
Article 25 Article 23 General framework for the 
temporary reintroduction of 
border control at internal 
borders 
Timelines, in 
accordance with 
Articles 27, 28 or 29. 
Article 26 Article 23a Criteria for the temporary 
reintroduction of border control 
at internal borders 
N/A 
Article 27 Articles 24  Procedure for foreseeable events 
(regular procedure):  
Advance notice to other MS and EC   
Up to 30 days or "for 
the foreseeable 
duration of the serious 
threat" if longer;  
Renewable for periods 
of up to 30 days up to 
a maximum of six 
months  
Article 28 Articles 25  Cases requiring urgent action 
(emergency procedure):  
Immediate (unilateral) action 
without prior notification by the MS  
Up to 10 days;  
Renewable for periods 
of up to 20 days, up to 
a maximum of two 
months  
Article 29 Articles 26  Prolonging border control at 
internal borders (prolongation 
procedure):  
Council recommends (on the basis of 
a Commission proposal) that one or 
more MS should reintroduce 
controls.  
Up to six months, 
renewable three times 
up to a maximum of 
two years  
Source: Authors.30 
 
                                           
27 European Communities (2006), Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code of 2006), OJ L 105, p. 1–32. Brussels, 13.4.2006, 
28 European Union (2016), Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of The European Parliament and of The Council of 9 March 
2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
(codification), OJ L 77, p.1-52. Brussels, 23.3.2016. 
29 Except for the Annex 3, where the MS notifications are analysed  
30  The table is based on the SBC of 2006 (Regulation (EC) 562/2006) and SBC consolidated version of 2016 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/399. 
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2.2. The reintroduction of internal border checks 
The list of Member State notifications based on Article 25 (formerly 23) of Schengen31, up to 
2006, shows that the reintroduction of internal border controls was used among the Member 
States on various occasions, from important high-level meetings (e.g. G7, World Economic 
Forum, NATO Summit, Nobel Prize ceremonies, visits of the Pope), to celebrations of 
controversial groups (e.g. the 50th anniversary of ETA, Youth days of radical young Basques) 
to responses to terror acts (e.g. the Breivik attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011).  
The reintroduction of internal border controls due to large numbers of people in need of 
humanitarian protection arriving in the EU in 2011 and 2015 provoked starkly different 
reactions. Prior to this, there was only one instance in 2001 where migration had been linked 
with reintroducing internal border checks: i.e. when Belgium reintroduced border controls for 
two weeks due to “the risk of a sudden temporary increase in asylum seekers.”32 The two 
cases have revealed the “limits and unfinished elements of the EU’s immigration policy” and 
the need to subject EU Member States’ decisions to derogate the border control-free area to 
more EU scrutiny.33 Thus, the explanatory memorandum for the 2011 Commission Proposal 
for new common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders 
in the exceptional circumstances of September 201134 included Article 26 (former Article 
23a), which clarified the criteria for Member States reintroduction of internal border control 
in compliance with EU law.35  
2.3. The 2011 Franco-Italian affair: Was there a breach of the Schengen Borders 
Code? 
In April 2011, following the Arab Spring revolutions, in total around 50,000 North African 
refugees from Tunisia, Libya and Egypt arrived in Italy.36 On the basis of a 5 April decree, 
Italian authorities issued six-month temporary residence permits on humanitarian grounds, 
mainly to Tunisians who arrived in the period between 1 January and 5 April 2011.37 The 
Italian government later estimated that 24,85438 such permits were issued. The residence 
permits gave an automatic right to move freely in the Schengen zone, thus many Tunisians 
started to head towards France, where they had some family links or at least knew the 
language. 
France responded to the Italian act by introducing border checks on Tunisian migrants and 
blocking a train that carried hundreds of migrants at the border.39 Austria, Belgium and 
Germany expressed their concerns, but refrained from re-introducing border checks. In 
addition, the Netherlands threatened to deport all Tunisians arriving from Italy. Whereas Italy 
claimed that it was being left alone to deal with asylum-seekers,40 the main argument put 
                                           
31 The list of Member States’ notifications compiled by European Commission can be accessed here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-
control/docs/ms_notifications_-_reintroduction_of_border_control_en.pdf.  
32 Statewatch (2003), Statewatch European Monitor, Vol. 3. No.4, February 2003. 
33 S.Carrera, E.Guild, M.Merlino and J.Parkin (2011), “A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and the 
Franco-Italian Affair”, CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, April 2011, p. 3. 
34 European Commission (2011), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control 
at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, COM/2011/0560 final.  
35 In the newly codified Regulation (EU) 2016/399, Article 23a is replaced by Article 26. 
36 “Extension of humanitarian residence permits to put an end to "emergency" - problems including "disappeared" 
Tunisians and rightless refugees from Libya persist”, Statewatch.org, June, 2012. 
 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/jun/02italy-libya.htm. 
37 E. Vallet (2016), Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?, Routledge. 
38 A government estimate number of August 2011, found in “Extension of humanitarian residence permits to put an 
end to "emergency" - problems including "disappeared" Tunisians and rightless refugees from Libya persist” , 
Statewatch.org, June, 2012 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/jun/02italy-libya.htm.  
39 S.Carrera,  E.Guild, M.Merlino and J.Parkin (2011) “Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and the Franco-
Italian Affair”,  CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe,  April 2011.  
40 See V. Pop, “Italian minister questions value of EU membership”, EUobserver.com, 11 April 2011 
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by France was that not all the entry criteria for Third Country Nationals had been met, in 
particular “sufficient means of subsistence” for Tunisian migrants throughout the residence 
period, as laid down in Article 5.1 of the Schengen Borders Code. 
In its first reactions, the Commission seemed to side with the French government and to 
claim that humanitarian residence permits should not result in an automatic right to travel.41 
Afterwards it assessed the legality of the actions of both the French and Italian governments. 
The Commission came to the conclusion that both states were in compliance with the EU law 
and that only “the spirit of the Schengen rules” had been violated.42 Interviews conducted 
for the purposes of this study have confirmed that the spirit of Schengen means that 
‘everyone’, once inside the external Schengen border, including Third Country Nationals and 
regardless of their status, has the right to circulate freely within the Union without being 
checked.43  
 
Figure 5. Schengen Internal Borders: Developments April 2011 – June 2015 
 
Source: Authors.  
 
It has been argued that the Commission missed the opportunity to establish a clear 
benchmark for defining the ‘spirit’ by assessing compliance with the principles of solidarity, 
loyal cooperation and fundamental rights.44 The Italian action violated the principle of 
                                           
 (http://euobserver.com/22/32155?print=1).   
41 See European Commission Website, Midday Press Briefing of 18 April 2011,  
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/player/streaming.cfm?type=ebsvod&sid=178405.  
42 “From a formal point of view steps taken by Italian and French authorities have been in compliance with EU law. 
However, I regret that the spirit of the Schengen rules has not been fully respected.” European Commission (2011), 
“Statement by Commissioner Malmström on the compliance of Italian and French measures with the Schengen 
acquis”, MEMO/11/538, Brussels, 25.07.2011.  
43 Explanation of the meaning of the “Spirit of Schengen” given during an interview with DG HOME,  European 
Commission, 17.05.2016, Brussels.  
44 S.Carrera (2012), “An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package: Preventing abuse 
by EU member states of freedom of movement?”,  CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No.47, March 2012. 
See also Basilien-Gainche, M.L. (2011), La Remise en Cause des Accords de Schengen, CERISCOPE, 2011 
Policy Department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional Affairs 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 25 
“sincere and loyal cooperation”, as the intended public policy goal was to encourage Tunisians 
to leave the country, which is more relevant than mere ‘application of entry criteria’.45 On 
the other hand, French action was probably disproportionate, going beyond what was “strictly 
necessary”.46 In this light, the European Commission, instead of launching infringement 
procedures against both States, started deliberations regarding the strengthening of the 
Schengen governance framework, which aimed to inject “more Europe” in governing 
Schengen borders.  
2.4. The substance of the 2013 Schengen governance reform 
After the Franco-Italian affair the European Commission aimed to halt previous ‘unilateral’ 
decisions to re-instate internal borders by Member States and to insist on more Europe. The 
Commission proposal was based on the presumption that the security of external borders is 
a precondition for the freedom of circulation in the EU.47 In its communication accompanying 
the proposal to revise the SBC, the European Commission stressed the need to ensure that 
the Schengen area can cope effectively with strains which may be placed on it by weaknesses 
at its external borders or by external factors beyond its control”.48   
The Commission proposal was echoed by the call from the 23-24 June 2011 European Council 
to consider the introduction of a “mechanism […] to respond to exceptional circumstances 
putting the overall functioning of Schengen cooperation at risk” that would enable support 
to, as well as monitoring of, “a Member State facing heavy pressure at the external borders” 
and a “safeguard clause […] to allow the exceptional reintroduction of internal border controls 
in a truly critical situation where a Member State is no longer able to comply with its 
obligations under the Schengen rules”.49 The proposal provided that the suspension of free 
movement should be automatic, should the Member States at the external borders fail in 
carrying out their obligations. Already at that time, the confidential risk analyses carried out 
by Frontex and Europol framed migration and asylum as sources of insecurity.50  
By contrast, the European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2011 stressed that “the necessary 
conditions for the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls in exceptional 
circumstances are already clearly set out” in the SBC and stated that any initiative from the 
Commission would first be “aimed at defining the strict application” of existing provisions, 
without introducing “any new additional exemptions”.51 In addition, in the same resolution, 
the European Parliament argued that “the crossing of external borders by non-nationals 
should not be framed as a ‘threat’ to public policy and internal security.” 52 Thus, in the end, 
recital 26 of the SBC stated that “migration and the crossing of external borders by a large 
number of third country nationals should not, per se, be considered to be a threat to public 
policy or internal security.“ 
                                           
Frontieres website (http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/content/part2/la-remise-en-cause-desaccords-de-schengen) 
and Wastl-Walter, D., Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2014. 
45 S.Carrera, E.Guild, M.Merlino and J.Parkin (2011), “A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and the 
Franco-Italian Affair”, CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, April 2011, p. 18.  
46 Ibid., p. 19.  
47 S.Carrera (2012), „An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package: Preventing abuse 
by EU member states of freedom of movement ?”,  CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No.47, March 
2012. 
48 European Commission (2011), Schengen governance – strengthening the area without internal border control, 
COM(2011) 561 final, Brussels,16.9.2011, p. 2. 
49 European Council (2011), European Council 23/24 June 2011 – Conclusions, EUCO 23/1/11, Brussels 29.9.2011, 
p. 8. 
50 S.Carrera (2012), “An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package: Preventing abuse 
by EU member states of freedom of movement ?”, CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No.47, March 2012. 
51 European Parliament (2011) Resolution of 7 July 2011 on changes to Schengen, P7_TA(2011)0336, Strasbourg 
7.7.2011. 
52 S.Carrera (2012), “An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package: Preventing abuse 
by EU member states of freedom of movement ?”, CEPS paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No.47, March 2012. 
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2.5. ‘The Schengen Freeze’ and the European Parliament’s Role 
‘The Schengen Freeze’ controversy arose during the negotiations on the 2013 Schengen 
Governance Package and related to the role played by the European Parliament in the 
Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism. After the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009, the European Parliament acquired new powers and the role of co-legislator 
of the EU‘s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Thus, when the Schengen 
governance reform was negotiated, the European Parliament fought hard for co-legislator 
competences in the SEM mechanism.53  
After two years of negotiations regarding the Parliaments role in the SEM,54 the Danish 
Presidency of the Council decided to reclassify the legal basis of a proposal amending the 
SEM from Article 77 TFEU to Article 70 TFEU.55 Article 77 of the TFEU provides that, in the 
area of border checks, asylum and immigration (Chapter 2 of the TFEU), the “European 
Parliament shall act in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure”” as co-legislator 
with the Council. Article 70, on the other hand, provides that, for ASFJ issues, the “Council 
may, on a proposal from the Commission, adopt measures laying down the arrangements 
whereby Member States, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective and 
impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies”. Under this article the 
European Parliament and national parliaments are only “informed of the content and results 
of the evaluation“. Thus, whereas Article 77 of the TFEU sees the European Parliament as the 
co-legislator (as is the case with the SBC), Article 70 does not provide any formal role for the 
Parliament. 
 
The EP reacted in an unprecedented way, freezing relevant Justice and Home Affairs files and 
threatening to bring an action before the CJEU.56 This controversy, known as the Schengen 
Freeze, “revealed a pre-Lisbon mind-set among member states in the Council, as did the 
Council’s legislative amendments that significantly watered down the ‘Union-focused’ nature 
of the Schengen Governance Package”.57 The ‘freeze’, however, proved to be a successful 
factor in subsequent negotiations. While Article 70 of the TFEU remained the legal basis, the 
European Parliament achieved some practical co-decision powers, such as that any change 
to the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism should be subject to consultation with the EP.58 
Nevertheless, the new powers of the Parliament still remain under strain in the light of the 
latest developments in the European refugee crisis, despite the earlier Statement which 
explicitly stipulates that “any future proposal from the Commission for amending this 
evaluation system would be submitted to the consultation of the European Parliament in 
order to take into consideration its opinion, to the fullest extent possible, before the adoption 
of a final text.”59  
                                           
53 Carrera, S., Hernanz, N. and Parkin, J. (2013), “The ‘Lisbonisation’of the European Parliament: Assessing progress, 
shortcomings and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice.” CEPS Paper 
in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 58, September 2013, p. 14. 
54 European Parliament (2013) Position adopted at first reading on 12 June 2013 with a view to the adoption of 
Regulation (EU) No .../2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 
in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders in 
exceptional circumstances, P7_TC1-COD(2011)0242, Strasbourg, 12.06.2013.  
55 Council (2013), Draft consolidated compromise text - Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of 
an evaluation mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, Council Document 10273/13, Brussels, 
30.05. 2013.  
56 European Parliament (2012), “EP decides to suspend cooperation with Council on five JHA dossiers until Schengen 
question is resolved”, Press Release, 14.06.2012. 
57 Carrera, S., Hernanz, N. and Parkin, J. (2013), “The ‘Lisbonisation’of the European Parliament: Assessing progress, 
shortcomings and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice.” CEPS Paper 
in Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 58, September 2013, p. 14. 
58 See Council (2013), Draft consolidated compromise text - Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, Council Document 
10273/13, Brussels, 30.05.2013. 
59 European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (2013), Statement attached to Council Regulation (EU) No 
1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the 
Policy Department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional Affairs 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 27 
3. MAPPING CHANGES IN THE SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The main innovation in the revised Schengen Borders Code is Article 29, providing for 
the possible temporary introduction of internal borders for up for two years where 
there are ‘serious deficiencies’ at external borders.  
• Under Regulation 1053/2013, the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism 
changed from a completely intergovernmental system into one that is fully integrated 
into the Union system. It is run primarily by the Commission, with ample opportunities 
for Member States to influence the actual application of the mechanism. 
• The new evaluation system began to operate de facto only in 2015, the year of the 
peak in Syrian refugees coming to the EU from Turkey via the Greek islands in the 
Aegean. It is too early to draw definite conclusions on the working of the new system 
since this case cannot be considered typical. 
• The new Schengen evaluation mechanism is proactive, allowing for deficiencies and 
non-compliance with EU law to be detected at an earlier stage and remedied at shorter 
notice than on the basis of often very lengthy, reactive and adversarial infringement 
procedures. 
• Most documents produced in the evaluation process are classified or restricted, mostly 
on reasonable grounds. This situation, however, severely restricts the possibilities for 
serious monitoring of the working of the process by the European Parliament and by 
national parliaments. 
 
This section provides a legal analysis of the Schengen governance framework, before and 
after the 2013 regulations. Thus Section refers to the relevant CJEU case law and political 
negotiations that led to the increased role of the Commission and the EP and elaborates on 
the main innovations in the revised Schengen Borders Code (Sub-Section 3.1.) and the 
Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism (Sub-Section 3.2.). Finally, the section 
explores the new powers of the Commission, European Parliament and national parliaments 
(section 3.3.). 
3.1. Innovations in the revised the Schengen Borders Code  
The Schengen Borders Code (hereafter SBC) sets out the main rules governing a) the 
abolition of internal border controls, including the conditions and procedures for their 
reintroduction, and b) the uniform control of external borders. In September 2011, the 
European Commission proposed the first major revision to the SBC rules, particularly with 
regard to Title III on the temporary reintroduction of controls at the internal borders.60 
The revision builds on developments after the Franco-Italian crisis of 2011 (see Section 2 
above).  
Prior to the revisions adopted in October 2013, rules concerning internal border controls 
and their re-imposition were organised as follows61: 
                                           
Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing 
Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen, OJ L 295/27, 6.11.2013. 
60 European Commission (2011), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of border control 
at internal borders in exceptional circumstances, COM(2011) 560 final, Brussels, 16.9.2011. 
61 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 
105, 13.4.2006. 
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• The basic rule on the re-imposition of internal border checks appeared in Article 25(1) 
(former Article 23 (1)) SBC, stating that Member States ‘may exceptionally reintroduce’ 
border controls at their internal borders on grounds of a ‘serious threat to public policy 
or internal security’, for a period of no more than 30 days or ‘the foreseeable duration of 
the serious threat if its duration exceeds the period of 30 days’. 
• The procedure had two variants depending on whether a Member State was dealing with 
‘foreseeable events’ under Article 27 SBC (former Article 24) or ‘urgent cases’ under 
Article 28 SBC (former Article 25). For foreseeable events, a Member State had to notify 
the Commission and other Member States of its plans and provide, ‘as soon as possible’, 
information on reasons, including details of the events considered to constitute a ‘serious 
threat’, the scope, dates and duration of the controls. The Commission could issue an 
opinion (i.e. non-binding), and the procedure further involved a ‘consultation’ between 
the Member State considering the re-imposition of controls, the other Member States and 
the Commission. In cases of ‘urgent action’, the reintroduction of controls could be 
immediate, other Member States and the Commission would be informed ‘without delay’, 
and provided with reasons for the use of the urgent procedure. The Commission 
envisaged these articles as separate procedures allowing MS to respond to different 
needs.62 Thus, it is interesting to note that, in the current Schengen crisis, the majority 
of MS have switched from ‘unforeseen threat’ to ‘foreseen’ and have started to apply 
these articles in sequence, which allows them to maintain internal border controls for 8 
months in total. 
• Articles 31 and 33 (former Articles 27 and 29 respectively) covered the obligation for 
the Member State concerned to inform the European Parliament of the measures taken 
to re-impose or prolong internal border controls, and to submit a report to the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and the Council at the time of or after the lifting 
of controls. Article 32 (former Article 28) established that, in the event that internal 
border controls were re-imposed, the rules of the SBC concerning external border checks 
would apply. 
• Article 34 (former Article 30) established the obligation to inform the public about the 
re-imposition of internal border controls, unless security reasons prevented it, while 
Article 35 (former Article 31) specified that, if the concerned Member State requests it, 
the European Parliament, Commission and other Member States should keep any 
information supplied on the re-imposition of border checks confidential. 
 
In October 2010, the European Commission published a report on the application of Title III, 
as required by the former Article 38 SBC (not in the new version).63 Based on the 22 cases 
where Member States had re-imposed internal border controls since the entry into force of 
the SBC Regulation, the report found that Member States had not made use of rules on the 
prolongation of border controls beyond the initial 30-day period. The Commission’s criticism 
was mostly procedural, noting that the ‘timeframe […] for issuing its opinion for the purpose 
of formal consultation between the Member States and the Commission is too short’64 as far 
as foreseeable events (Article 27 SBC) are concerned. The information submitted was also 
deemed not substantial enough. No Member State except Finland had activated the 
confidentiality clause under Article 35 SBC (former Article 31). The Commission noted ‘that 
in general the current legal framework governing the temporary reintroduction of border 
control at internal borders is sufficient’.65 
                                           
62 Interview with Commission, DG HOME, 17.05.2016. 
63 European Commission (2010), Report on the application of Title III (Internal Borders) of Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), COM(2010) 554 final, Brussels, 13.10.2010. 
64 Ibid, p. 8 
65 Ibid, p. 10 
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The conclusions of the 2010 report suggest that subsequent controversies leading to the 
2013 revision of the SBC are first and foremost related to a shift in the political 
context, exemplified by the Franco-Italian affair in 2011. This shift enabled the 
different actors involved in the revision to push specific agendas in relation to the SBC. Any 
effort to determine whether the post-2013 SBC rules on the re-imposition of internal border 
controls constitute an innovation in this respect should take stock of the priorities placed in 
the foreground by the different actors in the legislative process. 
 
The position of the European Commission can be found in the legislative proposal of 
October 2011, the key aspects of which are the following: 
• It wanted a replacement of most of the rules found in Title III, concerning in 
particular the re-imposition of internal border controls, which would have shifted most of 
the power to decide from the Member States to the European Commission.66 
• This involved strengthening the necessity criteria for the re-imposition of internal border 
controls, by means of a new Article 26 (former Article 23a) SBC, taking into account ‘in 
particular’ (not exclusively) threats at the ‘Union or national level’, the existence and 
availability of ‘support measures’ at the national or Union level, as well as ‘the likely 
impact of such a measure’ on free movement within the Schengen area. 
• The new Articles 27 and 28 would have required that Member States make a request 
to the European Commission for the purpose of re-imposing controls, six weeks prior to 
the planned reintroduction in the case of ‘foreseeable events’ under Article 27. The 
request would have included ‘all relevant data’, echoing the findings of the 2010 
Commission report on the application of Title III SBC, and this information would also 
have been submitted to the European Parliament. In cases falling under Article 27 SBC, 
the proposed legislation provided that the decision to re-impose border controls 
would be taken by the European Commission through ‘implementing acts’ in 
combination with a new Article 38 SBC (former Article 33a). For Article 28 requests, the 
European Commission would have held sole power to decide on the prolongation of 
controls.  
• The proposal put forward a new Article 29 addressing ‘cases of persistent serious 
deficiencies’ in the way a Member State controls its segment of EU external borders or 
handled its return procedures. Where, through procedures detailed in the regulation on 
Schengen evaluation, deficiencies were detected and these deficiencies constituted ‘a 
serious threat to public policy or internal security at the Union or national level’, internal 
border controls were to be reintroduced for six months, to be extended for up to three 
further consecutive periods of six months if the Member State concerned did not take 
remedial action. The exclusive power to make decisions would rest with the European 
Commission. Interviews revealed that initially it was envisaged that Member States 
geographically located just inside the one with the ‘persistent deficiencies’ would act as a 
new ‘external border’ for the period until the deficiencies were solved. 
 
By contrast, the Council’s position67 consisted in locating most of the decision powers on 
the re-imposition of internal border controls with the Member States. Three points are 
noteworthy: 
• A new Article 21 (now Article 19a) giving the European Commission power to issue 
recommendations to a Member State if a Schengen evaluation found ‘serious difficulties 
or deficiencies’ associated with external border controls. The recommendations could be 
blocked by the Council, and their implementation would have been monitored by the 
Commission reporting to a committee of Member State officials. 
                                           
66 Peers, S. (2013) The Future of Schengen. Stockholm: SIEPS, Report No. 6, November 2013, p. 31. 
67 Presented and examined in: Peers, S. (2012), Amending the EU’s Border Code, Statewatch Analysis No 180, 
London, June 2012 (2nd version). URL: http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-180-schengen-border-code.pdf 
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• Articles 27 and 28: the Council’s version would have left the power to decide over the 
reintroduction of internal controls and their prolongation entirely in the hands of the 
Member States, thus reversing the logic of the Commission’s initial proposals. The rules 
adopted under the initial SBC for the Commission to issue an opinion would have 
remained, as they were under Article 27, and in Article 28 the general rules for 
Commission opinions and Member State consultations would have applied. 
• Article 29: the Council supported the principle of an entirely new provision in the SBC 
that would have applied ‘in cases of persistent serious difficulties or deficiencies’ in a 
Member State’s external border control or return policy.  In contrast with the European 
Commission’s initial proposal, Member States would have retained sole power for deciding 
on the reintroduction of border controls. The Council’s version of the new Article 29 SBC 
also provided that the Council itself would ‘as a last resort and as a measure to protect 
the common interests’ of the Schengen area, and if all other measures failed to have an 
effect, have the power to recommend that a Member State (or several of them) re-impose 
internal border controls. 
 
Finally, the European Parliament’s position on the revision68 largely aligned with that of 
the Council insofar as it aimed to limit the scope of the Commission’s powers to decide on or 
prolong the reintroduction of border controls.69 Nevertheless, the position of both institutions 
diverged significantly over whether the Commission or the Council should have the upper 
hand in the context of the new procedure for reintroducing internal border controls on the 
‘serious deficiencies’ ground. 
 
Given the expectations and controversies, then, to what extent is the post-2013 version of 
the SBC new or innovative? The following key changes can be flagged: 
• A new Article 21 (former Article 19a), to which the European Parliament agreed without 
amending the Council text. The article empowers the European Commission to make 
recommendations to Member States addressing serious deficiencies in carrying out 
external border controls identified in a SEM on-site mission. 
• The re-imposition of border controls has been reaffirmed as a measure of ‘last 
resort’ following amendments from the European Parliament. 
• A new ‘serious deficiencies’ ground: The key amendment here to the Council’s 
version of the legislation was the requirement for it to act on a proposal from the 
Commission when making a recommendation to Member States. The Commission can no 
longer make a decision on its own in this area, as provided for in its original proposal. 
Article 29 also provides for a procedure whereby a Member State may decide not to go 
along with the Council’s recommendation, requiring the concerned Member State to 
communicate its reasons for not doing so in writing to the European Commission, which 
is then tasked with providing an assessment report examining the decision against the 
‘common interest’ of the Schengen area. 
 
The extent to which these changes constitute an innovation, however, is unclear. As other 
analyses have noted, the procedures that Member States must follow to re-impose internal 
border controls on grounds that had already been specified in the 2006 SBC have not been 
impacted significantly, although the 2013 revision introduces ‘more detailed rules on 
                                           
68 European Parliament (2012), Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary reintroduction of 
border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances (COM(2011)0560 – C7-0248/2011 – 
2011/0242(COD)) 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Renate Weber, P7_TA(2013)0259, Brussels, 
14.06.2012. 
69 Peers (2013), The future of Schengen, op.cit., p. 41. 
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criteria and time limits’.70 Likewise, while there is the new ground of ‘serious deficiencies’ for 
re-imposing border controls, it cannot be construed as a unilateral power for Member States, 
as any reintroduction of internal border controls still requires a recommendation from the 
Council, and a proposal from the European Commission. In the meantime, the 2013 revision 
increased the accountability of the Member States ex post factum, by establishing more 
detailed criteria for their reports on the re-imposition of border controls, affirming the 
possibility of a Commission opinion on those reports and a requirement for the Commission 
to produce yearly reports on the Schengen system. In this regard, it is important to take 
stock of the changes made to the Schengen evaluation and monitoring system, which are 
detailed in the next section. 
3.2. Changes in the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism 
This sub-section provides a historical overview of developments in the Schengen Evaluation 
Mechanism from 1999 until its entry into force in 2015.  
3.2.1. Schengen evaluation 1999-2014      
Three years after the Schengen Implementing Agreement (CISA) became operational and 
controls at internal borders had to be abolished in the first seven Member States in 1995, 
the Schengen Executive Committee in 1998 adopted a Decision establishing a Standing 
Committee. The committee was composed of high-ranking officials of the Schengen States. 
They were entrusted with evaluating the implementation of the Schengen rules in the States 
where the CISA entered in force. According to that decision, the sole responsibility for 
checking the proper application of the CISA “shall continue to remain with the Schengen 
States”.71 After the integration of the Schengen acquis into Union law in 1999 this mechanism 
continued to operate for fifteen years (1999-2014). The Council took over the role of the 
Schengen Executive Committee. The Commission participated as an observer in the Council’s 
working group on Schengen evaluation and in the expert teams that made the on-site visits.72 
In the Hague Programme of 2005, the Commission was invited to present a proposal 
supplementing the existing Schengen evaluation mechanism. The long battles between the 
Commission and the Member States on the division of competences in the new evaluation 
system and, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with respect to the role of the 
Parliament, are reflected in three subsequent proposals on this issue presented by the 
Commission in 2009, 2010 and 2011 and in the final text of the Regulation.73  
3.2.2. Main elements of Regulation 1053/2013 
The Regulation codified and developed many of the elements from the previous evaluation 
system. It provides for annual (or more frequent) planning of the evaluation of the situation 
in Member States on the basis of visits by teams of representatives from the Commission 
and experts from the Member States and Frontex. Each Member State is evaluated at least 
once in five years.74 These visits are to be prepared on the basis of risk analyses by Frontex 
and of information produced by Member States in response to a standard questionnaire. The 
visits result in evaluation reports that are discussed with the Member State concerned. If 
                                           
70 Peers (2013), The future of Schengen, op. cit., p. 44. 
71 Executive Committee (2000), Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 1998 setting up a Standing 
Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen (SCH/Com-ex (98)26 def.), OJ 2000 L 239 of 
22.9.2000 p. 138-143. 
72 Council (2014), The legacy of Schengen evaluation within the Council, concluding on fifteen years since Schengen 
integration into the EU, Council document 14374/14/REV1 of 14.11.2014. 
73 See recital 11 of European Union (2013) Regulation 1053/2013. On the prolonged negotiations and their outcome 
see: S. Carrera, (2012) “An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 Schengen Governance Package,” Op.cit.; Y. 
Pascouau (2013), “The Schengen Governance Package: The subtle balance between Community method and 
intergovernmental approach,” EPC Discussion Paper of 12 December, 2013; M. Novotná (2015), “The Schengen 
Governance Package – another missed opportunity?” IES Policy Brief 2015/1, February 2015. 
74 Article 43(2) Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 2016/399). 
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deficiencies are identified during the evaluation, the report will contain draft 
recommendations for remedial action. The Council, on the basis of a proposal from the 
Commission, will adopt recommendations for remedial action to redress the weaknesses; 16 
proposals for such recommendations are mentioned in the Commission’s register of 
documents from September 2015 until mid June 2016.75 
 
The Member State has to provide (within three months) an action plan on how to remedy the 
deficiencies identitfied and report to the Commission on the implementation of the plan within 
six months. The Commission makes an assessment of the adequacy of the plan and its 
implementation. In case of serious deficiencies, the Commission may schedule 
(un)announced on-site visits to check up on the implementation of the action plan (see Figure 
6 below). 
 
Figure 6. Schengen evaluation mechanism evaluation in relation to Article 29 
 
Source:  European Commission website (2016).76  
 
It is worth noting, however, that the current scheme will be changed by incorporating the 
new EBCG vulnerability assessment (see Sub-section 5.2.2.). The evaluation mechanism 
covers all areas of the Schengen acquis, such as borders, visa policy, the Schengen 
Information System (SIS II), data protection, police cooperation, judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and drugs policies. It covers both the efficiency of controls at external 
borders and the absence of controls at internal borders.77  The repeated references in the 
Schengen Border Code to Regulation 1053/2013 illustrate the close link between the two 
instruments.78 
                                           
75 None of these proposals was accessible to the public: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&n=10&adv=0&coteId=&year=&number=&version=F&
dateFrom=&dateTo=&serviceId=&documentType=&title=1053%2F2013&titleLanguage=&titleSearch=EXACT&sort
By=NUMBER&sortOrder=DESC, accessed on 13 June 2016. Only the proposal on the consequences of the serious 
deficiencies at the external borders of Greece was published - see European Commission (2016), Proposal for a 
Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional 
circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, COM(2016) 275 final, Brussels, 4.5.2016. 
76 European Commission Website (2016), “The Schengen Rules Explained”, URL:http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/docs/the_schengen_rules_explained_20160210_en.pdf 
77 Recitals 1 and 13 of the SEM Regulation. 
78 In Recitals 29, 30 and 33 of Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and in Articles 21(3), 39(1)(b),43(2),(3) and (5) of 
the SBC. 
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3.2.3. Main differences between Regulation 1053/2013 and the 1998 Decision 
The seven main differences between the old and the new evaluation mechanism are: 
 
• The new mechanism is more clearly structured, including a serious follow-up mechanism 
for monitoring the implementation of recommendations by Member States. They need to 
draft ex post reports - the lack of systematic follow-up was a weak point in the old system; 
• The Commission’s role has changed from observer to overall organiser and coordinator 
of the evaluations; 
• Expertise of other EU institutions and bodies, such Frontex, Europol, Eurojust, EASO and 
EDPS may be used. They can participate as observers in the on-site missions; 
• The Commission is now entitled to schedule unannounced on-site visits in Member States; 
• The evaluation and on-site-visits may also cover the absence of border control at internal 
borders; 
• The European Parliament is now entitled to receive the relevant information (draft and 
final evaluation reports, recommendations that are classified as “EU restricted”) and may 
influence the practice of the evaluation system; 
• More information on the application of the Schengen evaluation is in the public domain.79 
 
The main achievement is that the new Regulation replaced a fully intergovernmental 
evaluation system with a system that clearly functions within the EU, supplementing existing 
mechanisms for detecting non-compliance with Union law and providing for action to ensure 
compliance by Member States. The earlier “inter pares” system lacked “teeth” as Member 
States were reluctant to openly criticise each other.80 The current system has been criticised, 
mainly, by Member States, stating that the Commission is taking too much of a “top-down” 
approach.81  
3.2.4. Regulation’s entry into force in 2015 
The Regulation was adopted in October 2013. It provided for the first annual and multi-
annual evaluation programme to be established by the Commission in May 2014 and for the 
first annual plan to cover the last five weeks of 2014 only.82 During 2014 the evaluations 
were still conducted on the basis of the 1998 Decision.83 The focus was on preparation of the 
evaluation cycle and developing training for the evaluation experts.84 The annual evaluation 
programme for 2015 was established by the Commission in November 2014, which included 
both announced and unannounced (in the unpublished part of the programme) on-site 
visits.85 The first evaluations under the Regulation (in Austria, Belgium and Sweden) were 
                                           
79 E.g. European Commission (2015) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Seventh bi-annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 November 2014 - 30 April 2015, COM(2015)236, 
Brussels, 29.5.2015; European Commission (2016), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda 
on Migration,  COM(2016) 85 final, Brussels, 10.2.2016; European Commission (2016), Back to Schengen - A 
roadmap, COM(2016)120, Op.cit.; European Commission (2016), Assessment of Greece's Action Plan to remedy the 
serious deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation on the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of 
management of the external border, COM(2016) 220 final, Strasbourg, 12.4.2016; European Commission (2016), 
Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for temporary internal border control 
in exceptional circumstances, COM(2016) 275 final, Op.cit. 
80 Interview with MEP, 01.06.2016 and interview with the EP LIBE Secretariat,03.06.2016.   
81 Interviews with Permanent Representations of Greece, Germany and Slovenia, on 13.05.2016, 27.05.2016 and 
31.05.2016 respectively; also interview with the Council secretariat, 19.05.2016. 
82 Articles 5(5) and 6(5) of the SEM (Regulation 1053/2013); all further references in this section are to this 
Regulation, unless otherwise specified. 
83 The last sentence of Article 23 of the SEM. 
84 European Commission (2015) Seventh bi-annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 November 
2014 - 30 April 2015, COM(2015)236, Op. cit. p. 9/10. 
85 The unpublished Commission Implementing Decision C(2014)8377 of 14 November 2014, mentioned in European 
Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for temporary 
internal border control in exceptional circumstances COM(2016)275; The annual evaluation programme for 2016 
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performed in the first months of 2015 (see Sub-Section 5.1.1.). A few months later, 
unprecedented numbers of refugees, fleeing the war situation in the Middle East, crossed the 
external borders of the Schengen area. The refugee crisis gave rise to a prolonged and 
intensive evaluation and monitoring of controls following the findings of unannounced on-site 
visit at the external borders of Greece in November 2015. 
 
3.3. Role of the Commission, the Parliament and national parliaments  
3.3.1. Role of the European Commission 
The Regulation provides that the Member States and the Commission are jointly responsible 
for the implementation of the SEM. But the Commission is also entrusted with an overall 
coordination role in relation to establishing annual and multi-annual evaluation programmes, 
drafting questionnaires and setting schedules of visits, conducting announced and 
unannounced visits and drafting, together with the team of experts performing the visit, the 
evaluation reports and draft recommendations. The Commission also ensures the follow-up 
and monitoring of the evaluation reports and the Council’s recommendations.86  
 
The power to adopt recommendations remained with the Council. The Regulation’s preamble 
gives four reasons: 1. To strengthen mutual trust between Member States, 2. To reinforce 
peer pressure amongst them, e.g. through political discussions at ministerial level, 3. To 
reflect that the evaluation system fulfils a complementary function in parallel to the normal 
control procedure, such as the infringement procedure and 4. To take into account “the 
potential politically-sensitive nature of recommendations, often touching on national 
executive and enforcement powers”.87 If the evaluation team during a visit identifies serious 
deficiencies in the management of external borders, the Commission, on the basis of the 
SBC, may in addition recommend that the Member State evaluated take certain specific 
measures with a view to ensuring compliance with the Recommendation adopted under 
Article 15 of the Regulation.88 The proactive evaluation and monitoring mechanism of the 
Regulation creates the possibility that deficiencies and non-compliance with EU law are 
detected at an earlier stage and can be remedied at shorter notice than the often very lengthy 
and adversarial infringement procedures. 
 
In order to allow Member States to be informed at an early stage about the Commission’s 
activities, to influence and potentially block measures considered undesirable, certain 
activities first have to be discussed in a committee of Member States’ representatives that 
“assists” the Commission. This form of preventive control applies with respect to the drafts 
of the annual and multi-annual programmes, of the standard questionnaire, and of the draft 
evaluation reports after a visit to a Member State.89 The Member State concerned has 
opportunity to challenge or explain the findings during the ‘drafting meeting’. This report is 
transferred to other MS for consideration. In addition, the Commission is acting collegially, 
meaning that, while the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) is in 
the driving seat, other Commissioners and also the President of the Commission can influence 
the final result. 
                                           
was established in European Commission (2015) Commission Implementing Decision of 9.12.2015 establishing the 
first section of the annual evaluation programme for 2016 in accordance with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU) 
No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of 
the Schengen acquis,  C(2015) 8537 final, Brussels, 9.12.2015. 
86 Article 3 of the SEM.    
87 Recital 11 of the SEM.   
88 Article 21 of the SBC. 
89 Article 5(2), Article 6(9), Article 9(1), Article 14(5) and Article 21 of the SEM. 
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3.3.2. Role of the European Parliament 
According to Article 70 TFEU, the European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be 
informed of the content and results of the evaluations of the implementation of EU policies 
in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Accordingly, the Regulation stipulates that most 
of the key documents produced during the evaluation mechanism be transmitted by the 
Commission to the Parliament under the confidentiality rules.90 This applies to the multi-
annual evaluation programme, the annual evaluation programme, the Frontex risk analyses, 
the evaluation reports on each Member State, the recommendations to Member States, the 
action plans and their implementation, the annual reports on the evaluations carried out and 
the review report.91  
 
The content of Member States’ replies to the standard questionnaire is only available to 
Parliament upon request in “serious matters”, on a case-by-case basis. But the Commission 
has to inform the Parliament of the replies.92 If an on-site visit reveals a serious deficiency 
deemed to constitute a serious threat to public policy or internal security, the Parliament may 
ask the Commission for more information.93 It is unclear how the Parliament would be aware, 
unless it first has received the draft report from the Commission, about such serious 
deficiencies in a Member State.  
 
Most documents transmitted by the Commission under the Regulation are classified as ‘EU 
RESTRICTED’94, meaning that disclosure of this information “could be disadvantageous to the 
interests of the Union or of one or more of the Member States.“95 
 
According to the SBC, the Commission has to inform the Parliament of notifications by 
Member States of their plans to temporarily reintroduce controls at their internal Schengen 
borders, of the actual reintroduction and the Member States’ reports on those reintroductions 
and of the reasons which might trigger the application of Article 21 and Articles 25 to 30 
SBC.96 If the Member State decides to classify part of the information, this does not preclude 
the Commission from making the information available to the Parliament. The transmission 
and handling of information and documents transmitted to the Parliament must comply with 
the rules concerning the forwarding and handling of classified information between the 
European Parliament and the Commission.97 The same applies to classified SEM documents. 
 
The rules on transmission and handling of classified documents are to be found in the inter-
institutional agreement and in the Parliament’s rules of procedure on handling of classified 
information apply.98 In practice, very few MEPs actually have access to these documents. 
While MEPs and Political Group Advisors have access, MEPs’ assistants are not able to read 
the “EU RESTRICTED” documents in the Secret Room of the European Parliament.99 MEPs 
are not allowed to take any notes. In addition, the blanket nature of making whole documents 
confidential, not only its sensitive parts, discourages MEPs, as it takes time to find the key 
                                           
90 European Parliament and Council (2014), Interinstitutional agreement of 12 March 2014, OJ C 95, Op. cit. 
91 Article 5(1), Article 6(2), Article 7(1), Article 14(5), Article 15(3), Article 16(1) and (6), Article 20 and Article 22 
of the SEM. 
92 Article 9(2) of the SEM 
93 Article 16(7) of the SEM. 
94 Interview with LIBE Secretariat, 03.06.2016.  
95 Article 2(d) of the European Parliament (2015), Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 8th parliamentary 
term - September 2015,  ANNEX VII : Confidential and sensitive documents and information. 
96 Articles 27 to 29 and Article 31 of the SBC. 
97 Article 27(3) of the SBC. 
98 Article 17 of the SEM and European Parliament and European Commission (2010), ANNEX II, Framework 
Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ L 304/47, Brussels, 
20.11.2010 and European Parliament (2015), Annex VII of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. 
99 Interview with LIBE Secretariat, 03.06.2016. 
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information.100 And finally, whereas the final documents are transmitted by General 
Secretariat of the Commission to the Secret Room of the European Parliament, the drafts are 
transmitted by DG HOME to the LIBE Secretariat.101 There is anecdotal evidence that MEPs 
are running between both places in order to get the full overview from draft and final 
documents.102  
 
On the Parliament’s website, before February 2016 and the debate on the evaluation of the 
controls at the external borders of Greece in Strasbourg,103 no trace of a motion, a 
parliamentary question, a written declaration or a debate on the new Schengen evaluation 
mechanism or on any of the documents transmitted to the Parliament on the basis of the 
new Regulation could be found. 
 
According to recital 14, during the evaluation and monitoring, special attention should be 
paid to respect for fundamental rights. According to Article 12 the training of the evaluation 
team experts should cover respect for fundamental rights. These provisions were inserted 
under pressure from the Parliament and increased the role of the EU Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA). If the Commission or Member States violated these or other provisions in the 
Regulation, the Parliament could start an action before the Court of Justice, e.g. for 
annulment of an implementing act establishing a questionnaire or evaluation report failing to 
properly address fundamental rights. At the moment, however, FRA experts are invited as 
observers in on-site evaluation missions related to returns and SIS II, but not on borders 
issues.104 
 
Finally, according to recital 20, the Parliament has to be consulted in advance if the 
Commission is considering submitting a proposal to amend the Regulation. The SBC goes 
less far, demanding only, in Article 43(5) (former Article 37a), that the Parliament is 
“immediately and fully informed of any proposal to amend” the Regulation. 
3.3.3. Role of national parliaments 
Both the TFEU and the Regulation provide for the transmission of information to national 
parliaments and, hence, give them a potential role. The Commission has to inform the 
parliaments of the content and results of the evaluations and transmit the annual reports and 
the Council should transmit its recommendation to the national parliaments.105 This 
information should allow those parliaments to supplement the check provided by the 
European Parliament. Whether national parliaments have indeed received the relevant 
information could not be established. For example, interviewees in the Permanent 
Representations could not recall any involvement of the National Parliaments. In addition, in 
the Dutch and German parliamentary document registers from 2015, there is no trace of 
these documents. The (unpublished) proposal adopted by the Commission in late 2015 for a 
Council recommendation on the management of the external border by Sweden, apparently, 
was transmitted to the German Bundestag in January 2016.106  
 
                                           
100 Interview with MEP, 01.06.2016.  
101 Interview with LIBE Secretariat, 03.06.2016. 
102 Interview with MEP, 01.06.2016.  
103 European Parliament Newsletter on “1-4 February 2016 - Strasbourg plenary session”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/plenary/2016-02-01/1.  
104 Interview with FRA, 04.05.2016. 
105 Articles 15(3), 19 and 20 of the SEM. 
106 See Bundestag Dru cksache 18/7612, listing under point A.5: European Commission (2015), Proposal for a 
Council Recommendation in accordance with Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013, 
COM(2015)672, Brussels, 11.12.2015; Council (2016), Proposal for a Council recommendation addressing the 
deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation of Sweden's application of the Schengen acquis in the field of 
management of the external border (Arlanda Airport), Council document 5240/16, Brussels, 02.02.2016. 
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In discussions with offcials of both Chambers of the Dutch Parliament for the purposes of the 
study, it emerged that they did spot unpublished Commission action plans and proposals for 
recommendations and action plans on the basis of Article 15 in ‘Extranet’, a database from 
the Council including classified or other non-published EU documents accessible to Member 
States’ governments. They were not, however, aware that the Commission had transmitted 
the non-public documents to the Dutch Parliament. The latter was not notified that 
Commission had produced new documents under the Regulation and that those documents, 
which the Commission is obliged to transmit to the national parliaments, are available via 
Extranet. 
 
This appears to be a rather minimalistic interpretation of the Commission’s obligation to 
transmit these documents to the national parliaments. According to these officials, only 
publicly available Commission documents are sent directly to national parliaments. Most 
Schengen evaluation documents on the basis of the Regulation are confidential and not 
available to the public. This may explain why these documents are not mentioned in national 
parliamentary documents and why there has been no recorded parliamentary discussion on 
such documents in these two Member States. The confidential nature of the documents 
severely restricts the possibilities for MPs to consult experts other than government officials 
on the meaning of these documents or to have a public discussion on these documents.107  
 
  
                                           
107 For example, Maurer A. (2015), Comparative study on access to documents (and confidentiality rules) in the 
international trade negotiations, European Parliament Policy Department, Directorate General for External Policies, 
Brussels, April, 2015. 
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4. STATE OF PLAY: WHAT DOES THE SCHENGEN BORDERS 
CODE MEAN IN PRACTICE? 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The Member States’ justifications for the reintroduction of intra-Schengen state 
borders controls under Articles 25 – 26 SBC, in particular on and after 13 September 
2015 are inadequate.  
• The proportionality assessment for the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border 
controls needs to be thorough and complete given the fundamental nature of the right 
to intra-Schengen free movement of persons. 
• Member States should provide serious and compelling reasons, with supporting 
documentation regarding the genuine existence of a threat, if seeking to curtail the 
free movement of persons across the area since the border-cotrol-free free movement 
of persons is one of the main objectives of the internal market and a core benefit of 
it. 
• Where Member States invoke the threat of terrorism as a reason for the reintroduction 
of intra-Schengen border controls, sufficient detail as to the nature of the threat must 
be provided to the EU institutions so that they can ensure that the proportionality 
assessment is correctly carried out.  
• The EU institutions and the Member States must respect their duty under the Refugee 
Convention (Article 31) and so may not initiate criminal prosecutions or apply any 
other penalties to refugees for their irregular entry onto their territory (including that 
which results from intra-Schengen movement). 
• Whereas Article 23(a) of the SBC stipulates that the exercise of police powers on 
internal borders may not have the objective of border controls and must be based on 
general police information and experience ‘regarding possible threats to public 
security and aim, in particular, to combat cross-border crime’, several Member States 
use police checks in border areas for immigration control purposes, making a direct 
connection between irregular immigration and possible threats to public security. This 
practice is contrary to the purpose of Article 23(a) and recital 26 of the SBC. 
• National practices of mobile police checks at the internal borders illustrate that the 
line between border controls and border checks, prohibited in Article 22 of the SBC 
on the one hand, and police checks allowed in Article 23 SBC, on the other, is unclear. 
• The classification of ‘asylum seekers’ as ‘illegal immigrants’ to justify border controls 
or police checks in border areas runs counter to the SBC and CEAS. It allows the 
extended use of internal border checks, contrary to the purposes of the SBC and 
means that asylum seekers crossing internal borders can be detained on the basis of 
regular migration rules, disregarding applicable EU laws on the reception of asylum 
seekers. 
This section identifies challenges in relation to the rule of law standards in the 2013 Schengen 
governance reform package as mapped out in Section 3. The question that arises in light of 
the refugee and security crises of 2015-2016 is whether the new framework is sufficiently 
robust for the successful operation of the Schengen border-control-free area.  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a majority of people arriving in the EU in 2015/16 seeking 
asylum were from countries torn apart by recent or ongoing conflicts and wars, such as Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq – countries with high refugee recognition rates. Thus, the intersection 
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of the arrival of refugees in larger numbers than anticipated and the perception of 
unreasonable pressure on the intra-Schengen borders is evident. Some of the Member States 
claimed they asked the Commission how to properly apply the CEAS and SBC in this case, 
and subsequently, where to register people coming – in EURODAC or SIS II. 
 
The most substantial issue that concentrated the minds of officials in Ministries of Interior 
(MoI) over this period was finding reception facilities for the arrivals.108 Member States 
tended not to keep significant reception facilities available for asylum seekers, but rather to 
try to expand and contract these facilities depending on the ebbs and flows of arrivals. This 
has many unfortunate consequences, not least endless investment in recruitment and 
training. Well-trained and experienced officers are let go because of a drop in numbers one 
year, only to be replaced a year or two later with new inexperienced officers when the 
numbers go up again. 
  
Similarly, Member States do not keep substantial housing stock available in case of an 
increase in asylum arrivals. But when people do arrive, they need to find housing rapidly. 
The impact of successful efforts to maximise flexibility in asylum reception systems was 
revealed when the numbers of people using the system increased substantially and Member 
States were left scrambling to catch up with reception needs. The temptation to make this 
reception need a problem for the neighbouring Member States must have been substantial. 
In addition, some MS on the ‘Balkan route’ have requested and received emergency funding 
to deal with the issues. However, there were also expectations among Member States 
affected that the EU agencies and/or other MS would extend their hand to provide substantial 
help in terms of human resources for border guards or police functions, though not that much 
in terms of asylum support services and caseworkers. This led to creative solutions; the 
Slovenian authorities, for example, established common police patrols under the Prüm 
decision.109  
 
The actual responses to the refugee and security crises varied from reintroducing intra-
Schengen border controls under the SBC to informal responses such as using police checks 
at internal borders and even setting up fences. This placed renewed strain on the new 
governance system put in place in the aftermath of the Franco-Italian affair (See Section 2). 
This section further sets out the legal and practical issues, which arose when implementing 
the Schengen Borders Code in the light of the refugee crisis. 
4.1. A legal assessment of the justifications provided by Member States on the 
reintroduction of intra Schengen border controls 2015-16  
The criteria against which any justification by a Schengen state to reintroduce border controls 
with another Schengen state must be assessed are now set out in Regulation 2016/399. The 
Regulation, in Articles 21 and 25–30, sets out the conditions under which the reintroduction 
of intra-Schengen state border controls can (lawfully) be applied.  
The first requirement of Article 25, setting the general framework, is that there must be a 
“serious threat to public policy or internal security” in a Member State. There is no definition 
of ‘public policy’ in the Regulation. There may be a presumption that the meaning is 
consistent with the use of the same words in other EU instruments (including the Treaties, 
which use the same words).  
In 2011 the European Parliament published a detailed study on the meaning of public policy 
                                           
108 Interview with German Permanent Representation, 27.05.2016; Slovenian Permanent Representation, 
 30.05.2016. 
109 Interview with Slovenian Permanent Representation, 30.05.2016. 
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in the context of EU instruments of private international and procedural law.110 The public 
policy exception is consistently narrowly interpreted by the CJEU as a restriction on a right. 
This is likely to be the case here as well, as the subject matter is a core principle of the 
internal market, i.e. the free movement of persons.111 This principle is set out in recital 27 
of the SBC (emphasis added): 
“In accordance with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, a derogation 
from the fundamental principle of free movement of persons must be interpreted strictly 
and the concept of public policy presupposes the existence of a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.” 
 
As the legal base of the SBC is Article 77(2)(b) of the TFEU, which sets out the procedure to 
ensure the absence of controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal 
borders, a narrow meaning of the exception on the grounds of public policy consistent with 
the meaning of the term as used elsewhere in the free movement of persons context is 
justified. The CJEU considered the compatibility of public policy with police checks inside the 
border in its Adil ruling112. The court found that police controls inside the border area which 
are selective and do not resemble border controls but are police measures aimed at 
combating illegal residence, whether they fall under the concept of public order or public 
security, are compatible with the Regulation. But it did not clarify the scope of the test of the 
use on the grounds of public policy (see the Case Summary in Annex 1). 
 
Internal security is similarly not defined in the Regulation. The term is less frequently used 
in EU law, though it exists in the TFEU, notably in Article 72.113 The EU has an internal security 
strategy that includes tackling serious and organised crime, terrorism and radicalisation, 
cybercrime, threats from new technologies, new and emerging threats and crises, natural 
and man-made disasters.114 A link could be inferred regarding the meaning of internal 
security from the choice of subjects included in the strategy of that name. In any event, 
when a Schengen state seeks to use the internal security ground for the reintroduction of 
intra-Schengen border controls, reasons and justifications must be provided and explained. 
Whether the threat is one of organised crime or radicalisation, definitions, the nature and 
extent of the threat, the weight of the evidence of the threat and any relevant statistics would 
need to be provided.  
 
The reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls must be exceptional and introduced as 
a last resort (Article 25(1) and (2)). Recital 23 of the SBC Preamble provides more clarity, 
stating (emphasis added): 
“As free movement of persons is affected by the temporary reintroduction of 
internal border control, any decision to reintroduce such control should be taken in 
accordance with commonly agreed criteria and should be duly notified to the 
                                           
110 Hess, B., and Pfeiffer, T. (2011), Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception as referred to in EU Instruments of 
Private International and Procedural Law, European Parliament, Brussels. 
111 For instance: Article 27 of European Community (2004), Directive 2004/38 on the right to move and reside of 
citizens of the Union states that “Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall comply with the 
principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned. 
Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for taking such measures” and that “the 
personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case 
or that rely on considerations of general prevention shall not be accepted.”  
112 CJEU (2012), Atiqullah Adil v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, C-278/12 PPU (Adil case), Judgment 
of the Court (Second Chamber) of 19 July 2012. 
113 Peers, S., (2013) “The extent of national competence as regards internal security,” Submission to the EP inquiry 
into mass surveillance, Brussels, 18.11.2013; Peers, S. (2011), EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd edition, Oxford 
EU Law Library, Oxford.  
114 Council (2014) Council Conclusions of 4.12.2014 on the development of a renewed EU Internal Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 4 December 2014.  
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Commission or be recommended by a Union institution. In any case, the 
reintroduction of internal border control should remain an exception and should only 
be effected as a measure of last resort, for a strictly limited scope and period of 
time, based on specific objective criteria and on an assessment of its necessity 
which should be monitored at Union level.” 
 
This confirms the status of intra-Schengen border controls as an exception to a fundamental 
right – the free movement of persons. It further indicates that the interpretation of any 
exception should be narrow and that the monitoring of the use of the exception must not rest 
with the Member State that is applying it, but with the Union.  
 
It is worth noting that, according to recital 26 of the SBC (emphasis added): 
“Migration and the crossing of external borders by a large number of third-country 
nationals should not, per se, be considered to be a threat to public policy or 
internal security.”  
 
Thus, where a Schengen state seeks to rely on the movement of persons across a Schengen 
border as a ground for reintroduction of controls, a justification well beyond the mere 
movement of persons must be involved. As Frontex reports in its 2016 Risk Analysis, at least 
222,931,394 people entered the EU in 2015.115 These almost 223 million persons will have 
the possibility of crossing Schengen internal borders once inside the EU. Thus the movement 
of persons as a ground for the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls clearly must 
have a much more substantial content than numbers. Numbers over time and the purpose 
for which people come to the EU can have a differential impact on some Member States, in 
comparison with others, of course. People in need of international protection may need more 
assistance at the beginning of their stay if they have not been able to arrive with their goods 
and belongings like tourists. Yet, the scale of the numbers of persons in need of protection 
is dwarfed by those of travellers in general. There is a difference between the justifications 
offered by Sweden, which hosts quite a lot of beneficiaries of international protection, and 
Denmark and Norway, who host far fewer. But the argument that border controls are an 
appropriate way to engage with the different destinations of refugees is suspect. On the 
contrary, some of the proponents arguing for maintaining open borders are doing it not out 
of solidarity, but in the hope that they are just transit countries for asylum seekers (See Sub-
section 4.5 on Visegrad states). This reveals the tensions between the fairly well-functioning 
SBC and Dublin III, which has never functioned properly. 
 
The criteria for the temporary reintroduction of border controls (and their prolongation) are 
set out in Article 26. The main question that the Member State must assess is the extent to 
which the measure is likely to adequately remedy the threat to public policy or internal 
security and the proportionality of the measure in relation to the threat. Criteria that must 
be taken into account are: 
(a) The likely impact of any threats to public policy or internal security including following 
terrorist incidents or threats and including those posed by organised crime; 
(b) The likely impact of such a measure on the free movement of persons within the 
area without internal border controls. 
 
This means that Schengen states must provide exact details of the nature of the threat and 
its impact, which must be so substantial and immediate that it justifies the use of exceptional 
border control measures. Furthermore, the consequences of blocking EU citizens and their 
                                           
115 Frontex (2016), Risk analysis for 2016. URL: 
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right to free movement must be taken into account in order to assess the proportionality of 
the measure, as against the primary right of EU citizens to move freely within the area.  
 
The procedure is set out in Article 27, which requires the Member State to notify the other 
Member States and the Commission, within the time limit, supplying the following 
information: 
(a) The reason for the proposed introduction including all relevant data detailing the 
events that constitute a serious threat to public policy or internal security; 
(b) The scope of the proposed reintroduction specifying for which parts of the internal 
borders controls will be introduced; 
(c) The names of the affected crossing points; 
(d) The date and duration of the planned reintroduction. 
The information must be provided to Member States, first and foremost, as they are the most 
immediately affected by any reintroduction of controls. The Commission is charged with 
ensuring that the justifications pass the proportionality test and fulfil the heavy evidential 
requirements of the Regulation and that Member States do not take these measures, which 
are profoundly negative in respect of the fundamental rights of the Treaties, lightly or on the 
basis of inadequate information.  
The procedural requirements also include substantive elements that must be satisfied by any 
Member State seeking to reintroduce such border controls. The Regulation requires evidence 
of the threat, including data, to be submitted to the Member States and the Commission. The 
Member States are obliged to provide very specific data as to the time and place so that the 
other Member States and the Commission can fully assess the proportionality of the measure 
against the threat that the Member State has specified and justified under Article 26. 
4.2. Third country national movements or refugee movements? 
On an examination of the notifications made by the Member States which have reintroduced 
intra-Schengen border controls on the basis of the movement of third country nationals since 
13 September 2015, there seems to be a noticeable shortage of detail on the reasons for the 
reintroduction of border controls.  
 
The German notifications116 seem to be motivated by exasperation with the Italian and Greek 
authorities’ management of their external borders. The references, necessary according to 
the Regulation, to public order and internal security are without any specific detail.  
 
The same is true for the Austrian notifications117, which seem to have been based on the 
German ones. The Austrian authorities sought to bolster their public security argument in 
their 18 November 2015 notification118 by mentioning security deficits, but again there is no 
detail. However, the burden on the police is put forward as a reason in the 15 October 
notification.119 This is an interesting ground as it suggests that the public security threat is 
due to the shortage of Austrian law and order personnel available for deployment. In the 
notification of 14 March 2016120 the Austrian authorities continued their attack on Greek 
border controls: “Austria, due to ascertained and still prevailing serious flaws in external 
border controls in Greece, will continue to conduct internal border controls for a further two 
months […] This is the only way within the scope of legal and actual opportunities to avoid 
                                           
116 German delegation (2015), Council Document, 11986/15. 
117 Austrian delegation (2015), Council Document 12110/15. 
118 Austrian delegation (2015),Council Document 14211/15.  
119 Austrian delegation (2015), Council Document 13127/15. 
120 Austrian delegation (2016), Council Document 7136/16. 
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security deficits in the future for the benefit of all citizens within the Schengen area” (see 
Annex 3 for more analysis). 
 
The claim that border controls within the Schengen area are of benefit for EU citizens is a 
rather hollow inversion of the obligation in Article 26 SBC to assess the impact of the controls 
on the free movement of persons. Instead of providing details of the obstacles that the border 
controls may constitute for EU citizens, the Austrian authorities seek to justify the controls 
(without any further data or arguments) on the basis of securing those citizens (see Annex 
3 for more analysis). 
 
Slovenia was in and out very quickly, though it is clear that their authorities did not examine 
too carefully the requirements as regards the grounds for a reintroduction of border 
controls121 (see Annex 3 for more analysis). 
 
Hungary allegedly took some internal border measures from 17 to 26 October 2015, though 
no notifications are available in the Council Registry. The Hungarian authorities started 
building a fence along the internal border with Slovenia, though the measures were 
abandoned and it was then claimed that roadworks had been going on.122  
 
The Nordic Union countries appear to have their own specificities regarding the public 
security threat. The Swedish notifications provide a very interesting argument regarding the 
‘functioning of Swedish society’ as one of three goals of Swedish security.123 This probably 
makes sense in a Swedish context but it is difficult to unpick from a distance. Norway is 
concerned about the unpredictability of arrivals as a security threat. In its notification of 14 
April 2016,124 the Norwegian authorities stated that “the number of asylum seekers arriving 
in Norway continues to be low. However, we still fear that this might change if the controls 
are lifted as the migratory pressure at the external border continues to be significant.” On 
this basis there will never be a time when the controls should be lifted as their presence is 
based on nebulous fears. Denmark’s public security threat appears to be that people might 
not move on as quickly as the Danish authorities would like because  its neighbours have 
imposed carrier sanctions requiring travel companies to check ID documents (for more 
analysis, see Annex 3). 
 
None of these notifications fulfils the simple criterion in Article 26, i.e. the 
requirement to make a reasonable claim regarding the likely impacts of any threats to public 
policy or internal security, including following terrorist incidents or threats and including those 
posed by organised crime. The justifications amount to no more than bare assertions without 
any evidence, explanation or other material that might substantiate the claim. 
 
The objective of Article 26 is to require Schengen states to provide real information and 
credible claims on threats to public policy or internal security. Not one of the states has done 
this in any credible manner. The mere repetition of the words “public policy” and “internal 
security” is not the equivalent of real grounds for the reintroduction of border controls as 
required by Article 26. Vague references to worries about over-burdened police, with no 
indication as to why the authorities are unable to transfer police from other regions to assist 
or to engage temporary officers to fill the gaps, are inadequate. Claims that other Member 
States (Greece and Italy) are not doing their job on border controls will be addressed further 
below in the context of the right to seek asylum under the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
                                           
121 Slovenian delegation (2015), Council Document 12111/15. 
122 Interview with Slovenian Permanent Representation, 30.05.2016. 
123 Swedish delegation (2015), Council Document 14047/15. 
124 Norwegian delegation (2016), Council Document 7948/16. 
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(EUCFR). The threat to the functioning of Swedish society caused by the arrival of refugees 
would need much more explanation and development to satisfy the requirements of Article 
26. The claim that the functioning of Swedish society is under stress is not substantiated by 
any statistics or data on the actual situation on the ground. 
 
The Belgian authorities reintroduced border controls with France on 24 February 2016 in the 
Province of West-Flanders. According to the notification125, the reason was the serious impact 
on public policy and internal security because of the situation in the North of France and the 
fact that the Port of Zeebrugge “creates a major pull effect to migrants trying to reach the 
UK”. 
 
According to the notification, the Belgian police are faced with criminal organisations involved 
in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings, the visual presence of significantly 
increased numbers of irregular and homeless migrants has a negative effect on public 
security, and illegal intrusions into the port of Zeebrugge create unacceptable safety and 
security risks. Finally, the notification states that “the expected and announced closures of 
illegal settlements of migrants around the main port areas of Calais and Dunkirk…will most 
likely generate a further significant growth of the number of irregular migrants towards West-
Flanders.” In the second notification, the Belgian authorities126 accepted that “transmigrant” 
numbers had dropped significantly but claimed that the security impact remained high. In 
particular the Belgian authorities sought to prevent the emergence of tent camps and noted 
the material damage, which “has an impact on the general feeling of insecurity of the 
inhabitants of the region.” The authorities stress the success of the measure to achieve a 
better level of security. In the next notification of 29 March127, 2016 the Belgian authorities 
noted that “with improved weather conditions ahead, the chances are that more people will 
want to attempt to cross over to the UK” as a reason for the continuation of the border control 
with France. This weather argument was repeated in the notification of 13 April128 2016 “the 
risk is real that this rise [in numbers of migrants] will continue because of the start of the 
summer season and the better weather conditions.” (See Annex 3 for more analysis). 
 
Noticeable in this Belgian series of notifications is the argument that border controls with 
France are necessary to prevent migrants from getting to the UK. The centrality of weather 
conditions is also interesting.  
 
In any event, nowhere are the requirements of Article 26 met. The likely impacts are not 
supported by any data other than the numbers of people seeking asylum in West Flanders, 
which rose from 133 in January 2015 to 783 in December 2015 but with no indication of 
where they came from. The assumption that these are arrivals from France is nowhere even 
mentioned in the notification. How border controls impact on port safety is a matter of some 
debate and the argument that the local inhabitants do not like to see homeless people on the 
streets should galvanise the authorities to provide shelter, as they are required to under the 
European Social Charter.129 The suggestion that predictions about the weather determine the 
movement of people is particularly surprising. While it is certainly the case that those best 
                                           
125 Belgian delegation (2016), Council Document 6490/1/16. 
126 Belgian delegation (2016), Council Document 7351/16. 
127 Belgian delegation (2016), Council Document 7351/1/16. 
128 Belgian delegation (2016), Council Document 7873/16. 
129 European Committee of Social Rights (2009), Defence for Children International (DCI) v. the  
Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008, Council of Europe: European Committee of Social Rights, 20 October 2009. 
URL: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b9e37ea2.html [accessed 4 May 2016]; European Committee of Social Rights 
(2013), Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. The Netherlands (complaint), Complaint No 90/2013, Council of 
Europe: European Committee of Social Rights, 21 January 2013.  
URL: http://www.refworld.org/docid/513d96582.html [accessed 4 May 2016]. 
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placed to make reasonable predictions are the weather authorities, the association of their 
predictions with movements of people in need of international protection is not substantiated.  
4.3. How well do borders work as a response to terrorism? 
Two Member States reintroduced border controls on the basis of a terrorism threat – namely 
Malta and France. Malta suggested that the global terrorist threat was sufficient, which if 
accepted would mean that Malta might never lift intra-Schengen border controls again as the 
global terrorist threat is something so nebulous that it is unquantifiable.130 In the event, 
Malta lifted its border controls on 31 December 2015 (according to the European Commission) 
just in time for the New Year (see Annex 3). 
 
France justified its reintroduction of border controls on the basis of a national state of 
emergency. As the object of all three substantial terrorist attacks in the EU in 2015 (January, 
July and November) one can understand the view of the French authorities that they have a 
problem. Whether border controls are the solution is another question. However, for the 
moment, the Commission does not appear likely to challenge the French choice of border 
controls as a counter-terrorism measure. In the prolongation notification of 29 March,131 the 
French authorities noted that the three-month state of emergency in France from 13 
November 2015 until 13 February had been renewed for a further three months and so the 
French authorities were extending their reintroduction of border controls for a similar period. 
A further notification on 25 April132 stated that, “in light of the major ongoing terrorist threat, 
illustrated by the attack on Brussels on 22 March 2016, the French Government has decided 
to extend these border controls until 26 May 2016 inclusive” (see Annex 3). 
 
It may well be that there is evidence of a terrorist threat on the border between Belgium and 
France but the question which must be answered with details and specific material according 
to Article 26 is how the reintroduction of border controls between them (and France has 
purported to introduce border controls with all neighbouring Member States) contributes to 
the task of dismantling terrorist network(s). All passengers who take the Thalys train from 
Paris to Brussels are acutely aware of the negative impact on travel these controls have for 
people seeking to leave France. But what is unclear is the positive impact there may be in 
counter-terrorism terms. The proportionality of the border control response to the terrorist 
threat needs a more thorough justification. 
4.4. The scope of the controls 
There are three types of controls that may be invoked. The first are exceptional controls 
where an unforeseen event (or series of events) justifies the immediate reintroduction of 
border controls as there is not time to inform the other Member States and institutions. This 
type of border control can be extended for ten-day periods for up to two months. As soon as 
the threat is foreseeable, the second type of control must be used where advanced notice to 
the other Member States and institutions is required before the introduction of the controls. 
This form of control can be used for up to six months with regular updates regarding the 
continuing existence of the threat. The third type of control is one that must be based on 
exceptional circumstances where the overall functioning of the Schengen area is put at risk. 
This requires a decision of the Council on the basis of a proposal by the Commission specifying 
the nature of the risk and why it constitutes a threat to the overall functioning of the system. 
What happened in the period from 13 September 2015, when the first reintroduction of 
controls was announced by Germany on the first exception basis, is that all the Member 
                                           
130 Maltese delegation (2015), Council Document 14731/15. 
131 French delegation (2016), Council Document 7360/1/16. 
132 French delegation (2016), Council Document 8217/16. 
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States that reintroduced controls used the maximum period of two months on the exceptional 
un-notified basis, then the full period of the notified reintroduction of controls – a further six 
months. This seems rather calculated in order to maximise the available period for controls 
before a decision on exceptional circumstances putting at risk the overall functioning of the 
system would need to be taken. 
  
Turning to the scope of the border controls, here the notifications are more precise. All 
Member States (except Malta) provide some details of where they plan to carry out the border 
controls, as required by Article 27 of the SBC (former Article 24). In some cases the details 
about the exact border crossing points at which these will be conducted are fairly complete 
(for instance, as regards Austria) but in other cases are very imprecise, such as in the cases 
of Denmark and Norway. These include, for the most part, the names of the affected crossing 
points. There are fewer specifics on the date and duration of the reintroduction of border 
controls. The need to re-notify the institutions every 10/20/30 days or for the foreseeable 
duration means that there are quite a lot of notifications in the Council Registry, though it 
would seem that some are missing. 
  
An assessment of the impact of the border controls on public policy is generally missing. 
While there are standard statements in the notifications of the importance of public security, 
there are no specifics on why there is a threat that reaches the threshold of public security. 
Furthermore, there is little clarification on why border controls are a solution to any threat at 
all. No state seems willing to indicate how border controls at a small number of border 
crossing points with a few neighbours is going to solve security deficits. It is also worth 
remembering that these controls only apply to those border crossing points that  Member 
States themselves have notified to the Commission under the SBC as places where the Code 
applies. So they do not automatically apply to green field border crossings (a matter of 
national law). As regards the grounds of internal security, here too there is a lack of precision. 
The need to make a proportionality assessment of the need for intra-Schengen border 
controls in light of the threat to internal security is entirely missing.  
 
None of the notifications address the impact on the free movement of persons within the 
Schengen area, though this is something that the Commission addresses in its assessment 
of the Austrian/German reintroduction of border controls (it notes that no EU citizens have 
complained to them, so apparently the controls are not annoying EU citizens).133 The 14 
March 2016  Austrian notification suggests that its reintroduction of border controls is, in 
fact, for the benefit of all citizens of the Union though there is no justification given for this 
statement.134 
4.5. The Visegrad States 
The Visegrad states’ position looks like something of a puzzle. In the statement of December 
2015, they urged common, resolute and united action by Member States  to preserve 
freedom of movement within Schengen, but, on the other hand, the same countries opposed 
a plan for the relocation of asylum seekers in order to address the arrival of high numbers of 
migrants at the external borders of the EU and they even started to build fences. 
  
                                           
133 European Commission (2015), Commission Opinion of 23.10.2015 on the necessity and proportionality of the 
controls at internal borders reintroduced by Germany and Austria pursuant to Article 24(4) of Regulation No 
562/2006 (Schengen Borders Code), C(2015) 7100 final,  Brussels, 23.10.2015. 
134 Austrian delegation (2016), Council document 7136/16. 
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The only 2004-accession Member State to introduce border controls under Article 28 SBC 
was Slovenia135, and it dropped the controls quickly. In reaction to the Proposal for Council 
Implementing Decision, Slovenia questioned the proportionality of the measures maintained 
by Germany, Austria and the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, Slovenia was also among the 
countries that responded by building a fence on the border with Croatia, which is a Schengen 
candidate country.136  
 
On 17 December, in the margins of the European Council meeting, the Visegrad states (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic) issued a statement regarding the 
emergency introduction of intra-Schengen border controls.  
 
The statement is something of a warning to those states that have reintroduced border 
controls: “A common resolute and united action is needed to improve, support and preserve 
Schengen as one of the cornerstones of the European integration project. We call on all true 
friends of Schengen to join this effort towards a conclusive debate on the key proposals 
tabled by the European Commission in this respect.”137 Clearly, among the strongest 
supporters of a border-control-free Europe are those who arrived last at the table. 
 
For these states there has been a very sharp distinction drawn between the operation of the 
Schengen area and the arrival of refugees in unexpected numbers in the EU. While the 
Visegrad states were very solicitous of the correct application of the Schengen border control 
free system, they were highly resistant to the asylum re-location plan to distribute 
responsibility for the reception of asylum seekers, and the sorting of their claims, more evenly 
across the Member States. Because the relocation proposals shifted asylum seekers towards 
Visegrad states, they insisted that the relocation system had to be ‘voluntary’ for states, the 
very aspect which has hampered the implementation of the relocation system. The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia voted against the relocation scheme, adopted by 
the Council in September 2015, for the relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece 
(and initially Hungary) to other Member States.138 Hungary has brought an action before the 
CJEU seeking annulment of the Council Decision, essentially arguing that this decision lacks 
a legal basis in EU law.139 
 
 
 
                                           
135 The situation of Hungary is not available in the Council Registry, though the Commission states that it re-
introduced intra-Schengen controls for a short period before lifting them. See European Commission (2016), 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of 
Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration,  COM(2016) 85 final, Brussels, 
10.2.2016. 
136 See: Barbara Surknov, “Slovenia Builds Border Fence to Stem Flow of Migrants,” November 11, 2015 in New 
York Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/world/europe/slovenia-border-fence-migrants-
refugees.html?_r=0. 
137 Visegrad Group (2015), Joint Statement of the Visegrád Group countries, Brussels, 17.12.2015. URL: 
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the-151221-1. 
138 Council (2015), Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the 
area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, OJ L 239, 15.9.2015, p. 146–156, providing 
for the relocation of 40,000 persons and Council (2015), Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 
establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, OJ L 
248, 24.9.2015, p. 80–94 on the relocation of a further 120,000 asylum seekers. Based on the  European Commision 
(2015) Proposal for a Council Decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for 
the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary,  COM(2015) 451 final, Brussels, 9.9.2015. 
139 CJEU (2015) Case C-647/15, Hungary v Council of the European Union, submitted 3 December 2015. 
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4.6. The right to asylum, in light of the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border 
controls 
As noted above, the Schengen crisis is inherently linked to the arrival of unexpectedly 
substantial numbers of asylum seekers in the EU. Also, as pointed out above, among the 
main nationalities of origin, these asylum seekers have been recognised as refugees or have 
received subsidiary protection in very large percentages. So the crisis could well be framed 
as not so much one of border controls but rather of reception facilities and the duties of 
Member States. Border controls became a surrogate for the proper reception of asylum 
seekers and the correct operation of the CEAS. Instead, the language of ‘crisis’ transformed 
the appellation of people from “refugees” (which would soon be recognised) into “illegal 
immigrants” who were committing criminal acts by travelling through the Schengen border-
control-free area. The first consequence was to avoid responsibilities for reception and 
determination of refugee status under the CEAS. The second consequence has been to place 
refugees and people who should be receiving international protection and reception while 
their claims are being considered in danger of being criminalised for unauthorised border 
crossing, even though the borders are intra-Schengen ones where there should be no controls 
applied. 
 
Several Member States, in particular in their first notifications, refer exclusively to migrant 
flows and thus pre-suppose the entry of ‘illegal’ migrants and not refugees, which is striking. 
For example, Belgium mentioned “very large numbers of illegal immigrants.”140  Slovenia 
referred firstly to “uncontrollable migration flows” and then to “illegal migration”.141 Austrian 
authorities, in their first notification, refer to “the huge migration flows” and, in their 
subsequent  notification, to “enormous migration flows”.142 German authorities claim to face 
an “uncontrolled and unmanageable influx of third-country nationals into German territory” 
and, in their subsequent notification, report an ongoing “massive influx of third country 
nationals”.143 Danish authorities refer to mixed migration: “migrants and 
refugees“.144  Similarly, Norwegian authorities referred to “an unpredictable migratory flow, 
containing a mix of asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential criminals […], victims of 
crime.’’145  Finally, Swedish authorities, like their Nowegian and Danish counterparts,, 
referred  to mixed migration  and an “unprecedented migratory flow“, which “may include 
i.a. asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential criminals such as smugglers or traffickers 
of human beings, but also potential victims of crime“.146   
 
The fact is, however, that the majority of third country nationals who have entered the EU 
irregularly since the summer of 2015 are in search of international protection.147 Of them, 
the majority are Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan, all nationalities with very high recognition rates 
as persons in need of international protection. As persons seeking international protection, 
they are entitled to the full application of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, 
the EUCFR and the CEAS. Only if third-country nationals arrive irregularly and do not seek 
international protection can they be treated as irregularly present and subject to sanctions.  
This is the consequence of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which states: 
 
                                           
140 Belgian delegation (2016), Council document 6490/16. 
141 Slovenian delegation (2015), Council documents 12111/15 and 12418/15.  
142 Austrian delegation (2015), Council documents 12110/15 and 12435/15. 
143 German delegation (2015), Council documents 11986/15 and 12984/15.  
144 Danish delegation (2016), Council document 5021/16. 
145 Norwegian delegation (2015), Council document 14633/15. 
146 Swedish delegation (2015), Council document 14047/15. 
147 EUROSTAT (2016), Asylum Statistics, at  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics..  
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1.  The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry 
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory 
without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
2.   The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees 
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be 
applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into 
another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period 
and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.” 
 
There is a very lively debate in the international community about the meaning of “coming 
directly” from a country of persecution. Courts in different EU states have interpreted the 
provision according to national law. For instance, in the UK, the term cannot be interpreted 
restrictively. In other words, a stop-off along the way should not exclude the refugee from 
protection. UK legislation states that the main considerations are the length of stay in the 
intermediate country, the reasons for the delay there, and whether or not the person sought 
protection there.148 The operation of the Dublin III Regulation, which sets out the 
responsibility of Member States for determining asylum applications made in the EU, is only 
one of the mechanisms at work.149  
 
Article 3 SBC states:  
“This Regulation shall apply to any person crossing the internal or external borders of 
Member States, without prejudice to: 
(a) the rights of persons enjoying the right to free movement under Union law; 
(b) the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in 
particular as regards non-refoulement.” 
 
This means that the rules of the SBC do not apply to those seeking international protection, 
as the Refugee Convention and the CEAS already apply to them and their arrival in and 
movement around the EU. Yet, the argument of the Member States is that asylum seekers 
should remain in the first Member State through which they enter the EU and seek asylum 
there (unless very specific special circumstances apply).150 In theory, if an asylum seeker 
continues his/her journey onwards to a more hospitable Member State to make the asylum 
application, he/she should be sent back to the first one. The Dublin III rule is ostensibly 
applicable irrespective of the failure of Member States to provide reception conditions as 
required under the CEAS, though both the CJEU and the ECtHR have effectively modified the 
rules in their judgments concerning Greece and Italy that vulnerable asylum applicants (and 
all asylum seekers for Greece) should not be returned to Greece and Italy (where they are 
families with children) because of the inadequacy of reception conditions there.151  
                                           
148 UK Magistrate (1999) INLR 490 at 497A-C, case of Adimi. 
149 Moreno-Lax, V.(2012), "Dismantling the Dublin system: MSS v. Belgium and Greece." European Journal of 
Migration and Law 14.1: 1-31. 
150 Hailbronner, K., and Thiery C. (1997), "Schengen II and Dublin: Responsibility for asylum applications in Europe." 
Common Market Law Review 34.4: 957-989. 
151 ECtHR (2011), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of 
Human Rights, 21 January 2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d39bc7f2.html [accessed 3 May 
2016];  CJEU (2011), N. S. (C 411/10) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. (C 493/10) and 
others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform  C-411/10 and C-493/10, 
European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union, 21 December 2011, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ef1ed702.html [accessed 3 May 2016];  ECtHR(2014) Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 
Application no. 29217/12, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 4 November 2014, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5458abfd4.html [accessed 3 May 2016] 
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It is because of this Dublin III effect that Member States and EU institutions claim the they 
are justified in continuing to refer to asylum seekers moving across the EU as ‘migrants’, not 
‘refugees’. Instead, and in spite of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, Member States insist 
that these people are irregularly present and have crossed the Schengen borders illegally 
(and therefore should be punished). The language of penalties is constantly present and the 
practice of criminalising asylum seekers is growing. According to the FRA, almost a third of 
people arriving irregularly in Hungary are prosecuted for the offence of unauthorised border-
fence crossing.152 It would seem evident that Article 31 of the Refugee Convention ought to 
protect these asylum seekers from this kind of prosecution and yet there is a problem. The 
CJEU in a decision of 17 July 2014 held that it did not have jurisdiction to interpret Article 
31.153 This was a somewhat surprising decision, not least in light of the pressing need for a 
consistent EU-wide interpretation of the application of penalties to those seeking asylum who 
have irregularly crossed EU internal frontiers. The facts of the case resemble those for so 
many of people moving across the continent in 2015-16. Mr Qurbani was an Afghan national 
who, having used the services of a people smuggler, entered Greece after passing through 
Iran and Turkey. He left Greece to travel, by plane, to Munich (Germany), with a forged 
Pakistani passport obtained from another people smuggler. He was arrested at Munich 
airport, after the authorities responsible for carrying out checks recognised that his passport 
was forged and he immediately applied for asylum. He was charged and convicted of 
unauthorised entry, unauthorised stay and forgery of documents, notwithstanding Article 31. 
He appealed and eventually the matter was referred to the CJEU. Regardless of the fact that 
the TFEU requires the CEAS to be in conformity with the Refugee Convention and regardless 
of the fact that the CJEU had on other occasions interpreted the Refugee Convention in the 
context of the CEAS, in this case it found it had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. This 
refusal to deal with an important issue of EU law was exacerbated by the fact that the 
Qualification Directive154 specifically refers to Article 31 of the Refugee Convention (in Article 
14).  
 
From the notifications that those Member States who reintroduced intra-Schengen border 
controls have submitted on grounds of migration, the failure of Greece either to prevent 
refugees from arriving in the first instance or to keep all those arriving in Greece is the main 
complaint (except in respect of Belgium where it is the failure of France to keep people who 
want to go to the UK in France). The Austrian authorities are particularly clear about this 
issue. The problem is that refugees arriving in Greece are entitled to seek asylum. As the 
reception conditions are appalling and the refugee sorting system is sclerotic in Greece, they 
are entitled to move on to other Member States (as the German chancellor acknowledged in 
August 2015). That onward movement should not turn them into ‘illegal migrants’ either in 
law or rhetoric. They are still in need of international protection, whether they be in Greece, 
Germany, Sweden or Belgium. The only question at issue is whether their successful attempt 
at ‘self-relocation’ should be recognised. 
 
 
                                           
152 See FRA’s website for regular overviews on borders and migration http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-
migration-borders/overviews/march-2016. A worrying development considered elsewhere in this study is the 
decision of the Dutch Raad van State that a person can be considered an irregularly arriving ‘migrant’ until such 
time as he or she makes an asylum claim: ABRS 24 December 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:4064  
153 CJEU (2014), C- 481/13 Qurbani 17 July 2014, not yet reported. 
154 European Union (2011), Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of 
the protection granted (recast), Brussels, 20.12.2011 OJ L 337 (Qualification Directive). 
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4.7. Exceptional circumstances and the overall functioning of the Schengen area 
Until 12 May 2016, the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls was notified on the 
basis of Article 28 (immediate action) – valid for two months, then Article 27, possible for six 
months. After this eight-month period the Member States were required to lift their intra-
Schengen border controls unless Article 29 was invoked.  
 
This article provides for exceptional circumstances where the overall functioning of the 
Schengen area is put at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to external 
border controls. Where those circumstances constitute a serious threat to public policy or 
internal security within the area, border controls may be reintroduced for six months. 
Thereafter they may be renewed three times (to a total of two years). This procedure is a 
last resort measure to protect the common interests of the area and can be used only where 
all other measures are ineffective in mitigating the serious threat identified. Under this 
provision the Council may recommend that one (or more) Member State(s) decide to 
reintroduce border control at all or at specific parts of their internal borders.  
 
This provision can be triggered only after an Article 21 support option has been exhausted. 
Under this measure, where serious deficiencies at the external border are identified in an 
evaluation prepared by the Commission with a view to ensuring compliance with the SBC, 
the Commission can recommend that the offending Member State take specific actions. These 
are: 
 
• Deploy Frontex Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) to manage the offending 
borders; 
• Submit a strategic plan based on a risk assessment to Frontex for its opinion (on 
effectiveness). 
 
As 2016 moved towards the summer, the triggering of Article 29 became increasingly likely 
as some of the Member States applying intra-Schengen border controls considered it 
necessary to continue them. Consequently, the Commission carried out its assessment of 
Greek border controls, as Greece was most closely connected with the arrival of refugees in 
the EU (mainly from Turkey) and the movement of these people northwards out of Schengen 
into Macedonia and then back into Schengen in Hungary or Austria. The Commission found 
the Greek controls in need of substantial change.155  The Commission identified the following 
timeline in its March 2016 Schengen Roadmap:156 
 
• 12 May 2016 at the latest: Greece reports on the implementation of the Council 
recommendations.  
• 12 May 2016: If the serious deficiencies in external border control persist, the 
Commission will present a proposal under Article 29(2) of the Schengen Borders Code.  
• 13 May 2016: If the serious deficiencies in external border control persist, the Council 
should adopt a recommendation under Article 29(2) of the Schengen Borders Code 
for a coherent Union approach to temporary internal border controls.  
• 16 May 2016: The Commission presents its Third Report on Relocation and 
Resettlement.  
• June 2016 at the latest: The co-legislators reach political agreement on the European 
Border and Coast Guard and adopt the legal act.  
                                           
155 European Commission (2016), Assessment of Greece's Action Plan to remedy the serious deficiencies identified 
in the 2015 evaluation on the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of management of the external border, 
COM(2016) 220, Op. cit. 
156 European Commission (2016), Back to Schengen - A roadmap, COM(2016) 120, Op. cit. 
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• June 2016: The Commission presents its assessment of the possibility of resuming 
Dublin transfers to Greece.  
• August 2016 at the latest: The European Border and Coast Guard is operational.  
• September 2016 at the latest: The European Border and Coast Guard has delivered 
the first vulnerability tests so that any necessary preventive measures can be taken.  
• December 2016: If the overall situation allows, the target date for bringing to an end 
the exceptional safeguard measures taken.  
 
One of the key questions is: what is the nature of the persistent serious deficiencies in the 
Greek external border control? From the reasons given by the Schengen states for re-
introducing border controls, the arrival of ‘migrants’, by which they appear to mean refugees, 
is the most consistent. Greece cannot refuse to admit refugees without potentially placing 
itself in breach of the Refugee Convention, the EUCFR and the CEAS. The Greek assessment 
affair is discussed in chapter 5, suffice it here only to note that the Greek authorities sent 
their action plan  to the Commission on time and provided extensive information on their 
external border controls and measures to be taken to enhance them.  
 
Following the Greek response, on 4 May 2016, the Commission, in application of Article 29 
of the SBC, published a proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a 
recommendation for temporary internal border controls in exceptional circumstances putting 
the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk.157 This Decision, adopted on 12 May 
2016, allows the maintenance of temporary border controls for a maximum of six months by 
Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, as follows: 
 
• Austria at the Austrian-Hungarian border and Austrian-Slovenian border; 
• Germany at the German-Austrian border; 
• Denmark at the Danish ports with ferry connections to Germany and at the Danish-
German land border; 
• Sweden in the Swedish harbours in the Police Region South and West and at the 
Öresund Bridge; 
• Norway in the Norwegian ports with ferry connections to Denmark, Germany, and 
Sweden.158  
 
The proposal was adopted by the Council159 with only minor amendments (see below). On 
13 May Germany notified the Council and Commission that it would continue its border 
controls with Austria under the new legal basis160 and Austria followed suit the same day, 
concerning its border controls with Hungary and Slovenia.161 Both the Commission’s proposal 
and the Council’s recommendation confirm the intersection of intra-Schengen border controls 
and asylum reception capacity. The first paragraph of both preambles commences: “The EU 
is facing an unprecedented migratory and refugee crisis following a sharp increase of mixed 
migratory flows since 2015. This has led to severe difficulties in ensuring efficient external 
border control in accordance with the Schengen acquis and in the reception and processing 
of migrants arriving.” 
 
                                           
157 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Council Implementing Decision setting out a recommendation for 
temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances, COM (2016) 275, Op. Cit. 
158 Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation for temporary internal border 
control in an exceptional circumstances, 8835/16, Op. cit. 
159 Ibid. 
160 German delegation (2016), Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the German internal 
borders in accordance with Articles 29(2) of […] the SBC, Brussels, Council Document 8930/16, 13.05.2016. 
161 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at the Austrian internal 
borders in accordance with Article 29(2) of of […] the SBC, Brussels, Council Document 8947/16, 13.05.2016. 
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A number of aspects of the Commission’s recommendation deserve attention.162 First, the 
recommendation presents a useful overview of the development of the legislation, the 
intricacies of dealing with the arrival of refugees in the EU, and the attempt by a small number 
of Member States to use intra-Schengen border controls as a mechanism to deflect asylum 
reception responsibilities. But the Commission accepted without question the justifications 
used by the Member States for the use of exceptional measures. Referring to the ‘important 
secondary movements’ of asylum seekers (though in the proposal they are designated as 
‘migrants’), the Commission focused on questions of proper documentation and/or 
registration not taking place in Greece. The proposed recommendation specifically states, in 
paragraph 14 of the preamble, that “this risk of secondary movements is particularly high for 
those irregular migrants [sic] who are not accommodated in adequate reception facilities”. 
The Commission merely found that serious deficiencies in external border control permitted 
the use of the new legal basis for intra-Schengen controls. However, for the purposes of 
triggering Article 29 SBC, the Commission makes two important choices. First, it excludes 
the application of intra-Schengen controls at air or sea borders, thus placing what one might 
call a travel mode limitation on the use of Article 29 SBC. The only source of serious threat 
is the movement of persons across land borders. This will ensure that the Greek economy is 
not hindered over the summer months by the application of intra-Schengen border controls 
on the flights and ferries so vital to its tourism industry. Secondly, the Commission specified 
carefully exactly which borders could be subject to controls (see above). By extension, this 
means that other borders cannot be subject to intra-Schengen controls under this proposal. 
The Commission appears to anticipate that there will be a gradual lifting of these exceptional 
border controls and that the application of the Article 29 SBC procedure will terminate at the 
end of 2016. 
 
The Council’s recommendation made a few changes to the text proposed by the Commission. 
First, in paragraph 11 of the preamble regarding the appropriateness of using intra-Schengen 
border controls to displace asylum reception obligations, it added that that “these measures 
are necessary and are considered proportionate.” Further, to address the complaint of some 
Member States that their neighbouring states introducing the controls had failed to consult 
or notify them, the Council added in Article 1 “Before introducing such controls the Member 
State concerned should exchange views with the relevant neighbouring Member State(s) with 
a view to ensuring that internal border controls are proportionate, in accordance with the 
[SBC]”.   
 
Finally, the commitment of the Council and the Commission to ending the intra-Schengen 
controls is made clear in Article 3 of the recommendation, which states that the controls 
permitted under it should be targeted and limited in scope, frequency, location and time, to 
what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat and to safeguard public policy and 
internal security. Further, the Member States are required to carry out regular reviews and 
adjust controls to the level of threat addressed, including phasing them out wherever 
appropriate.  
 
The policy adopted by the Commission and the Council as regards the reintroduction of intra-
Schengen border controls appears to be to allow the Member States a wide latitude as regards 
the grounds for the introduction of controls. No systematic or comprehensive assessment of 
the grounds provided by the Member States using the powers was undertaken. Indeed, there 
is little to indicate that the Commission used its power to request additional information, 
except in one or possibly two cases. On the other hand, both the Commission and the Council 
are seeking to manage the situation by limiting the types of controls that can be carried out 
                                           
162 Those aspects of the Proposal which relate to the Greek assessment are addressed in Sub-Section 5.1. 
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and the places where this can be done. There seems to be a containment policy at work, 
which will gradually squeeze the space for controls down to nothing. The notification 
obligations on Member States using the Article 29 SBC exception are likely to be applied 
intensively under the Commission’s supervision. This will concentrate the minds of the civil 
servants who are charged with justifying the continued use of Article 29 of the SBC. 
4.8. Informal borders and fences  
Instead of the formal temporary reintroduction of internal border controls on the basis of 
Article 25 of the SBC, Member States such as the Netherlands have used Article 23 of the 
SBC (formerly Article 21) as a legal basis to enhance police checks in response to the 
increasing numbers of migrants. Other Member States, such as Hungary and Austria, opted 
for even farther-reaching measures, such as building fences. Though all these measures 
indicates that the line between border control and other internal security measures is 
increasingly blurring. 
4.8.1. Border control as a contribution to EU internal security 
Current controversies over the governance of the Schengen area need also to be understood 
in the context of a transformation of how border control relates to EU policy in the field of 
internal security. Internal and external border control measures are increasingly associated 
with, and embedded within, the concerns and priorities of EU internal security, rather than 
simply involving the issue of controlling access to the territory of the Member States of the 
European Union.  
 
The association between access control and internal security is clearly shown in the April 
2016 communication of the European Commission on “Stronger and Smarter Information 
Systems for Borders and Security”163 accompanying the proposal for the establishment of an 
Entry/Exit System.164 The communication argues for “the need to join up and strengthen the 
EU’s border management, migration and security cooperation frameworks and information 
tools in a comprehensive manner”, pointing out that “[b]order management, law 
enforcement, and migration control are dynamically interconnected”.165 The argument 
concerns in particular counter-terrorism policy, but also touches upon EU measures related 
to organised crime, and is framed in terms of “gaps” in “the very broad spectrum of data”166 
already accessible and available to border control and law enforcement authorities in the EU, 
including to EU JHA agencies.167 The “joining up” of border control and internal security, then, 
is operationalised in particular through an extensive discussion of interoperability. The 
Commission recommends considering four steps, including the development of a single 
search interface “to query several [border control and law enforcement] information systems 
simultaneously and to produce combined results on one single screen”, interconnectivity of 
information systems that would allow systems to automatically consult the data they 
respectively contain, the sharing of a single biometric matching service, and a common 
repository of data for information systems.168 Beyond this specific communication and 
proposals, the joining up of border control and policing also informs other initiatives. This 
concerns in particular the new ECBG, where, according to the interviews conducted for the 
                                           
163 European Commission (2016), Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security, COM(2016) 
205 final, Brussels, 6.4.2016. 
164 European Commission (2016), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System, COM(2016) 196 final. 
165 European Commission (2016), Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security, COM(2016) 
205 final, Brussels, 6.4.2016, p. 2. 
166 Ibid, p. 12. 
167See Annex 2 for further analysis. 
168 European Commission (2016), Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security, Op. cit., p. 
14. 
Policy Department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional Affairs 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 55 
study, the new body would have access to SIS II, in addition to having use of Eurodac for 
return operations169. 
 
In many ways, these proposals echo earlier measures called for by the European Commission 
and by the Council in the context of information management for the area of freedom, 
security and justice.170 How they meet current concerns with EU internal and external borders 
is therefore unclear. In the meantime, the closer association advocated between access 
control and internal security should raise questions. Access/border control is a specific 
concern, which involves dealing with, at times, particularly vulnerable individuals who should 
benefit from specific rights and protections. Making border control an integral part of internal 
security measures, in this respect, may well undermine the specific challenges and priorities 
associated with this subject matter, and further weaken the status of already vulnerable 
persons (see Annex 2 for further analysis). 
4.8.2. Police checks at internal borders – the line remains unclear 
Police checks within the territory, including border areas, are allowed insofar as the exercise 
of these police powers does not have an effect equivalent to border checks. ‘Border checks’ 
are defined in Article 2 of Regulation 2016/399 as ‘checks carried out at border crossing 
points, to ensure that persons, including their means of transport and the objects in their 
possession, may be authorised to enter the territory of the member states or authorised to 
leave it’. Article 23(a) of the SBC clarifies that the exercise of police powers shall not have 
the objective of border controls; they must be based on general police information and 
experience ‘regarding possible threats to public security and aim, in particular, to combat 
cross-border crime’. Furthermore they must be devised and executed in a manner clearly 
distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external borders, and carried out on the 
basis of ‘spot checks’.  
 
In its case law, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has provided further criteria 
on this use of police checks to ensure these checks would not have an effect equivalent to 
‘border checks’ as prohibited in Article 22 of the SBC.171 In Melki and Abdeli, the CJEU 
affirmed that Articles 22 and 23 (former 20 and 21) of the SBC also apply to border areas 
within 20km of the internal borders and prohibit national legislation granting national police 
authorities the power to check the identity of any person, ‘irrespective of his behaviour and 
of specific circumstances giving rise to a risk of breach of public order’.172 Based on this 
criterion, Schengen States are obliged to specify, in their national rules, the criteria for using, 
and the frequency of, the internal borders controls to be applied. From the wording of 
23(a)(ii) (former 21) of the SBC, one can deduce that police checks in border areas should 
specifically address public security threats, such as cross-border crimes. In the Adil 
judgment, the CJEU, responding to a question of a Dutch court assessing the lawfulness of 
mobile police checks, held that police checks within the border areas with the objective of 
combating illegal residence would not be prohibited under Article 23(a)(ii) (former 21) of the 
SBC.173 However, these checks must be based on ‘general information and experience 
                                           
169 See Articles 6a and 43 of Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on the 
European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, and  amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (not yet published in the OJ, agreed in LIBE committee on 27.06.2016) 
170 European Commission (2010), Overview of information management in the area of freedom, security and justice, 
COM(2010) 385 final, Brussels, 20.7.2010; Council (2014), Draft Council Conclusons on an updated Information 
Management Strategy (IMS) for EU internal security, 15701/1/14 REV1, Brussels, 24.11.2014. 
171 Article 22 of the SBC reads: “Internal borders may be crossed at any point without a border check on persons, 
irrespective of their nationality, being carried out”. 
172 CJEU (2010), C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli, 22 June 2010.  
173 CJEU (2011), C-278/12 PPU, 19 July 2012, Adil, para 65-67. 
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regarding the illegal residence of persons at the places where the checks are to be made’ 
and the carrying out of those checks must be subject ‘to certain limitations concerning, inter 
alia, their intensity and frequency.’ With this conclusion, allowing the use of police checks in 
border areas for immigration control purposes on the basis of Article 23(a), the CJEU made 
a direct connection between irregular immigration and possible threats to public security. 
 
Taking into account this CJEU case law, the Dutch rules on internal border controls were 
amended in 2014 to intensify the frequency and duration of mobile border checks in the 
border areas (‘MTV’ checks’ or ‘Mobiel Toezicht Veiligheid’).174 At the same time, a new rule 
was added according to which, on a temporary basis, the controls at both land, sea, and air 
borders could be intensified in the case of ‘a sudden or expected increase of irregular migrants 
crossing at the borders’. In this situation, which requires a decision of the State Secretary of 
Security and Justice, the maximum number of border checks is doubled.175 This power of 
intensified police checks was used for the first time in September 2015, in response to the 
increasing number of refugees arriving in the Netherlands. The decision to use this power 
was amongst other things, based on the justification to ‘prevent human smugglers from 
misusing the vulnerable position of asylum seekers’. Since September 2015, the Dutch 
government has extended the use of this exceptional power for border checks several 
times.176 In this latter decision, also referring to the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November, 
the Secretary of State mentioned three goals of these intensified border checks:  
 
• fighting irregular migration and human smuggling; 
• preventing humanly degrading incidents (such as people dying in trucks), and; 
• preventing substantial public order and national security incidents in the Netherlands. 
 
In looking at case law assessing the legitimacy of these intensified border checks, which was 
necessary to decide on the lawfulness of the detention of migrants caught during these 
checks, two Dutch courts reached opposite decisions in 2015.177 Whereas the Groningen 
court found that the decision of 16 October 2015 on the use of intensified border checks did 
not violate the conditions included in the SBC, the Rotterdam court held the Dutch reasons 
for deploying this measure invalid. The latter court decision was annulled by the highest 
administrative court in December 2015.178 According to this court in the Netherlands, the 
Dutch government legitimately considered the influx of asylum seekers as a specific 
indication of an expected increase of irregular migration in the near future, which justified 
the use of intensified border controls. The main argument of the Dutch court in coming to 
this conclusion was that asylum seekers are irregular migrants at the time they cross the 
internal borders of the EU and before they apply for asylum. This classification of asylum 
seekers as illegal immigrants is problematic for two reasons. First, it allows the extended use 
of internal border checks, contrary to the purposes of the SBC. Second, based on this 
                                           
174 Decision of 2 July 2014, published in the Dutch Official Journal (Staatsblad) 2014, no. 250. Generally, these rules 
provide that on a daily basis, twenty trains may be checked, of which only three trains for each ‘connection/line’. In 
each train only one part may be examined, of which a maximum of four wagons. Dealing with the prevention of 
irregular immigration, the Dutch rules provide that border checks may be performed for a maximum of 90 hours 
per month, of which six hours a day. 
175 In practice this means that, for border checks on motorways, the maximum time of border checks is 180 hours 
a month, of which 12 hours a day. 
176 16 October 2015, 23 November 2015, 1 February 2016 and most recently 2 March 2016. See the information 
sent to the Dutch parliament, Second Chamber 2015-2016, 19637, no. 2077 and Staatscourant 2016, no. 5616, 11 
April 2016. 
177 District court Groningen (2015), 16 November 2015, AWB 15/9361; and District court Rotterdam (2015), 3 
December 2015, AWB 15/19730, JV 2016/22. 
178 Dutch highest administrative court (2016), Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 24 December 2015, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:4064. 
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classification of asylum seekers as illegal migrants, the highest Dutch court allowed their 
detention on the basis of regular migration rules, which is in violation of asylum laws.179  
 
Dutch practice and case law illustrate that the line between border controls and checks, 
defined in Article 2 of the SBC and prohibited at the internal borders according to Article 22 
of the SBC on the one hand, and police checks as allowed in Article 23 SBC, on the other, is 
blurred. Contrary to the application of Article 25 of the SBC for the temporary reintroduction 
of border controls, the use of border checks, according to Article 23, is more ambiguous, 
both concerning the purpose for which they are used (public security or immigration control?) 
and the conditions under which these controls may take place. What is the point of prohibiting 
checks to ensure that people are allowed to enter or to leave the territory at the internal 
borders between Schengen states, if exactly the same objective can be achieved by Member 
States allowing police checks within 20km of the internal borders to prevent irregular 
immigration? With regard to the conditions for police checks, it is important to note that the 
use of intensified border checks as performed by the Dutch authorities does not require the 
prior notification of the Commission or other Member States. Furthermore, the criteria 
included in Article 25 of the SBC do not apply, such as the presence of a serious threat to 
public policy or internal security and the condition that border controls may only be 
reintroduced as measure of ‘last resort’.180 Thus, questions remain not only on the intensity 
and the circumstances under which border checks may be applied in order to ensure that 
these checks are not equivalent to border controls, but also with regard to the implied 
purposes of border checks and controls.181  
 
In January 2016, a German lower court (the Amtsgericht Kehl), dealing with a person 
suspected of the illegal import of drugs, submitted a preliminary question to the CJEU on 
whether the police checks, on which the prosecution was based, were allowed under Articles 
23 and 24 (former 20 and 21) of the SBC, if these police checks had been applied irrespective 
of the individual behaviour of the person at stake and the specific circumstances, and in the 
absence of any temporary reintroduction of border controls at the relevant internal border.182 
Although the questions of the German court did not specifically address the the use of border 
checks for the purpose of immigration control, the answers of the CJEU might provide further 
clarification on the legitimacy of border checks within the internal border areas under Article 
23 (former 21) of the SBC. 
4.8.3. Fences: a solution permitted only for external borders? 
The increasing number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe in 2015 resulted in several 
unilateral actions by Member States, including the setting up of physical barriers at both 
internal and external borders of the Schengen area. The first MS to build fences at internal 
borders was Hungary, as Hungarian authorities reportedly started building a fence with 
Slovenia to re-direct the flow of refugees.183 Subsequently the fence with Slovenia was 
demolished and Hungary continued to build fences on its external borders with Croatia and 
Serbia.  In February 2016, Prime Minister Viktor Orban announced his intention to develop a 
                                           
179 See the annotation of Evelien Brouwer to this judgment, JV 2016, no. 54 (in Dutch). 
180 In the Netherlands, the government promised only following the advice of the Dutch Advisory Committee on 
Migration Affairs, to inform the European Commission on a ‘confidential basis’ about the use of intensified border 
checks, Explanatory memorandum to the Decision of 2 July 2014, Staatsblad 2014, no. 250 p. 9. 
181 Cornelisse, G. (2014), “What is wrong with Schengen? Border disputes and the nature of integration in the area 
without internal borders,” Common Market Law Review 51: p. 741-770. 
182 CJEU (2016) C-9/16, submitted 7 January 2016 (unpublished case). 
183 Novinite (Sofia News Agency), “Hungary Starts Building Razor-Wire Fence along Border with Slovenia,” 
September 24, 2015. URL: http://www.novinite.com/articles/170976/Hungary+Starts+Building+Razor-
Wire+Fence+along+Border+with+Slovenia.  
Internal borders in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 58 
280-mile-long razor-wire barrier at the southern borders of Hungary.184  Slovenia began 
erecting a similar fence with Croatia185 and Austria announced that it would start building 
fences at its internal borders. After severe criticism by the European Commission in April 
2016 of the plans for fences at the borders with Italy at the Brenner Pass, the Austrian 
government announced, on 13 May 2016, that it would withdraw this plan. 
4.9. No complaint – No Impact on free movement of persons? 
The above legal analysis indicates the weight attributed to the free movement of persons 
across the EU, as one of the greatest achievements of Schengen. Nevertheless, none of the 
notifications have elaborated on how the measures will be applied in a way that least 
impinges upon free movement. The Commission seemed to be satisfied with the formula 
used by the Member States that the measures would be used if “strictly necessary”.186 In 
addition, Commission officials explained that no official complaints had been received 
regarding the internal borders impinging upon the free movement of the EU citizens.187 
Nevertheless, there is a noticeable growing concern among EU citizens and in particular 
among youth organisations who actively advocate the free movement of persons within the 
Schengen area.188 The campaigns such as “Don‘t Touch My Schengen“ or “Schengen Watch“ 
show the increasing concern about the lack of legal certainty as regards free movement 
rights. Youth organisations mentioned their personal experiences of being stopped by police 
at internal borders and subjected to what looked like a border control.189    
 
The lack of transparency and legal certainty is raising more questions among EU citizens. For 
example, the European Citizens Action Service (ECAS), which runs “Your Europe Advice“ 
providing legal advice for mobile EU citizens, has experienced a 9.4% increase in enquiries 
in 2015 compared to 2014, which is indicative of an increasing sentiment of uncertainty 
among citizens about the practical implementation of free movement. 
  
                                           
184 Nick Gutteridge, “The Great Wall of Europe: Hungary splits continent in two with huge fence to stop migrants,” 
February 29, 2016 in Express.co.uk at http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/648269/Hungary-plan-fence-border-
Romania-migrants-refugees-crisis-Viktor-Orban-Schengen. 
185 Barbara Surknov, “Slovenia Builds Border Fence to Stem Flow of Migrants,” November 11, 2015 in New York 
Times. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/world/europe/slovenia-border-fence-migrants-
refugees.html?_r=0; Simon Tomlinson, “Will a fence halt the human tide flowing into Slovenia? Country becomes 
latest to build barriers along its borders as 47,500 migrants arrive in just a few days,” 23 October 2015 in Daily 
Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3286365/Slovenia-latest-country-resort-building-fences-borders-47-
500-migrants-enter-overwhelmed-nation-days.html.  
186 Interview with Commission, DG Justice, 08.06.2016 and interview with the Commission. DG HOME, 17.05.2016. 
187 Interview with Commission, DG Justice, 08.06.2016 and interview with the Commission. DG HOME, 17.05.2016. 
188 See Annex 4, Stakeholders discussion  on 07.06.2016. 
189 See Annex 4, Stakeholders discussion  on 07.06.2016. 
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5. IS THE SCHENGEN EVALUATION AND MONITORING 
MECHANISM FIT FOR PURPOSE? 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The relationship between the Frontex ‘risk assessment’ of the capacity of Member 
States to face threats and pressure at the external borders and the information on 
Member States ‘subject to particular pressure’ collected by European Asylum Support 
Office is unclear. 
• The relationship between the proposed ‘vulnerability assessment’ of the new European 
Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and the existing Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring 
mechanism has been defined in the new EBCG Regulation, though it is not clear how 
it will be implemented in practice. 
• There is a lack of information on pending infringement procedures dealing with alleged 
violations of the Schengen Borders Code by Member States. This hampers democratic 
debate on the necessity and proportionality of the reintroduction of border controls or 
police checks at the border areas.  
5.1. Results of the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring Mechanism  
The SEM contains assessments of both external and internal borders, with the latter one of 
the innovations of the Schengen governance reform.190 The evaluation involves 
questionnaires sent to MS, as well as announced and unannounced visits.  
5.1.1. Evaluation of external borders 
The SEM Regulation states that a team of experts from the Member States and the 
Commission - with relevant EU agencies as observers - can carry out an evaluation of the 
application of the Schengen acquis. The SEM provides a range pf evaluations, from the 
management of external and internal borders to returns, the SIS, the VIS, and judicial and 
police cooperation. Article 10 of the SEM provides for the composition of teams for both 
announced and unannounced on-site visits. Article 11 of the SEM provides the basis 
thequestionnaire to be sent to MS. This sub-section further analyses the outcomes of regular 
SEM external border evaluations conducted in Greece, Austria, Sweden, Belgium and Poland.   
5.1.1.1. Greece 
An external borders evaluation team visited Greece from 10 to 13 November 2015, during 
the very peak of the refugee crisis, to conductn unannounced on-site evaluation visit. Experts 
went to Greek sea border sites (Chios and Samos Islands) and land border crossings with 
Turkey (Orestiada, Fylakio, Kastanies, Nea Vyssa).  
 
In the annual evaluation programme for 2016, the announced on-site visits to Greece were 
planned for April 2016 as one of six or seven MS to be evaluated in that year. Apparently, in 
the second section (non-published part) of the annual evaluation programme for 2015, an 
unannounced visit to Greece was planned for November 2015. 
 
When making decisions, the Commission applies Article 38 of the SBC, using ‘the committee 
procedure’ within the scope of Regulation No 182/2011 meaning that the decision-making 
remains secret and is led by DG HOME, with consultation with all the relevant Commissioners 
                                           
190 Interview with an MEP, 01.06.2016.  
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and the President. This comitology procedure explicitly excludes MEPs and thus lacks 
democratic accountability.  
 
Following such a procedure, on 2 February 2016, the Commission adopted a report detailing 
the findings and assessments, and listing best practices and deficiencies identified during this 
evaluation.191 There were suggestions that this draft report was modified on its way up the 
Commission hierarchy. Allegedly, the political context and pressure from MS eager to 
maintain border controls were also important for reaching these conclusions.192 According to 
this report, the on-site visit revealed serious deficiencies in the carrying out of external border 
control by Greece, in particular due to the lack of appropriate identification and registration 
of irregular migrants on the islands, of sufficient staff, and of sufficient equipment for 
verifying identity documents. However, during the 21 March 2016 LIBE Committee meeting, 
the Greek authorities admitted to a lack of EURODAC machines on the small islands, though 
not SIS II machines.193  
 
According to the Commission, under the current circumstances, situational awareness and 
reaction capability are not sufficient for effective border surveillance. The Commission’s 
choice of words is severe: the serious deficiencies relating to external border control in Greece 
‘constitute a serious threat to public policy and internal security and put at risk the overall 
functioning of the area without internal border control’. The Commission report, which 
focuses solely on Greece, emphasises failures in Greek border management without taking 
so much into account that other Member States may not have fulfilled their obligations in 
assisting Greece. Thus, the Commission sent a subliminal message that any country alone 
would not be able to manage border controls under such pressure, but then found Greece 
guilty for not managing them.  
  
In a decision of 12 February 2015, the Council adopted a recommendation addressing ‘serious 
deficiencies’ identified in the 2015 evaluation on the application of the Schengen acquis in 
the field of external border management by Greece, including during the un-announced on-
site visit in November 2015 to the external borders.194 In this recommendation, 49 points 
were listed, covering the registration procedure, border surveillance, risk analysis, 
international cooperation, human resources and training, border checks procedure, and 
infrastructure and equipment. In accordance with Article 15(3) of the SEM, this 
recommendation was sent to the European Parliament and the national parliaments. 
 
This Council Decision was followed by a Commission Implementing Decision of 24 February 
2016, setting out recommendations on specific measures to be taken by Greece.195 The 
Commission’s recommendation was based on Article 29 SBC and the Council’s 
recommendation on Article 15 (3) of the SEM. The Decision of the Commission included 14 
measures. These measures partly covered the same fields as the Council recommendation 
(border surveillance and border checks, registration, and identification), with the exception 
of international cooperation, and including measures dealing with the reception and return of 
                                           
191 European Commission (2016), Commission Implementing Decision in accordance with Article 14(5) of Regulation 
(EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013,  Brussels, 02.02.2016. 
192 Interviews with Council, 19.05.2016, German Permanent Representation, 27.05.2016 and Slovenian Permanent 
Representation, 30.05.2016.  
193 LIBE Committee (2016), LIBE hearing on 21.03.2016, Discussion on the situation of the Schengen area. 
194 Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation on ddressing the serious 
deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of management 
of the external borders by Greece, Council document 5985/16, Brussels, 12.02.2016. 
195 European Commission (2016), Commission Implementing Decision of 24.2.2016 setting out a recommendation 
on specific measures to be taken by the Hellenic Republic following the evaluation report of 2 February 2016, C(2016) 
1219 final, Brussels, 24.2.2016. 
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irregular migrants and funding. The Greek authorities were requested to report to the 
Commission no later than 12 March 2016 on the measures taken to implement the 
recommendations. In the meantime, the Commission published its “Back to Schengen” 
Communication, setting a deadline of 12 May for taking a decision under Article 29, the date 
coinciding with the end of German and Austrian internal border controls.196 
Based on the assessment of the Action Plan presented by the Greek government, the 
Commission published an adequacy assessment on 12 April 2016.197 Meanwhile, another 
announced visit to Greece took place between 10 and 16 April 2016. In the adequacy 
assessment, the Commission found that ‘significant progress’ had been made by Greece, but 
that, for many actions, more clarity was needed in terms of timing, responsibility and financial 
planning. Whereas some actions could not be adequately addressed or completed, for other 
actions additional information was needed. To provide this further information, the Greek 
authorities were given until 26 April 2016. According to the Commission, the Hellenic 
government provided the requested additional elements and clarifications on its Action Plan 
by the deadline, though the Commission gave no further details on the actual measures or 
actions adopted.198   
5.1.1.2. Austria 
 
In November 2015, the Council adopted a recommendation with remedial actions for Austria 
to address the deficiencies identified during the Schengen evaluation in the field of 
management of the external border carried out in 2015.199 The 18 recommendations covered 
the integrated border management strategy, inter-agency cooperation,  risk analysis system, 
training of border guards, border checks (including the recommendation to pay particular 
attention to minors and stamping of documents of family members of Union citizens), and 
procedures at the Salzburg and Vienna airports. The evaluation team assessed how privacy 
is ensured during the performance of interviews in the ‘second line checks’, when the person 
is brought to a separate location for further investigation on whether he/she meets all entry 
conditions for third-country nationals. Furthermore, based on the 2015 Schengen evaluation 
on Austria addressing deficiencies in the return policy, the Council adopted a decision 
including recommendations dealing with this field.200 In February 2016, the Council adopted 
recommendations addressing deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation in the field of the 
SIS.201 In response to the recommendations on the external borders and return, Austria 
submitted action plans which were not published in the Council Registry.202 
                                           
196 European Commission (2016), Back to Schengen - A roadmap, COM(2016) 120 final, Op.cit. 
197 European Commission (2016), Assessment of Greece's Action Plan, COM (2016) 220 final, Op.cit. 
198 European Commission (2016), Commission proposal for a Council Implementation Decision setting out a 
recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional circumstances, COM (2016) 275, p. 5. 
199 Council (2015) Schengen evaluation of Austria - Council Recommendation on addressing the deficiencies 
identified in the 2015 evaluation on the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of management of the external 
border, Council doc. 14067/15, Brussels, 17.11.2015; Based on the European Commission (2015) Commission 
Implementing Decision, C(2015)6144 (not public). 
200 Council (2015) Schengen evaluation of Austria - Council Recommendation on addressing the deficiencies 
identified in the 2015 evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of Return, Council document 
15435/15, Brussels, 17.12.2015;  based on the European Commission (2015) Evaluation report of the Commission, 
C(2015) 6341 of 05.10.2015 (not public). 
201 Council (2016) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation No 
562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders, Council 
document 6390/16, Brussels, 24.02.2016. 
202 For the Action plan dealing with the recommendations on external air borders, see: Austrian delegation (2015) 
Council document 6761/16, 03.03.2015; with regard to recommendations on return, see: Austrian delegation 
(2016), Action Plan of Austria of 16 March 2016, Council document 7258/16, 31 March 2016. These action plans are 
published at www.statewatch.org. 
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5.1.1.3. Sweden 
 
On 15 March 2016, the Council adopted 15 recommendations addressing the deficiencies 
identified in the 2015 evaluation of Sweden's application of the Schengen acquis in the field 
of management of the external borders.203 These recommendations included the preparation 
by Sweden of a concrete multi-annual action plan for the implementation of the national plan 
for integrated border management. 
  
Furthermore, it was recommended that Sweden take further measures in the field of human 
resources, training of officers performing border checks, the infrastructure at airports 
(including the optimising of the location of control booths to ensure the possibility of 
profiling), and border checks (including the improvement of the application of border checks 
procedures). It was also recommended that Sweden provide border guards with risk analysis 
products concerning the fight against terrorism and instructions to regularly use the technical 
means available for detecting false/falsified documents when performing checks on all 
categories of persons).  
 
       5.1.1.4. Belgium 
 
In the 2015 evaluation on the implementation of the Schengen acquis by Belgium, the 
European Commission found deficiencies in the field of police cooperation, common visa 
policy, the SIS, and return. These recommendations were adopted in the period February - 
April 2016 by the Council.204  
 
       5.1.1.5. Poland 
 
In December 2015, the Council adopted recommendations dealing with the deficiencies in 
the implementation of the Schengen acquis in the field of the SIS in Poland based on the 
Schengen evaluation by the Commission in 2015.205 
 
With respect to the the deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation on the application of the 
Schengen acquis by Poland in the field of management of the external land border with 
Ukraine, the Commission drafted a (not publicly accessible) proposal for a Council 
recommendation in May 2016.206  
5.1.2. Bi-annual reports on the functioning of the Schengen area 
Since 2012, the European Commission has submitted bi-annual reports to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the functioning of the Schengen area. In its seventh bi-annual 
report on the functioning of the Schengen area, covering the period between 1 November 
2014 and 30 April 2015, the Commission addresses in particular the different measures taken 
                                           
203 Council (2016), Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation on addressing the deficiencies 
identified in the 2015 evaluation of Sweden's application of the Schengen acquis in the field of management of the 
external borders, Council Document 7124/16, Brussels, 15.03.2016. 
204 In the following Council Implementing Decisions: of 27 February 2016 with regard to the deficiencies in the field 
of the Schengen Information System, Council (2016), Council document 6200/16; of 8 March 2016 dealing with the 
deficiencies in police cooperation, Council (2016) Council document  6846/16; and two decisions of 5 April 2016, 
dealing with return and the common visa policy, respectively Council (2016), Council document 7533/16 and Council 
(2016), Council document 7536/16.  
205 See Council (2015), Schengen evaluation of Poland - Council Recommendation on addressing the deficiencies 
identified in the 2015 evaluation of the application of the Schengen acquis in the field of the Schengen Information 
System, Council document 15108/15, Brussels, 07.12.2015, based on the evaluation in European Commission 
(2015), COM (2015) 457 (not public). 
206 Council document 9691/16, 31.05.2016 (not public). 
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by the Member States in response to the increasing numbers of asylum seekers and irregular 
border crossings.207 The Commission addressed other alleged violations of the Schengen 
acquis, including alleged push-back practices at the external borders by Greece and Bulgaria, 
summary removals from Spain (Ceuta and Melilla), and excessive waiting times caused by 
checks by Spanish authorities in Gibraltar. The Commission asked Polish authorities to take 
necessary measures to amend the bilateral agreement with Ukraine to ensure that the shared 
border crossing points meet relevant safeguards included in the SEM. 
 
In the seventh bi-annual report, the Commission emphasises the added value of on-site visits 
under the new Schengen evaluation mechanism and the fact that all aspects of the Schengen 
acquis are evaluated over two months. The first two evaluations under this new regime took 
place in Austria (February-March 2015) and Belgium (April-May 2015). The new Schengen 
evaluation mechanism allows for unannounced visits: the first of which took place in Sweden 
early March 2015. In Poland a revisit took place on 25-27 March 2015, dealing with the 
evaluation of the use of SIS/Sirene.208 At the time of the publication of the seventh bi-annual 
report (May 2015), the reports of these visits were still to be finalised. 
 
In December 2015, the Commission published its eight bi-annual report.209 In this report, 
the Commission refers to the terrorist attacks in Paris of 13 November 2015, but also to the 
unprecedented number of migrants arriving in the Schengen area, taking into account 
different measures adopted by the MS at their internal borders in response to these 
developments. Addressing the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls by 
different MS in order to better manage secondary movements, the Commission finds that it 
must remain a temporary measure ‘helping to bring the situation back to normal’. Dealing 
with the Schengen evaluation mechanism, the Commission reports that two announced visits 
were carried out in the Netherlands and Germany, covering all the policy areas and that 
results of the earlier visits to Austria and Belgium have become available. During the 
reporting period, unannounced visits took place in Spain and Hungary addressing the 
management of external border controls.   
5.1.3. Infringement procedures initiated by the Commission 
Only a few procedures have been initiated by the European Commission dealing with alleged 
infringements of the SBC in accordance with Article 258 TFEU:210 
• 19 February 2009: reasoned opinion against France based on the Schengen Borders 
Code, procedure closed 26 January 2012 (2008/2024). 
• 24 October 2012: formal notice against Austria for alleged infringement of Article 22 
of the Schengen Borders Code, procedure closed 28 March 2014 (2012/2121).  
• 24 October 2012: formal notice against Slovakia for alleged infringement of Article 22 
the Schengen Borders Code, procedure closed 28 March 2014 (2012/2123).  
• 16 October 2014, formal notice against Germany for non-compliance of the German 
‘Bundespolizei Gesetz’ with Art 20 and 21(a) SBC, still pending (2014/4130). 
 
Furthermore, in its sixth report on the evaluation of Schengen, the Commission mentioned 
an infringement procedure dealing with Czech law obliging carriers to carry out systematic 
                                           
207 European Commission (2015), Seventh bi-annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 November 
2014 - 30 April 2015, COM(2015)236, Brussels, 29.5.2015. 
208 SIRENE stands for Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries. 
209 European Commission (2015), Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 10 
December 2015, COM(2015) 675, Strasbourg, 15.12.2015. 
210 See European Commission, DG HOME website (2016), “Browse infringements of EU Home Affairs law”, EU law 
monitoring. URL:http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/eu-law-and-
monitoring/infringements_by_policy_border_management_and_schengen_en.htm (last update 29 April 2016). This 
website does not give any information on which specific provision of the SBC has not been complied with.  
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checks on persons crossing the internal borders. The procedure was closed in 2014. According 
to the Commission, the Czech Republic had modified its legislation to make it compatible with 
EU law.211  
 
Thus, based on this information, only the procedure against Germany is still pending. In 
2014, members of the German parliament (Bundestag) submitted questions on this 
procedure, asking for information about the specific criticisms of the Commission with regard 
to non-compliance with the SBC and the conclusions the Federal German government drew 
from this procedure.212 The Federal Government replied that the European Commission raised 
legal concerns regarding Section 23 paragraph 1 number 3 of the Federal Police Act (BPolG), 
asking Germany to specify restrictions with respect to the intensity and frequency of checks. 
According to the German government the national legislation is compatible with the SBC and 
was to be discussed with the Commission at the beginning of 2015, after which the Federal 
Government would give its opinion. In 2015, the Federal government, despite repeated 
enquiries by members of the German parliament, refused to submit the letter of formal notice 
of the Commission in this infringement procedure.213 The Federal government based this 
refusal on a German act on the cooperation between government and parliament on EU 
matters, obliging it to submit information on infringement procedures dealing with directives, 
but not regulations. Due to this lack of specific information, it is unclear whether the 
infringement procedure initiated by the Commission deals with the same issues as submitted 
by the court of Kehl (Amtsgericht) in the preliminary questions to the CJEU of January 2016 
(see above). Nevertheless, it seems that the Commission is not planning to go further on this 
question.214  
 
The interviews carried out during this study revealed that there is a lack of knowledge about 
the infringement procedures due to issues of information handling, in particular in the 
provision of information to the national and the European Parliaments (see Sub-section 3.2. 
for more information).  
5.2. Role of EU agencies in the evaluation of external borders management and 
capacities  
This sub-section provides an assessment of the role given to EU agencies such as Frontex, 
EASO and the FRA in the Schengen monitoring and evaluation system.  
5.2.1. Role of Frontex 
5.2.1.1. Frontex risk analysis 
The tasks of Frontex (the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union) are regulated in Council 
Regulation 2007/2004, amended by Regulation 1168/2011.215 Article 2 of the Frontex 
Regulation provides for an assisting and coordinating role for Frontex, for example, in 
providing assistance to Member States in training their border guards and in the 
establishment of common training standards. 
 
                                           
211 European Commission (2014), Sixth bi-annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 31 October 
2014, COM(2014)711, Brussels, 27.11.2014, p. 5. 
212 Bundestag Drucksache 18/3464, 22 December 2014. 
213 Bundestag Drucksache 18/4149, 27 February 2015, p. 2. 
214 Interview with German Permanent Representation, 27.05.2016.  
215 European Communities (2004), Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union, OJ L 349, Brussels, 25.11.2004, amended by the European Union (2011), Regulation 
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Frontex plays a role in carrying out risk analyses, including the assessment of the capacity 
of Member States to face threats and pressure at external borders, and the conducting of 
research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders. For the purposes of its 
risk analyses, the Agency may assess, on the basis of Article 4 of the Frontex Regulation, 
after prior consultation with the Member States concerned, ‘their capacity to face upcoming 
challenges, including present and future threats and pressures at the external borders of the 
Member States’. This is expected to be of particular relevance for those Member States facing 
specific and disproportionate pressures. To that end, Frontex may assess the border control 
equipment and resources of the Member States. The assessment shall be based on 
information given by the Member States concerned, and on the reports and results of joint 
operations, pilot projects, rapid interventions and other activities of the Agency. Article 4 
explicitly mentions that these assessments by Frontex are without prejudice to the SEM. 
However, as indicated in Section 3.2, the risk analyses prepared by Frontex are used for the 
preparation of the visits to Member States for the five-yearly evaluations on the basis of 
Article 43 of the SBC. Furthermore, Article 7 of SEM requires Frontex to carry out yearly risk 
analyses for all Member States as a basis for the preparation of the annual evaluation 
programme for announced and unannounced on-site visits by expert teams. Article 7(2) 
includes the sentence:  “The Commission may at any time request Frontex to submit to it a 
risk analysis making recommendations for evaluations to be implemented in the form of 
unannounced on-site visits.” Thus, it seems that the Commission has more leverage in terms 
of timing to arrange unannounced visits without waiting for the annual Risk Analysis. 
 
Although not (directly) related to its tasks in evaluation, it is worth noting that, with the 2011 
amendment, Frontex has been granted more operational tasks, including the coordination or 
organisation of joint return operations, the setting up of European Border Guard Teams to 
be deployed during joint operations, pilot projects and rapid interventions, and the 
development and operation of information systems enabling ‘swift and reliable exchanges of 
information regarding emerging risks at the external borders’.216 
 
During the interviews conducted for the purposes of this study, the overall views on Frontex 
risk analyses were positive.217 The respondents mentioned coherent and thorough analysis 
as a strength. However,  there were a number of concerns raised. One of the issues is timing, 
as Frontex is obliged to prepare the risk analyses by August 31 of the next year, which means 
that the risk analysis for 2016 is prepared on the data gathered by August 2015. Such a long 
time lapse means that the information might not be relevant any more. Some respondents 
raised concerns on whether such analysis should be public, as it loses the depth and details. 
Some wanted to see more concrete indicators being used on what is actually happening at 
the borders, whereas  others called for a greater focus on more predictive intelligence, rather 
than risk assessment.  
5.2.1.2. Proposal for the European Border and Coast Guard: ‘vulnerability assessment’ 
In the so-called ‘Borders Package’, presented on 15 December 2015, the Commission 
launched the proposal for the establishment of a European Border and Coast Guard 
(EBCG).218 The establishment of the EBCG would mean that the current Frontex would obtain 
                                           
216 See Article 8a on rapid interventions and Article 11c on the processing of personal data of the European 
Communities (2007), Regulation (EC) No 863/2007. 
217 Interviews with German Permanent Representation, 27.05.2016; Slovenian Permanent Representation, 
30.05.2016; Council secretariat, 19.05.2016.  
218 European Commission (2015), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final, Strasbourg, 15.12.2015.   
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extended powers.219 Whereas Frontex currently only has a coordinating role, supporting 
Member States in controlling their external borders, the EBCG is due to gain more resources 
and executive powers. The final text on the EBCG was agreed between the EP and the Council 
in late June 2016.220 In operational terms, the new EBCG will have a rapid intervention pool 
of 1,500 officers. Various officers, ranging from police to border guards, would be deployed 
from a reserve of the EBCG, depending on the type of emergency. In addition, the EBCG 
would have its own technical pool for a more efficient response to manage a given situation. 
In addition, the EBCG proposal aims to improve the coordination of information exchange 
and operational cooperation between border authorities and other ‘authorities with coast 
guard functions’. To this end, it is expected that EBCG will gain access to the SIS II database 
and will take a more active role on returns. As was discussed earlier in this study, this 
indicates the blurring lines between functions of border guards and policing (see Sub-Section 
4.8.1.).  
 
The EBCG text also strengthens the monitoring and supervisory competences of the new 
Agency in Article 7.1.b of the Regulation. The Commission proposes to strengthen the new 
Agency's role by adding a ‘common vulnerability assessment methodology’ in Article 12(1), 
which aims at identifying operational weakenesses and assess “the capacity and readiness” 
of EU Members States to control the common EU external borders. It is envisaged that the 
vulnerability assessment would be based on “objective criteria”. Article 12(2)states that “the 
Agency shall monitor and assess at least once a year unless the Executive Director, based 
on risk assessments or a previous vulnerability assessment, decides otherwise, the 
availability of the technical equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, 
adequately skilled and trained staff of Member States necessary for border control. .”221 In 
Article 12 (3) it is stressed that particular attention will be paid to the capacity “to carry out 
all border management tasks including the capacity to deal with the potential arrival of large 
numbers of persons shall be taken into account.” 
 
The information necessary for carrying out this vulnerability assessment would be submitted 
by liaison officers posted in specific Member States, monitoring external border management 
in that state.222 The results of the vulnerability assessment will be sent to the concerned 
Member State, which will have the chance to provide comments. Member States would be 
expected to take measures to address any deficiencies identified in that assessment, based 
on the recommendations issued by the Agency’s Executive Director.223 The Executive Director 
shall base the recommendations on the risk analysis, the results of the assessment, the 
comments received by the Member States involved, as well as the results of the SEM. The 
                                           
219 Carrera, S. and den Hertog, L. (2016), “A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a Name?”, CEPS Paper,  
Liberty and Security in Europe,  no. 88, 2016 March. 
220 European Union (2016), Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on the 
European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, and  amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (not yet published in the OJ, agreed in LIBE committee on 27.06.2016). 
221 Article 12 of the European Union (2016), Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of … on the European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 
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immediate consequences at the external borders and subsequent consequences on the functioning of the Schengen 
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222 Article 11 of the European Commission (2015), Proposal for a Regulation [...] on the European Border and Coast 
Guard, COM(2015) 671 final, Op.cit. See also the European Commission (2015), Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A European Border and Coast Guard and effective 
management of Europe's external Borders, COM(2015) 673 final, Strasbourg, 15.12.2015., p. 4. 
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results of Vulnerability Assessments will be transmitted at least once a year to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Recital 17 states that224:  
 
“In cases where a Member State does not take the necessary measures in line with the 
vulnerability assessment or in the event of disproportionate pressure at the external borders 
where a Member State has not requested the Agency for sufficient support or is not taking 
the necessary actions for the implementation of these measures, rendering the control at the 
external border ineffective to an extent which risks putting in jeopardy the functioning of the 
Schengen area, a unified, rapid and effective response should be delivered at Union level. 
For the purpose of mitigating these risks, and to ensure better coordination at Union level, 
the Commission should identify and propose to the Council the measures to be implemented 
by the Agency and require the Member State concerned to cooperate with the Agency in the 
implementation of those measures. The implementing power to adopt such a decision should 
be conferred on the Council because of the potential politically-sensitive nature of the 
measures to be decided, often touching on national executive and enforcement powers. The 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency should then determine the actions to be taken for 
the practical execution of the measures indicated in the Council decision, and an operational 
plan should be drawn up with the Member State concerned. In case where a Member State 
does not comply within 30 days with this Council decision and does not cooperate with the 
Agency in the implementation of the measures contained in this decision, the Commission 
may trigger the application of the specific procedure where exceptional circumstances put 
the overall functioning of the area without internal border control at risk provided for in Article 
29 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399.”  
 
Thus, the relationship between the EBCG vulnerability assessment and the SEM and the 
consequences of non-compliance are not yet clear in practice.225 According to the 
Commission, while the Schengen evaluation mechanism is meant to maintain mutual trust 
among the Member States, the vulnerability assessment would be more focused on 
prevention, so as to avoid “crisis situations”.226 It is expected that the vulnerability 
assessment, in comparison with the SEM, would provide ongoing monitoring and would allow 
the new agency to respond more quickly. Nevertheless, the newly agreed text provides that 
‘vulnerability assessment’ could trigger Article 29 SBC as a separate track. Indeed, while the 
Regulation states that this will be without prejudice to the SEM, the new procedure entails 
an amendment of Regulation (EU) 2016/399. The new article 78a (in conjunction with article 
18) amends article 29 of the SBC (as follows) 227: 
 
" Article 78a 
1.  In exceptional circumstances, where the overall functioning of the area without internal 
border control is put at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to external 
border control as referred to in Article 21 of this Regulation or as a result of the non-
compliance of a Member State with a Council decision referred to in Article 18(1) of 
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225 Rijpma, J. (2016) “The proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard: evolution or revolution in external 
border management?” Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, March 2016, p. 14-17. URL: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556934/IPOL_STU(2016)556934_EN.pdf.  
226 European Commission (2015), Proposal for a Regulation [...] on the European Border and Coast Guard, 
COM(2015) 671 final, Op.cit., p. 4.  
227 European Union (2016), Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on the 
European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, and  amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (not yet published in the OJ, agreed in LIBE committee on 27.06.2016). 
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Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council*, and insofar as those 
circumstances constitute a serious threat to public policy or internal security within the area 
without internal border control or within parts thereof, border control at internal borders 
may be reintroduced in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article for a period of 
up to six months. That period may be prolonged, no more than three times, for a 
further period of up to six months if the exceptional circumstances persist.” 
 
Thus, the amendment provides that any EU Member State could claim the existence of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ justifying the reintroduction of temporary internal border 
controls, should the MS at external borders not coopoerate with the proposed EBCG 
intervention under Article 18228: 
 
“ Article 18 
 Situation at the external borders requiring urgent action 
1.           Where a Member State does not take the necessary measures in accordance 
with a decision of the Management Board referred to in Article 12(6) or in the event of 
specific and disproportionate pressure at the external border, where a Member State 
has not requested the Agency for sufficient support by means of actions as mentioned in 
Articles 14, 16 or 17 or is not taking the necessary actions for the implementation of those 
measures, thus rendering the control of the external borders ineffective to such an 
extent that it risks putting in jeopardy the functioning of the Schengen area, the Council, on 
the basis of a proposal from the Commission, may adopt without delay a decision by means 
of an implementing act, identifying the measures that should mitigate those risks to be 
implemented by the Agency and requiring the Member State concerned to cooperate with 
the Agency in the implementation of those measures. The Commission shall consult the 
Agency before making its proposal. 
1a.          If a situation requiring urgent action arises, the European Parliament shall be 
informed of that situation without delay and shall be informed of all subsequent 
measures and decisions taken in response.” 
 
A regular monitoring of compliance with EU standards by EU Member States holding the 
common EU external border is a welcome step forward in this initiative. It is, however, 
unclear how the vulnerability assessment procedure will address the challenges identified in 
this study with regard to the SEM in light of the recent experience in Greece and the use of 
Article 29 SBC. Envisaging a formal role in the assessment for the EBCG in trigerring Article 
29 SBC will mean that the process is no longer exclusively in the hands of the European 
Commission. It is not to be forgotten that, according to Article 62 of the proposal, the 
Management Board of the new Agency will be composed of “one representative of each 
Member State and two representatives of the Commission, all with voting rights.” This can 
be expected to grant EU Member States a high degree of influence over the decisions taken 
by the Executive Director. However, the European Commission will still remain in the main 
driving seat in the running of the SEM and in activating Article 29 SBC. That notwithstanding, 
the involvement of the EBCG will certainly lead to a higher degree of ‘politicisation’ 
surrounding the operability of the Article 29 SBC procedure. Moreover, unlike the SEM, the 
EBCG vulnerability assessment will not cover the monitoring of internal border checks. It is, 
therefore, necessary to better operationalise, and ensure the effectiveness of, the SEM 
irrespective of the new vulnerability assessment.  
                                           
228 European Union (2016), Regulation (EU) 2016/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on the 
European Border [and Coast] Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 
and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, and  amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (not yet published in the OJ, agreed in LIBE committee on 27.06.2016). 
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In addition, a question can be raised as regards the kind of checks and balances that will be 
in place to scrutinise the ‘objectivity’, impartiality and evidence-based nature of the 
assessement to be conducted by the new EBCG. So far, Article 1a provides that the EP should 
remain informed. As previously identifieid in this study, there are, however, fundamental 
obstacles and practical barriers in the current procedures, which prevent effective and 
meaningful access to documents and transparency by the European Parliament. Article 70.5 
states that “the Consultative Forum shall have effective access to all information concerning 
the respect for fundamental rights, including by carrying out on spot visits to joint operations, 
or rapid border interventions subject to the agreement of the host Member State, hotspot 
areas, return operations and return interventions.” It is therefore essential that this Article 
be fully implemented and that the Consultative Forum annual reports include fundamental 
rights considerations/challenges in Member States’ implementation practices in the context 
of Article 18 of the Regulation. Furthermore, the objectivity of the vulnerability assessment 
would be further ensured if the European Parliament called upon the new Fundamental Rights 
Officer to report back key issues in relation to the annual vulnerability assessment drawn up 
by the Agency. This would be in line with the new Article 71.2, which states that: “The 
Fundamental Rights Officer shall report on a regular basis and as such contribute to the 
mechanism for monitoring fundamental rights.” 
5.2.2. The European Asylum Support Office: evaluation of the CEAS and needs of 
Member States ‘subject to particular pressure’ 
For the moment EASO does not play an observer role in the SEM on-site missions. Since, 
anecdotally, one of the main issues that MS faced during the refugee crisis was a lack of 
capacity and preparedness to receive asylum seekers, to register them in the EURODAC and 
to assess their asylum claims in a timely fashion and in line with CEAS and EUFRC, the 
absence of EASO seems strange. According to Article 10(5) of Regulation 1053/2013, the 
Commission may invite Frontex, Europol or other Union bodies, offices or agencies involved 
in the implementation of the Schengen acquis to designate a representative to take part as 
an observer in an on-site visit concerning an area covered by their mandate. This provides a 
basis for an EASO observer in on-site visits in addition to the information that EASO may 
provide during the preparation of questionnaires and on-site visits. 
 
Nevertheless, EASO draws up its own reports on the functioning of the CEAS. According to 
Article 12 of the EASO Regulation 439/2010, EASO shall draw up an annual report on the 
situation of asylum in the Union, on the basis of information ‘already available from other 
relevant sources’. As part of that report, the EASO shall evaluate the results of activities 
carried out under this Regulation and make a comprehensive comparative analysis of them 
with the aim of improving the quality, consistency and effectiveness of the CEAS.229 
Furthermore, to be able to assess the needs of Member States ‘subject to particular pressure’, 
Article 9 of the EASO Regulation states that this Agency will gather, on the basis of 
information provided by Member States, the UNHCR and, where appropriate, other relevant 
organisations, relevant information for the identification, preparation and formulation of 
emergency measures referred to in Article 10 to cope with such pressure.  
 
The task of EASO to gather information includes the systematic identification, collection and 
analysis of ‘information relating to the structures and staff available, especially for translation 
and interpretation, information on countries of origin and on assistance in the handling and 
management of asylum cases and the asylum capacity in those Member States subject to 
                                           
229 European Union (2010), Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, OJ L 132, Brussels, 29.5.2010. 
Internal borders in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 70 
particular pressure, with a view to fostering quick and reliable mutual information to the 
various Member States' asylum authorities’ (Article 9(2)). 
5.2.3. Fundamental Rights Agency: ensuring fundamental rights compliance 
Fundamental rights are an integral part of the Schengen aquis. Thus, FRA plays an important 
role in supporting Schengen evaluators with fundamental rights expertise. FRA’s work has 
focused mainly on the following areas of the Schengen acquis: border management, return, 
visa policy, police cooperation and SIS II.  
 
It should also be noted that Recital 14 of the SBC stresses the importance of fundamental 
rights, stating that fundamental rights violations shall give rise to the intervention of the 
European Parliament (see Sub-section 3.2.). 
  
FRA is involved in Schengen evaluation at three levels: 
• Providing risk analysis;  
• Training evaluators;  
• Participation in the on-site mission;  
5.2.3.1. FRA risk analysis 
Under Article 8 of the SEM, the Commission may request relevant EU agencies to submit a 
risk analysis. Pursuant to this provision, the Commission requests yearly a risk analysis to 
FRA. FRA has to present its analysis to the Standing Committee on the evaluation and 
implementation of Schengen (Schengen evaluation committee). After the evaluation cycle is 
finished, the Commission makes such a report public. For example, in 2014, the FRA 
published its risk analysis.230 In its analysis, FRA provides an overview of the relevant 
fundamental rights issues in the EU Member States subject to regular evaluations. Due to 
mandate limitations, FRA does not cover Schengen Associated Countries in its analysis. The 
focus of the analysis is border management and return/re-admission, although other policy 
areas can also be covered. The risk analysis is based on: 
 
• Information and data gathered from the FRA research;  
• Publicly available official information from the UN, Council of Europe, national 
human rights institutions (e.g. ombudspersons), national authorities and civil society 
organisations (press reports are only exceptionally used, primarly for very recent 
events not yet covered elsewhere).  
 
The FRA risk analysis complements fundamental rights-related questions in the standard 
Schengen evaluation questionnaire.231 FRA follows its own institutional guidelines that cover 
methodological and procedural steps to prepare the risk analysis. The FRA methodology 
ensures that information provided is solid and cross-checked. 
 
                                           
230 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), 2014 Schengen evaluations: Risk analysis submitted by 
FRA under Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No. 1053/2013, Annex to MIGRAPOL CC Return Dir 54, Vienna, 09.08.2014. 
URL :http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=16015&no=4. 
231 European Commission (2014), ANNEX 1 to the Commission Implementing Desicion establishing a standard 
questionnaire in accordance with Article 9 of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 
establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, C(2014) 
4657 final, Brussels, 11.7.2014. ( further – SEM Questionnaire). URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/borders-and-visas/general/docs/c_2014_4657_f1_annex_en.pdf 
Policy Department C: Citizens’ rights and Constitutional Affairs 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 71 
5.2.3.2. Training of future evaluators 
FRA is involved in the training of future evaluators, who will participate to announced or 
unannounced on-site missions. Training of Schengen evaluators is organised by Frontex 
(covering border management and return) or by CEPOL (covering police cooperation, SIS 
and visa policies). FRA contributes to such training sessions.  
 
Evaluators usually come from national governments or agencies. The training covers those 
fundamental rights issues that could be at stake when evaluating a particular area of the 
Schengen acquis. There is no mechanism ensuring that the people who have received the 
training are actually deployed232, though the FRA respondent confirmed that many of them 
do indeed get deployed.233 
5.2.3.3. Participation in the on-site missions 
On the basis of Article 10(5) of the SEM, FRA is invited by the Commission to participate in 
the on-site missions as an observer. The agency is invited to the evaluation missions in the 
fields of return and readmission, but not on borders issues. FRA representatives cover 
relevant questions on returns and readmissions, safegards concerning protection from 
unlawful or arbitrary detention, forced return monitorin, etc. During the mission, FRA officials 
act as advisors/experts on fundamental rights-related issues. The missions are led by DG 
HOME in the Commission, which distributes the relevant information among the experts. 
5.2.3.4. Questionnaires  
The Schengen evaluation mainly relies on the information produced by the MS, as is 
enshrined in SEM (Regulation 1053/2013). MS complete a questionnaire with a set of 
fundamental rights-related questions, such as on the return aquis, detention conditions, 
detention of children, external borders, the respect of non-refoulement principle, and access 
to international protection. The questionnaire also includes the issue of how freedom of 
movement is respected when exercising border controls. Only questions 34 and 35 of the 
questionnaire234 relate to internal controls – i.e. whether or not police checks are tantamount 
to border checks. The questionnaires are not used for the FRA risk analysis, as they come in 
later than the FRA assessment. 
  
  
                                           
232 Interview with the Commission, DG Home, 17.05.2016.  
233 Interview with the FRA, 04.05.2016.  
234 European Commission (2014), SEM Questionnaire, Op.cit. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
This study has examined the Schengen governance system in the wake of the recent events 
of 2015 and early 2016, often referred to as the European refugee crisis. The analysis 
concludes that no legislative reform is necessary in light of these developments. While the 
Commission has referred to the need to get ‘back to Schengen’ before the end of 2016, the 
developments since the summer of 2015 show that we have never left it. The Schengen 
governance system adopted in 2013 is ‘fit for purpose’ and Schengen is here to stay. The 
few EU Member States that have reintroduced internal border checks have done so (at least 
formally) in compliance with the Schengen rules. Notwithstanding that, as this study shows, 
the grounds or justifications given by these States to continue with the reintroduction of 
internal border controls are not sufficient. The controls are disproportionate and beyond what 
is necessary in light of the predominantly asylum-based nature of the European refugee crisis 
and the lack of solidarity shown.  
 
The latest developments do not therefore justify any new legislative reform of the Schengen 
system and its governance framework. The Schengen system was reformed in 2013 and the 
new system has been only implemented in practice since 2015. It would therefore be 
premature to bring in a new legislative reform package. It is, however, imperative that each 
EU institutional actor play its role more effectively in the evaluation of EU Member States’ 
compliance with the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and the lawfulness of internal border 
checks. The European Commission cannot be a mediator among EU Member States - this is 
a role for the Council to play. The Commission must rather act as guarantor of the Treaties, 
and thoroughly and objectively evaluate Member States’ compliance with Schengen principles 
and rules. The European Parliament needs to be better equipped to ensure that the 
Commission is duly carrying out its role in evaluating Member States’ compliance with the 
rules, and to perform a greater democratic scrutiny over EU Member States’ compliance, in 
particular when their actions affect the fundamental rights of individuals. 
 
The analysis shows that the Member States’ justifications for the reintroduction of intra-
Schengen state borders controls under Articles 26–29 since 13 September 2015 have been 
woefully inadequate. They lack substantiation and detail and fail to substantively fulfil the 
requirements of the SBC. Justifications made by Member States for the reintroduction of 
intra-Schengen Border controls should be fully and properly communicated to the public and 
explained on the basis of the criteria set out in the SBC; rote repetition of the wording of the 
Articles in the SBC should not be considered sufficient. The proportionality assessment for 
the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls that any Member State seeking to use 
these provisions must undertake needs to be thorough and complete in light of the 
fundamental nature of the right to the intra-Schengen free movement of persons without 
border checks as a part of the internal market.  
 
Moreover, continuing internal border checks on the basis of fears of future/potential 
secondary movements of asylum seekers, or the instability of the EU-Turkey Statement, 
cannot be accepted. This justification is not based on independent and thorough evidence 
and is therefore disproportionate and could jeopardise the sustainability of the entire 
Schengen machinery. The fact that the European Commission is now in the driving seat of 
Schengen evaluations constitutes a positive step forward in comparison to the previous inter-
governmental (peer-to-peer) evaluation system. Still, recent developments have showed the 
need for the Commission to act more firmly in enforcing EU standards and to be better 
equipped. It must ensure that Member States’ actions are evidence- and needs- based, and 
are not just driven by irrational, fear-based national political games. The intersection of the 
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arrival of refugees in larger numbers than anticipated and the perception of unreasonable 
pressure on the intra-Schengen borders has been evident. The most substantial issue is the 
reaction to refugee arrivals, not via the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), but by 
the reintroduction of internal borders. These may be used to regulate the movement of third 
country nationals, but should not be applied to refugees. 
 
Where Member States invoke ‘secondary movements’ of asylum seekers within the Schengen 
area as a reason for the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls, very serious and 
compelling reasons should be provided with supporting documentation that shows the 
genuine existence of a threat. The free movement of persons without impediment by border 
controls is one of the main objectives of the internal market and a core benefit of it. Moreover, 
re-instating border checks can do little to ensure the requisite reception conditions for asylum 
seekers and refugees. Where Member States invoke the threat of terrorism as a reason for 
the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls, sufficient detail as to the nature of the 
threat, and how precisely internal border controls would address it, must be provided to the 
EU institutions so that they can ensure that the proportionality assessment is correctly carried 
out.  
 
All the EU Member States that continue to apply internal border checks have failed to pass 
the necessity and proportionality test required by the EU Schengen governance framework. 
The Commission proposal and subsequent Council Decision of 12 May, setting out a 
Recommendation for temporary internal border controls in exceptional circumstances that 
put the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk, was based on evaluations conducted 
back in November 2015. These focused solely on Greece’s capacity to deliver on SBC 
standards. However, the situation both in Greece and the five EU Member States that have 
been allowed to continue with border controls has profoundly changed during the last six 
months and the Schengen evaluation procedure does not always ensure an up-to-date 
account of the situation on the ground. Moreover, those Schengen evaluations did not focus 
on compliance and delivery of CEAS asylum standards by Greece, nor by the other EU 
Member States re-instating internal border checks. It is regrettable that the Commission has 
accepted the non-evidence-based justifications from the five Member States and has focused 
its assessment purely on border control standards in Greece. However, the Study shows that 
the Council Decision of 12 May 2016 set very specific conditions, geographical locations and 
a specific timeframe (as well as obligations to report back to the Commission) for these five 
Member States conducting internal border checks. The Council Decision also clearly shows 
that this is a rather small group of concerned states, who are clearly a minority in the wider 
EU Schengen membership picture. 
 
People moving across Schengen borders in search of international protection must not be 
classified as ‘irregular migrants’. People in need of international protection should never be 
referred to as ‘illegal’. The Member States and the EU institutions must recognise that they 
are asylum seekers and refugees in accordance with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) definition of a refugee and effectively apply EU asylum law and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The EU institutions and Member States must respect their 
duty under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (Article 31) not to commence criminal 
prosecutions or apply other penalties to refugees for their irregular entry onto their territory, 
including entry as a result of intra-Schengen movement. The classification of asylum seekers 
as irregular immigrants to justify borders controls or police checks in border areas is 
problematic for three reasons. First, it allows the extended use of internal border checks, 
contrary to the purposes of the SBC. Second, based on this classification, asylum seekers 
crossing internal borders can be detained on the basis of regular migration rules, disregarding 
applicable EU laws on the reception of asylum seekers. And third, it displaces the focus of 
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attention from a challenge that is predominantly one of asylum, to one of border containment 
and control as ‘the solution’. 
 
According to Article 23 of the SBC, the exercise of police powers and checks at the internal 
borders may not have the objective (or be equivalent to) border controls and must be based 
on general police information and experience ‘regarding possible threats to public security 
and aim, in particular, to combat cross-border crime’. Furthermore, they must be devised 
and executed in a manner clearly distinct from systematic checks on persons at the external 
borders (and rather be carried out on the basis of ‘spot checks’). Several Member States use 
police checks in border areas for migration control purposes, making a direct connection 
between irregular immigration and possible threats to public security. These police practices 
fall within the scope of the SBC and are therefore subject to European scrutiny. They are 
contrary to the purpose of Article 23 and recital 26 of the SBC stating that “migration and 
the crossing of external borders by a large number of third-country nationals should not, per 
se, be considered to be a threat to public policy or internal security”. National practices of 
mobile police checks at the internal borders illustrate that the line between ‘border controls’ 
and ‘border checks’, prohibited in 22 SBC on the one hand, and police checks allowed in 
Article 23 SBC, remains unclear. While the 2013 Schengen governance reform allowed the 
European Commission to conduct on-site evaluations of internal police checks practices, the 
effectiveness of this scrutiny is largely undermined by a high degree of legal uncertainty and 
the lack of transparency of Member State law enforcement authorities’ actions when checking 
people on the move. On the basis of the above, we put forward the following 
recommendations: 
 
Recommendations 
 
First, the 2013 Schengen Governance Package is fit for purpose and recent developments 
do not justify new legislative amendments or reforms to the Schengen Borders Code. The 
new rules have only recently been put into effect and there should be at least a five-year 
settling-in period before more amendments are considered. Instead, the Commission should 
take a much more robust and evidence-based approach to the legal assessment of Member 
States’ notifications for the reintroduction of intra-Schengen border controls and subject 
them to a comprehensive proportionality test. The test should centre on the impact of the 
abolition of intra-Schengen state border controls on the movement of persons and the 
internal market.  
 
Second, the Commission should prepare, in consultation with the UNHCR, guidelines for the 
Member States on the correct application of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention in the EU 
area without internal border controls. Where there is evidence that Member States are 
starting criminal proceedings against refugees for irregular entry onto their territory, either 
from outside the Schengen area or within it, it should commence infringement proceedings 
for failure to correctly apply the CEAS. The EU should equip itself with an ‘asylum evaluation 
mechanism’ similar to the one in Schengen based on Article 70 of the TFEU. 
 
Third, the results of Schengen evaluations of external and internal borders should meet a 
higher degree of public scrutiny and transparency. There should be a clear obligation to 
communicate publicly about developments such as those of the last 10 months, including the 
kind of measures adopted by some EU Member States and the exact scope of internal border 
checks and their justifications.  The European Parliament’s role should be better implemented 
and fine-tuned.  
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The European Parliament should be better equipped to require the Commission to fulfil its 
obligations under the Treaties and be a real guardian of the treaties, not a facilitator of the 
whims of the Member States. Specific procedures should be developed as regards the ways 
in which the Commission classifies and sends information resulting from these evaluations to 
the European Parliament.  
The European Parliament and national parliaments should be more accurately informed on of 
the state of play with respect to infringement procedures initiated by the Commission against 
Member States based on alleged violations of the SBC. This information should include the 
content of the letter of formal notice and reasoned opinion of the Commission and the 
subsequent answers of the Member States.  
 
Fourth, Member States that extend the use of police checks at the internal borders within 
the meaning of Article 23 SBC (former Article 21) should be obliged to inform the Commission 
and other Member States more thoroughly. Article 23 SBC (former Article 21) must be 
amended accordingly. The Commission should prepare guidelines on the use of police checks 
in border areas that can be allowed within the scope of Article 23(a) SBC (former 21(a)). 
There are currently no effective ways to assess and monitor checks by national police 
authorities that basically amount to border controls. Any future revision of the SIS II should 
include an obligation for national police and other law enforcement authorities to report the 
reason, scope and location of checks when using the SIS II. The over-use of SIS II by national 
authorities could be an indicator that domestic practices are jeopardising the SBC and the 
spirit of Schengen. 
 
Fifth, the current practical application of the Article 29 mechanism could be improved. Its 
current operability undermines the EU principles of solidarity between Member States and 
adherence to the Schengen acquis, by only punishing Member States who are unable or 
unwilling to cope with large numbers of asylum seekers and allowing others to close their 
internal borders without due foundation. It should instead ensure that the latter assist the 
border Member States in dealing with and receiving asylum seekers and migrants. The 
relationship between the risk analysis of Frontex, the proposed ‘vulnerability assessment’ of 
the European Border and Coast Guard, and the existing Schengen evaluation mechanism (as 
well as the consequences of non-compliance) should be clarified in the applicable EU law. 
Frontex (or the future European Border and Coast Guard) should not be able to trigger or 
justify the use of Article 29 SBC on its own. 
 
Sixth, a key weakness in the current Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism, and 
the evaluations performed by the Commission, is that they lack on-the-ground and objective 
knowledge of the actual challenges faced in the practical delivery of EU Schengen and asylum 
standards by relevant EU Member States. The role of civil society organisations should be 
explored and better utilised so as to ensure a more independent and substantiated 
assessment of Member States’ actions on the ground. The European Parliament should 
support the setting up of a ‘Shadow Evaluation Mechanism’, focused on Member States’ 
compliance with Schengen and CEAS rules. This should be further elaborated on by civil 
society organisations, in close cooperation with the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA). This mechanism would ensure an independent and on-the-ground assessment 
of the effective implementation of Schengen and asylum rules at domestic levels. 
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ANNEX 1. SUMMARIES OF CJEU CASE LAW ON THE 
SCHENGEN BORDERS CODE 
 
Up to May 2016 nine cases with respect to the rules on borders in the Schengen Borders 
Code (SBC) have reached the Court of Justice of the EU. The Court has handed down six 
judgments, four concerning rules on external borders and two with respect to rules on 
internal borders. Two more cases are pending before the Court: one on grounds for refusal 
at the external borders and one on police controls behind internal borders. One reference on 
controls behind internal borders was withdrawn after the judgment of the Court in a similar 
case. We will first discuss the judgments with respect to rules on external border and then 
those on internal borders. Finally, two other judgments of the Court with general observations 
on the Schengen Borders Code are mentioned in points 10 and 11 below. 
 
All judgments relate to the 2006 version of the Code. For the sake of clarity and uniformity, 
we use hereunder the new numbers of the corresponding Articles in the re-codified version 
of the SBC (Regulation 2016/399).  
  
So far no cases with respect to Regulation 1053/2013 have reached the Court. 
 
CJEU case law on external borders 
 
1. In its first judgment on the Schengen Borders Code in Carcia & Cabrera, the Court, in reply 
to a question referred by a Spanish court in two cases, held that Article 12 SBC does not 
imply that a Member State is obliged to expel a third-country national unlawfully present on 
its territory because he or she does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of duration 
of stay applicable there. Moreover, the Court held that Article 6 SBC establishing the entry 
conditions for third-country nationals when they cross an external border for stays not 
exceeding three months per six-month period, and Article 14 SBC concerning the refusal of 
entry to the territory of the Member States, both do not apply to third-country nationals who 
were unlawfully on the territory of the Member State and did not fulfil the conditions for 
entry, when the expulsion order was made against them (CJEU 22 October 2009 C-261/08 
Garcia & Cabrera, ECLI:C:2009:468, points 44, 45 and 66). 
 
2. The reference by the French Conseil d’Etat raised the question of whether a circular from 
the Minister of Interior introducing mandatory refusal of re-entry without a visa into French 
territory to third-country nationals holding acknowledgements of receipt of an asylum 
application was compatible with the Schengen Borders Code. Before that circular these third-
country nationals could leave France and return via the Schengen area external borders 
provided that that document had not expired. The circular put an end to that administrative 
practice without providing for a transitional period. 
 
The Court held that the rules governing refusal of entry laid down in Article 14 SBC apply to 
any third-country national who wishes to enter a Member State by crossing an external 
border of the Schengen area. These rules are also applicable to third-country nationals who 
are subject to the requirement to obtain a visa and wish to return via the Schengen area 
external borders to the Member State which issued them with a temporary residence permit 
pending examination of an application for asylum. That permit does not entitle the third-
country national to enter for that purpose the territory of another Member State. Further, 
the Court decided that the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate 
expectations did not require the provision of transitional measures in the SBC for the benefit 
of third-country nationals who had left the territory of a Member State when they were 
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holders of this type of temporary residence permit and wanted to return to that territory after 
the entry into force of the SBC. Finally, it was held that a Member State which issues to a 
third-country national a re-entry visa within the meaning of that provision cannot restrict 
entry into the Schengen area solely to points of entry to its national territory (CJEU 12 June 
2012 C-606/10 ANAFE, ECLI:C:2012:348). 
 
3. Another judgment was given in the case of Mr Zakaria who had permanent residence rights 
in Sweden and flew from Beirut to Copenhagen via Riga, using as an identification document 
his Palestinian refugee travel document issued by Lebanon. At Riga airport, the border guards 
inspected his documents and finally allowed him to enter Latvia and thus the Schengen area. 
Mr Zakaria considered that his documents were inspected in an offensive and provocative 
manner, which violated his human dignity. On account of the time taken by that inspection 
he missed his flight to Copenhagen. He lodged a complaint with the Head of the State border 
control and sought compensation before Latvian courts. In answer to questions from the 
Latvian Supreme Court, the Court of Justice held that Article 14(3) SBC obliges Member 
States to establish a means of obtaining redress only against decisions to refuse entry. But 
the national court should establish whether the treatment of Mr Zakaria at Riga airport was 
in conformity with Article 7 SBC, requiring border guards in the performance of their duties 
to fully respect human dignity and not to discriminate against persons. Member States should 
in their national law provide for the appropriate legal remedies to ensure, in compliance with 
Article 47 EU Charter, the protection of persons claiming the rights derived from Article 7 
SBC (CJEU 17 January 2013 C-23/12 Zakaria, points 35 and 40). 
 
4. Air Baltic in 2010 transported, on a flight from Moscow to Riga, an Indian citizen who, at 
border control at Riga airport, produced a valid Indian passport without a uniform Schengen 
visa and a cancelled Indian passport, to which a valid multiple entry uniform visa was affixed, 
issued by Italy. The cancelled passport contained the annotation: ‘Passport cancelled. Valid 
visas in the passport are not cancelled.’ The Indian citizen was refused entry into Latvian 
territory on the ground that he did not have a visa in a valid passport. The Latvian 
immigration authorities imposed an administrative fine on Air Baltic, on the grounds that Air 
Baltic had transported to Latvia a person without the required travel documents. Both the 
complaint made by Air Baltic with the administrative authorities and its action against the 
fine in the administrative court were dismissed. In reply to a the referral by the Riga 
Administrative Court, the Court of Justice held that Article 6(1) and Article 14(1) Schengen 
Borders Code, read together, provide that the entry of third-country nationals into the 
territory of Member States is not subject to the condition that, at the border check, the valid 
visa presented must necessarily be affixed to a valid travel document. The Court, more 
generally, held that a Member State does not have discretion to refuse a third-country 
national entry to its territory by applying a condition that is not laid down in the Schengen 
Borders Code (CJEU 4 September 2014 C-575/12 Air Baltic, ECLI:C:2013:2155, points 69 
and 70).  
 
5. In an action brought by the Parliament, the Court, in 2012, annulled Council Decision 
2010/252 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea 
external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by Frontex because 
the Decision contained essential elements of the surveillance of the sea external borders of 
the Member States which go beyond the scope of the additional measures within the meaning 
of Article 12(5) of the 2006 SBC, and only the Parliament and the Council, acting together, 
were entitled to adopt such a decision (CJEU 5 September 2012 C-355/10 Parliament v 
Council, ECLI:C:2012:519). 
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6. Pending before the Court is the question of whether Article 3(1) of Regulation 1889/2005 
on controls of cash entering or leaving the Community and Article 5(1) SBC must be 
interpreted as meaning that a national of a third State who is in the international transit area 
of an airport is not subject to the obligation to make a declaration about carrying cash of a 
value of EUR 10 000 or more under Article 3(1) of Regulation 1889/2005, or, on the contrary, 
whether those provisions must be interpreted as meaning that that national is subject to that 
obligation by virtue of having crossed an external border of the Community at one of the 
border crossing points referred to in Article 5(1) Schengen Borders Code. (Case El Dakkak 
C-17/16) 
 
CJEU case law on internal borders 
 
All three cases relate to the limits of the powers of national authorities to conduct police 
controls in a zone directly behind the internal land borders with other Schengen states.  
 
7. In the Melki case the French Cour de Cassation asked whether Article 67 TFEU precludes 
national legislation which permits police authorities, within an area of 20 kilometres from the 
internal land border with another Schengen state, to check the identity of any person in order 
to ascertain whether he fulfils the obligations laid down by law to hold, carry and produce 
papers and documents. The Court of Justice held that Article 67(2) TFEU and Articles 22 and 
23 SBC precludes national legislation which grants national police authorities the power to 
check, solely within an area of 20 kilometres from the land border with another Schengen 
state, the identity of any person, irrespective of his behaviour and of specific circumstances 
giving rise to a risk of breach of public order, in order to ascertain whether the obligations 
laid down by law to hold, carry and produce papers and documents are fulfilled, where that 
legislation does not provide the necessary framework for that power to guarantee that its 
practical exercise cannot have an effect equivalent to border checks. (CJEU 22 June 2010 C-
188/10 Melki & Abdeli, ECLI:C:2101:363). 
  
8. Mr Adil, an Afghan national was stopped by the Dutch border police when he was a 
passenger in a bus driving on a motorway within an area 20 kilometres from the land border 
with Germany. After he was stopped, Mr. Adil applied for asylum. He was put in immigration 
detention on the grounds of unlawful residence in Netherlands. Before the District Court and 
the Council of State, Mr Adil contested the lawfulness of the stop and the decision to detain 
him, on the grounds that the check amounted to a border check prohibited by the Schengen 
Borders Code. The Council of State referred the question on the limits of Member States’ 
power to conduct controls in the zone behind the internal land border to the Court of Justice. 
In the Adil judgment in 2012 the Court, as in the Melki judgment, observed that the checks 
were not carried out at the internal border as such. Hence, the checks were not prohibited 
by Article 22 SBC. Since they were carried out in the territory, the checks fell within the scope 
of Article 23 SBC. The Court held that Articles 22 and 23 SBC do not preclude national 
legislation which enables officials responsible for border surveillance and the monitoring of 
foreign nationals to carry out checks, in a geographical area 20 kilometres from the internal 
land border between two Schengen States with a view to establishing whether the persons 
stopped satisfy the requirements for lawful residence applicable in the Member State 
concerned provided that  three conditions are met: (1) those checks are based on general 
information and experience regarding the illegal residence of persons at the places where the 
checks are to be made, (2) they may also be carried out to a limited extent in order to obtain 
such general information and experience-based data in that regard, and (3) the carrying out 
of those checks is subject to certain limitations concerning, inter alia, their intensity and 
frequency. (CJEU 19 July 2012 C-278/12 Adil, ECLI:C:2012:508). 
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From these two judgments it appears that police checks applied uniformly throughout the 
territory will rarely be forbidden by Article 23 SBC. Specific rules on police checks in the 
border zone are permitted but should be accompanied by detailed safeguards to ensure that 
the checks are selective and targeted. In the Court’s words: “the more extensive the evidence 
of the existence of a possible equivalent effect, within the meaning of [Article 23 Schengen 
Border Code] apparent from the objective pursued by the checks carried out in a border area, 
from the territorial scope of those checks and from the existence of a distinction between the 
basis of those checks and that of those carried out in the remainder of the territory of the 
Member State concerned, the greater the need for strict detailed rules and limitations laying 
down the conditions for the exercise by the Member States of their police powers in a border 
area and for strict application of those detailed rules and limitations, in order not to imperil 
the attainment of the objective of the abolition of internal border controls” (Adil point 75). 
 
The earlier referral of a similar question to the Court by a Dutch District Court was withdrawn 
shortly after the Court’s judgment in Adil (see case C-88/12 (Jaoo)). 
 
9. The Amtsgericht Kehl (Germany), in a criminal case, referred two questions on police 
controls behind the internal land borders of the Schengen area to the Court in January 2016. 
Firstly, it asked whether Article 67(2) TFEU and Articles 22 and 23 SBC or any other rules of 
EU law preclude national legislation which grants the police authorities the power to check, 
within an area of up to 30 km from the internal (Schengen) land border, the identity of any 
person, irrespective of his behaviour and of specific circumstances, with a view to impeding 
or stopping unlawful entry into the territory of that Member State or to preventing certain 
criminal acts directed against the security or protection of the border or committed in 
connection with the crossing of the border, in the absence of any temporary reintroduction 
of border controls at the relevant internal border. 
 
Secondly, it asked whether Article 67(2) TFEU and Articles 22 and 23 SBC or any other rules 
of EU law preclude a rule of national law which grants the police authorities the power briefly 
to stop and question any person on a train or on the premises of the railways of that Member 
State, with a view to impeding or stopping unlawful entry into the territory of that Member 
State, and to request that person to produce for the purposes of checking the identity 
documents or border crossing papers he is carrying and visually inspect the articles he is 
carrying, if, on the basis of known facts or border police experience, it may be presumed that 
such trains or railway premises are used for unlawful entry and that entry is effected from a 
Schengen State in the absence of any temporary reintroduction of border controls at the 
relevant internal border. (Case A, C-9/16). 
 
10. In the Shomodi judgment, the Court of Justice held that the spirit of Regulation No 
1931/2006 on local border traffic demands that its provisions be given an autonomous 
interpretation where the need arises. Both the objectives of that regulation and its provisions 
indicate that the EU legislature intended to put rules in place for local border traffic which 
derogate from the Schengen Borders Code. (CJEU 21 March 2013, C-254/11 Shomodi, 
ECLI:C:2013:182, point 24). 
 
11. The Court held in Gaydarov that it cannot be either the purpose or the effect of the 
Schengen Borders Code, as is clear from recital 5 and Article 3(a) thereof, to restrict the 
freedom of movement of Union citizens as provided for by the TFEU. (CJEU 17 November 
2011, C-430/10 Gaydarov, ECLI:C:2011:749, point 28). 
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ANNEX 2. EU LARGE-SCALE INFORMATION SYSTEMS: WHO 
HAS ACCESS TO WHAT? 
 
To date, Europol and Eurojust are the only EU security agencies that are authorised to 
connect to the three EU databases of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice whose 
structure is primarily based on a central system: the Schengen Information System second 
generation (SIS II), the Visa Information Schengen (VIS) and EURODAC. However, officials 
of the Commission and JHA Counsellors of the Council are pondering the possibility of 
granting access to SIS II to the future European Coast and Border Guard. Below we first lay 
out the access rights of Europol and Eurojust as EU law currently defines them. We then 
move on to locating the positions of both agencies in the wider security landscape, as they 
are defined by these access rights. 
 
Access to SIS II 
 
According to Article 41 of Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of 
the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)235, Europol can access and 
search directly alerts on persons wanted for arrest or extradition,236 alerts on persons and 
objects wanted for discreet surveillance,237 and alerts on objects wanted for seizure in 
criminal proceedings.238 
 
If a search retrieves a hit, Europol informs the requesting Member State via a secure 
information exchange network application and Europol National Units. Europol may also 
request further information through the same channels.  
 
Europol is prohibited from recording or copying any parts of SIS II in any computer system 
such as the Analytical Work Files and the Europol Information System. Only specifically 
authorised Europol staff can handle SIS II requests. The Europol Joint Supervisory Body 
supervises the rights and practice of access to SIS II data.  
 
According to Article 42 of the SIS II Decision 2007/533/JHA, Eurojust can access and search 
directly alerts on persons wanted for arrest of extradition,239 alerts on missing persons, 240 
alerts to persons sought for participation in criminal procedures,241 alerts on objects wanted 
for seizure in criminal proceedings. 242 
 
In case of a hit, the members of Eurojust inform the issuing member states. No parts of SIS 
II can be copied onto Eurojust Computer System. According to Article 43 of SIS II 
Decision 2007/533/JHA Europol and Eurojust Staff may only access data that are necessary 
for the performance of their tasks.  
Finally, discussions are currently being held within the Commission regarding the possibility 
to grant the European Border and Coast Guard access to SIS II in order to improve and 
increase the operational involvement of this agency in return operations.  
                                           
235 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63–84 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32007D0533).  
236 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, Article 26.  
237 Ibid., Article 36.  
238 Ibid., Article 38.  
239 Ibid., Article 26.  
240 Ibid., Article 32.  
241 Ibid., Article 34.  
242 Ibid., Article 38.  
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Access to EURODAC 
 
According to Article 1.2 of EURODAC Regulation (EU) No 603/2013,243 Europol can access 
the database for law enforcement purposes. Article 7 of EURODAC Regulation (EU) 
No 603/2013 makes provision for the creation of a verifying authority, operating 
independently from the operating unit of Europol, which is authorised to request comparisons 
with EURODAC data. This unit is competent to “collect, store, process, analyse and exchange 
information to support and strengthen action by Member States in preventing, detecting or 
investigating terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences falling within Europol's 
mandate.”  
 
According to Article 21 of EURODAC Regulation (EU) No 603/2013, the Europol operating unit 
can electronically request comparison with fingerprint data in cases where there is an 
overriding public security concern, where the comparison is necessary and case-specific and 
where there are serious grounds to suspect that a person who is registered on EURODAC 
might be involved in a serious crime or terrorism-related offence.  Eurojust is not granted 
access to EURODAC. 
 
Access to the Visa Information System 
 
According to Article 1 of Decision 2008/633/JHA,244 Europol may access VIS for the purposes 
of combating terrorist and serious offences. Article 7 of Decision 2008/633/JHA makes 
provision for the creation of a specialised unit authorised to consult VIS data. Europol is 
authorised to retain VIS data for strategic purposes as long as the data has been anonymised. 
Eurojust is not granted access to VIS. 
 
EU agencies in the network of databases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
243 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment 
of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and 
on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for 
law enforcement purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, 
p. 1–30.  
244 Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information 
System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, 
detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 129–
136. 
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Graph X.Y. EU agencies in the network databases 
 
 
Source: Authors, 2016.  
 
These access rights locate Eurojust, Europol and the future EBCG in different parts of the 
network of institutions that are authorised to connect to these three databases. These 
institutions are of different nature. For the sake of clarity, the graph below distinguishes nine 
categories of end-users. These categories are based on an examination of the lists of 
authorities that are authorised to connect to the three databases, and which are published 
by EU-LISA245. Where necessary, we explain what these categories refer to: 
• Data Protection Authorities,  
• Justice (courts, judges and prosecutors), 
• Military police,  
• General administration,  
                                           
245 List of designated authorities which have access to data recorded in the Central System of Eurodac pursuant to 
Article 27(2) of Regulation (EU) No 603/2013, for the purpose laid down in Article 1(1) of the same Regulation, EU-
LISA, 2015; List of competent authorities which are authorised to search directly the data contained in the second 
generation Schengen Information System pursuant to Article 31(8) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Article 46(8) of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, 
operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System, EU-LISA, 2015; Report on the technical 
functioning of VIS, including the security thereof, pursuant to Article 50(3) of the VIS Regulation, EU-LISA, 2015. 
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• Asylum and Migration Services (departments in charge of policing foreigners and 
services in charge of granting asylum), 
• Police & Interior (general police services as well as forensic police services managing 
biometrics), 
• Transport (vehicle registration, port authorities and other competent agencies), 
• Security & Intelligence 
Visa and Consulates. 
 
The size of the nodes corresponding to end-users is proportional to the overall number of 
agencies in this category. For EU systems and agencies, nodes have a fixed size. 
Furthermore, the edges are weighted according to the degree of access that a category has 
with regard to one particular system. The thicker the edge, the closer the node of the agency 
is to one of the databases. Edges connecting EU agencies to EU databases have fixed 
thickness. 
 
Three clusters appear in this network. On the left side, one finds institutions that are 
connected solely to SIS II. These are transport authorities, military police (only three 
agencies and approximately 350 end-users institutions) and Eurojust. It is to be noted that 
the future EBCG, if it were to be granted access to SIS II, would also probably sit in this 
region of the network. In the upper left-hand side, between the SIS II and the VIS nodes, 
one finds a second cluster composed of institutions that can access both databases. This 
cluster comprises customs and judicial authorities, which nonetheless remain overwhelmingly 
drawn towards SIS II where most of their access lies. It also contains data protection 
authorities, which, by contrast, are drawn towards VIS where most of their access is.  
 
The third cluster corresponds to institutions that are granted access to the three databases: 
VIS, SIS II and EURODAC. This cluster is, first and foremost, clearly dominated by police and 
ministries of the interior, which enjoy the highest degree of access to the three databases, 
although they are closer to SIS II. Intelligence and national security services occupy a similar 
position, and it is to be noted that at least one national security service is granted access to 
EURODAC. Border guards, as well as migration and asylum departments, occupy a balanced 
position, located right in the middle of the three databases, since they have roughly equal 
access to all three.  
 
Europol is located in this node of the network. As it stands, however, the access rights of 
Europol to SIS II are limited to alerts that do no directly pertain to border control purposes. 
In particular, Europol is excluded from the scope of art. 24 of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 
dealing with third country nationals to be refused entry or stay into the Schengen Area. The 
same applies, mutatis mutandis, to Eurojust, whose access rights are limited to alerts 
covering criminal matters. If EBCG were granted access to SIS II, this regulation might be 
modified to open access rights of this article to the new agency. 
 
Access rights to EURODAC and VIS would remain virtually the main vehicle of Europol’s 
involvement in EU border control. On31 December 2015 however, Europol was not connected 
to EURODAC (EU-LISA 2016). The impact of Europol’s law enforcement checks in VIS on the 
issuing or refusal of visas remains unclear given the limited information published by eu-LISA 
to date. The technical reports on the operation of VIS (the  2016 version is still pending) 
makes no mention of checks by law enforcement authorities.  Similarly, the conditions under 
which Europol staff anonymise VIS data before retention by Europol remain unclear. So are 
the strategic purposes that such retention supposedly serves.  
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The image that nonetheless emerges from these observations is one where the inter-relations 
across data systems that are designed to deal with criminal and violent practices (mainly SIS 
II) on the one hand, and the data systems that are designed to manage the movement of 
EU citizens and third country nationals allows for a logic of suspicion to override a logic of 
rights, especially when those are the rights of third country nationals. Furthermore, there 
seems to be an inherent contradiction between the original exclusion of Europol from the 
scope of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 on border control cooperation in the SIS II, and the 
access rights that were subsequently granted to Europol in VIS and EURODAC for the 
purposes of combating serious crimes and terrorism. 
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ANNEX 3. ANALYSIS OF MEMBER STATE NOTIFICATIONS ON THE REINTRODUCTION OF 
BORDER CONTROLS AT THE INTERNAL BORDERS OF THE SCHENGEN AREA, SEPTEMBER 
2015-MAY 2016 
 
Note on references to articles in the SBC Regulation: the Annex replicates the article references provided by Member State authorities in their 
notifications. Notifications sent before the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (published in the OJ on 23.3.2016) use the old article 
references of Regulation (EC) 562/2006, which is referred as SBC 2006. 
 
Duration Grounds & Scope References 
AUSTRIA 
16.9.2015-
25.9.2015 
10 days 
26.9.2015-
15.10.2015 
20 days 
16.10.2015-
4.11.2015 
20 days 
5.11.2015-
15.11.2015 
11 days 
16.11.2015-
16.3.2016 
120 days 
Legal basis 
Article 25 SBC 2006 (notification 17.09.2015,  prolongations 28.09.2015, 
16.10.2015) 
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 ( prolongations - 18.11.2015, 15.02.2016, 16.3.2016) 
Article 29(2) SBC (notification - 13.05.2016) 
 
Reasons 
 ‘The security situation caused by the huge migration flows to and via Austria 
and the reintroduction of border controls by Germany on 13 September 2015 
[…] In view of the massive influx of third-country nationals, this measure is 
inevitable in order to prevent a threat to public order and internal security and 
a continuous overburdening of the police, emergency services and public 
infrastructure […] The great willingness to help shown by the Republic of 
Austria over the past weeks should not be overstretched. Under European law, 
the Republic of Austria is not responsible for the vast majority of the persons 
concerned. This means that the Member State responsible not only registers 
those seeking protection, but also deals with the asylum procedure and, if their 
application for protection is rejected, takes measures to terminate their stay 
[…] The single European legal framework can function in its entirety only if all 
 Austrian delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the 
Austrian internal borders in accordance with 
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 12110/15, 
17.09.2015 
 Austrian delegation (2015) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Austrian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 12435/15, 
28.09.2015 
 Austrian delegation (2015) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Austrian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
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Duration Grounds & Scope References 
16.03.2016-
15.05.2016 
60 days 
16.05.2016- 
12.11.2016 
180 days 
 
Member States act together to live up to their common responsibility’ 
(notification 17.9.2015) 
 ‘Due to the enormous migration flows to and across Austria, the security 
situation has continued to deteriorate dramatically […] Only last weekend, in 
the time period from 18 to 21 September (15:00 hours) about 33.000 persons 
have illegally entered Austria. In order to cope with such influx, 17,700 
individual accommodations were created in Austria in the last few days. This is 
a major challenge […] which can only be managed by controlling the influx of 
these people in an orderly manner, and by police force and army using existing 
transportation means to distribute refugees to available accommodations. It is 
indispensable for this purpose, that the persons can be registered at the very 
border, and that they can be given medical care and initial food provisions’ 
(prolongation notification 28.9.2015) 
 ‘Between 5 September and 8 October 2015, 07.00, a total of 238,485 persons 
were apprehended at the south-eastern borders of Austria, of which 9,107 
applied for international protection in Austria. Since our last statement on 2 
October, more than 44,000 persons apprehended […] Austria intends to extend 
these internal border controls, depending on how the situation develops, on the 
basis of Art. 23 and Art. 24 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is the only way 
to avoid, wherever possible in practice and by law, security deficits in the 
Schengen area for the benefit of our citizens’ (prolongation notification 
16.10.2015) 
 ‘As no significant change of the situation has occurred so far, Austria will 
continue to carry out internal border controls until 15 February 2016 on the 
basis of Articles 23 and 24 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is the only way 
to prevent security deficits within the scope of what is legally and factually 
possible in the interest of all citizens of the Schengen area’ (prolongation 
notification 18.11.2015) 
 ‘on account of the continuing influx […] to avoid security deficits in the future 
[…] 268,520 persons have passed the Slovenian-Austrian border since 15 
November 2015 […] Thousands of accommodations have been created in 
Austria to cope with such influx of migrants. By 08 February 2016 (07:00 am), 
a total of 12,500 provisional accommodations are operative, and there are 
currently 4,964 vacancies still available’ (prolongation notification 15.2.2016) 
– NB: ‘Austria would like to thank the European Commission for undertaking 
the necessary steps to apply Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code’ 
 ‘Although, not least because of the measures taken by Austria in close 
cooperation with the West Balkan States, the situation at the Slovenian border 
has somewhat eased, we cannot assume that any noticeable reduction of the 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 13127/15, 
16.10.2015 
 Austrian delegation (2015) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Austrian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25, and thereafter on the basis of 
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 14211/15, 
18.11.2015 
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Austrian internal borders in accordance 
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 6071/16, 
15.02.2016 
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Austrian internal borders in accordance 
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7136/16, 
16.3.2016. 
 Austrian delegation (2016) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Austrian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No 
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
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Duration Grounds & Scope References 
influx of third country nationals will be sustainable […] Austria, due to 
ascertained and still prevailing serious flaws in external border controls in 
Greece will continue to conduct internal border controls for another 2 months’ 
(prolongation notification 16.3.2016) 
 ‘The Council has adopted a recommendation, based on the Commission’s 
proposal, to prolong proportionate temporary controls at certain internal 
Schengen borders for a maximum period of six months, due to exceptional 
circumstances where the overall functioning of the Schengen area is put at risk’ 
(prolongation notification 13.05.2016) 
 
Scope 
‘The main focus will be, firstly, the land border between Austria and Hungary, but 
also the land borders with Italy, Slovenia and Slovakia’ (notification 17.9.2015) 
‘It will be necessary to continue to temporarily position adequate police forces at 
the border crossings initially with Hungary and Slovenia, subsequently if necessary 
also at border crossings with other neighbouring States […] Austrian internal 
Schengen land and air borders’ (prolongation notification 28.9.2015) 
Not specified in prolongation notification 16.10.2015 
Austrian-Slovenian border, detailed Annex in prolongation notification 18.11.2015, 
whereby the ‘crossing of the internal border is […] only possible and permitted at 
designated border crossings’ 
‘The focus will be, as before, at the Austrian-Slovenian border, but may be 
transferred at any time in view of possible shifts of irregular migration flows’ 
(prolongation notification 15.2.2016) 
‘The focal points will be at the Slovenian-Austrian, Hungarian-Austrian, and Italian-
Austrian borders, but in view of possible shifts of the irregular flows of migrants 
such focal points may move at any time to other sections of our borders’ 
(prolongation notification 16.3.2016) 
Not specified in prolongation notification of 13.05.2016 
Brussels, Council document 8947/16, 
13.05.2016 
BELGIUM 
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Duration Grounds & Scope References 
23.2.2016-
23.3.2016 
<30 days 
24.3.2016-
12.4.2016 
<20 days 
 
Legal basis 
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (25.2.2016) 
Modified to Article 25 SBC 2006 (11.3.2016) 
Prolonged with reference to Article 25.3 SBC 2006 and Article 23-24 SBC 2006 
(22.3.2016), then Article 25 and 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (29.3.2016) 
 
Reasons 
 ‘serious risk to public order and internal security because of very large numbers 
of illegal migrants that can be expected in the coastal region of Belgium within 
a short period of time […] measure to prevent escalating situation’ (notification 
25.2.2016) 
 ‘The Belgian authorities expect the announced closure and evacuation of the 
migrant camps in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region in France, to have a serious 
impact on Belgian territory’ (notification 25.2.2016) 
 ‘We have come to understand that the procedure under article 25 [SBC] […] 
applies to situations where a serious threat to the public policy or internal 
security in a Member State requires immediate action to be taken, including 
the case of an evolving situation which requires urgent action’ (notification 
11.3.2016) 
 ‘The Police are confronted with an increasing number of criminal organisations 
involved in the trafficking and smuggling of human beings to West-Vlaanderen 
and to the Port of Zeebrugge. Violent incidents with these criminal 
organisations are reported far more frequently than before […] visual presence 
of the significantly increased number of irregular and homeless migrants has a 
direct and non-negligeable negative impact on public security […] security 
situation in the Port of Zeebrugge has deteriorated frighteningly due to the 
regular illegal intrustions in the portal area […] The expected and announced 
closures of illegal settlements of migrants around the main portal areas of 
Calais and Dunkirk in the North of France will most likely generate a further 
significant growth of the number of irregular migrants’ (notification 25.2.2016) 
 ‘Even though the number of transmigrants dropped significantly in the days 
following the implementation of the border controls, indicating the dissuasive 
effect of our measures, the security impact remains high […] to do everything 
possible to prevent the emergence of tent camps that have a serious impact 
 Belgian delegation (2016) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the Belgian 
internal borders in accordance with Article 23 
and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 6490/16, 
25.2.2016 
 Belgian delegation (2016) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the Belgian 
internal borders in accordance with Article 25 
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across Schengen 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document 6490/1/16, 11.3.2016 
 Belgian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Belgian internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7351/16, 
22.3.2016 
 Belgian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Belgian internal borders in accordance with 
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7351/1/16, 
29.3.2016 
 Belgian delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Belgian internal borders in accordance with 
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Duration Grounds & Scope References 
on the internal security […] many migrants try to get into the Zeebrugge port 
area which results in well-known security and safety risks […] hazards to the 
physical integrity and wellbeing of the migrants […] also a lot of material 
damage. In addition, this has an impact on the general feeling of insecurity of 
the inhabitants of the region […] The border controls of the past month […] 
have had an impact on organised immigration crime, since special attention 
was also given to human smuggling’ (prolongation notification, 22.3.2016) 
 ‘number of intercepted transmigrants has dropped after the introduction of 
border controls at the end of February, but last week a new rise could be 
noticed. The risk is real that this rise will continue because of the start of the 
summer season and the better weather conditions […] one also needs to take 
into account the further evacuation of tent camps in the north of France’ 
(prolongation notification 13.4.2016) 
 
Scope 
Land border between the Province of West-Vlaanderen and France 
 
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7873/16, 
13.4.2016 
DENMARK 
04.01.2016-
03.04.2016 
<90 days 
04.04.2016-
03.05.2016 
30 days 
04.05.2016-
02.06.2016 
30 days 
20.06.2016-
12.11.2016 
Legal basis 
Articles 23 & 25 SBC 2006 
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification 4.3.2016) 
Article 29 (2) SBC (prolongation notification 02.6.2016) 
 
Reasons 
 ‘Since the beginning of September 2015 […] more than 91.000 migrants and 
refugees have crossed the border between Denmark and Germany […] more 
than 13.000 people have applied for asylum in Denmark bringing the total 
number of asylum seekers in 2015 up to more than 21.000. […] Furthermore 
[…] at least 50 percent of the persons who have crossed the border between 
Denmark and Germany are not in possession of a passport or lawful 
 Danish delegation (2016) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the Danish 
internal borders in accordance with Article 23 
and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 5021/16, 
5.1.2016 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Danish internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
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<150 days identification […] The Swedish, the Norwegian and the German Governments 
have already temporarily reintroduced border controls at their internal borders. 
Furthermore, today on 4 January 2016 the Swedish Government has 
implemented a new regulation obliging carriers to ensure that the persons they 
are transporting into Sweden are in possession of identity documents […] Given 
that there is no land border between Denmark and Sweden, the internal border 
control reintroduced by the Swedish Government combined with the new 
regulation […] will in fact result in a closed border for immigrants and asylum 
seekers with no identification […] Due to these measures set in place by our 
neighboring countries and particularly the measures set in place by Sweden, 
Denmark is of now faced with a serious risk to public order and international 
security because a very large number of illegal immigrants may be stranded in 
the Copenhagen area within a short period of time’ (notification 5.1.2016) 
 ‘On 7 January 2016, the Swedish Government decided to prolong the border 
control at the Swedish internal borders until 8 February 2016. Furthermore, 
the Swedish regulation [mentioned in previous letter] […] is still in force […] 
the number of immigrants crossing EU’s southern external borders and 
continuing their journey further north remains very high’ (prolongation 
notification 14.1.2016) 
 ‘On 4 February 2016, the Swedish Government decided to prolong the border 
control at the Swedish internal borders until 9 March 2016 […] The number of 
asylum seekers in Europe are still historically high, and according to Frontex, 
there is an ongoing pressure on Europe’s external borders. Our neighboring 
countries to the North have prolonged their temporary border controls and still 
have ID-controls at their internal borders in order to reduce the numbers of 
asylum seekers. These measures have […] left Denmark with a serious risk to 
public policy and internal security if the Danish border control were to be lifted 
at this point’ (prolongation notifications of 23.2.2016 and 4.3.2016) 
 ‘From 6 September 2015 […] until 27 March, the Danish Police assesses that a 
total of approximately 94,700 immigrants and asylum seekers have entered 
Denmark. From 4 January until 27 March 2016, approximately 2,850 
immigrants and asylum seekers have entered Denmark and approximately 
488,000 people have been checked at border crossings. In the same period, 
984 people have been refused entry and 127 people have been charged with 
human trafficking […] The Danish Police has not since 4 January 2016 reported 
any build-up of illegal immigrants anywhere in the country […] Denmark has 
received a historical high number of asylum seekers in 2015. In November 
alone, Denmark received around 5,100 asylum seekers including around 500 
unaccompanied minor asylum seekers […] Even though the number of asylum 
Brussels, Council document 5247/16, 
14.1.2016 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Danish internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 5786/16, 
3.2.2016 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Danish internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 6440/16, 
23.2.2016 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Danish internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 6754/16, 
4.3.2016 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Danish internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7499/16, 
1.4.2016 
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Duration Grounds & Scope References 
seekers has decreased since the introduction of temporary border controls, the 
number of asylum seekers seems to remain at a relatively high level’. Follows 
the reference to Swedish border controls (prolongation notification 1.4.2016) 
 ‘The decision to temporarily reintroduce border control at the Danish internal 
borders was made due to the measures set in place by our neighbouring 
countries and particularly the measures set in place by Sweden. As a 
consequence of these measures, Denmark is faced with a serious risk to public 
order and internal security because a very large number of illegal immigrants 
might be stranded in the Copenhagen area within a short period of time […] 
The numbers of asylum seekers in Europe are still historically high, and 
according to Frontex, there is an ongoing pressure on Europe’s external 
borders. Our neighboring countries to the North have prolonged their 
temporary border controls and still have ID-controls at their internal borders in 
order to reduce the number of asylum seekers’ (notification prolongation 
3.5.2016) 
 Council Implementing Decision of 12 May 2016 (prolongation notification 
2.6.2016) 
 
Scope 
‘The border control may extend to all internal borders, including land-, sea- and air 
borders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing points are 
determined by the Danish Police. The border control will initially focus on the ferries 
arriving from Germany to the harbours in Gedser, Roedby and Roenne, and the 
land border between Denmark and Germany’ (notification 5.1.2016). 
‘The border control will, however, remain focused on the ferries arriving from 
Germany and the land border between Denmark and Germany’ (prolongation 
notification 14.1.2016). 
Prolongation notification of 1.4.2016 specifies ‘the Danish-German border in 
Southern Jutland’. 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Danish internal borders in accordance with 
Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 8571/16, 
3.5.2016 
 Danish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Norwegian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across Schengen 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document 9792/16, 2.6.2016 
FRANCE 
13.11.2015 – 
13.12.2015 
30 days 
Legal basis 
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (notification of 22.10.2015, prolongations - 10.12.2015, 
11.02.2016, 29.03.2016) 
 French delegation (2015), Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the French 
internal borders in accordance with Articles 23 
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Duration Grounds & Scope References 
 
14.12.2015-
27.04.2016 
<90 days 
 
27.04.2016 – 
26.05.2016 
30 days 
 
27.05.2016 – 
26.07.2016 
30 days 
 
 
Prolongation notification of 29.3.2016 explicitly cites Articles 23(3) and 23a SBC 
2006; 
Articles 25 & 26 SBC (prolongation notification of 26.04.2016); 
Articles 25 & 27 SBC (notification of 27.05.2016); 
  
Reasons 
 Initial notification in French linked reintroduction of internal border controls at 
identified border crossings to the UN Climate Change Summit (COP21), that 
was held in Paris from 30th of November to 11 of December (notification of 
22.10.2015) 
 ‘The terrorist attacks that took place in Paris on 13 November 2015 led the 
government to declare a state of emergency throughout the country […] owing 
to the imminent danger resulting from serious breaches of public order’ 
(prolongation notification 10.12.2015) 
 ‘Given that the terrorist threat remains, the French Government has decided to 
extend the reintroduction of controls at its borders with all neighbouring 
countries for a period of 30 days, i.e. 27 February to 27 March’ (prolongation 
notification 11.02.2016) 
 ‘Following the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and the state of 
emergency imposed in France for three months, then renewed for three months 
[…] due to the ongoing terrorist threat, the French Government has decided to 
extend the reintroduction of controls at its borders with all neighbouring 
countries for a period of 30 days, i.e. 28 March to 26 April 2016 (prolongation 
od 29.03.2016). 
 ‘In light of the major ongoing terrorist threat, illustrated by the attack on 
Brussels on 22 March 2016, the French Government has decided to extend 
these border controls until 26 May 2016 inclusive.’ (prolongation notification of 
26.04.2016). 
 ‘France will soon be hosting two major sporting events on its mainland 
territory: UEFA Euro 2016 from 10 June to 10 July 2016, and the Tour de 
France from 2 to 24 July 2016. Given the magnitude of these events and the 
millions of spectators they will attract from many countries, as well as the risk 
analysis which has been carried out, there is an expected risk of disturbances 
to public order arising from these events. This risk is heightened by the 
terrorist threat which France and the whole of Europe have been facing in 
recent months. […] France has decided to reintroduce border controls […] for 
the period from 27 May to 26 July 2016.” 
 
and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document, 13171/15, 22.10.2015. 
 French delegation (2015), Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the French internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 15181/15, 
10.12.2015 
 French delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the French internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 5981/16, 
11.02.2016 
 French delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the French internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7360/1/16, 
29.03.2016 
 French delegation (2016), Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the French internal borders in accordance with 
Articles 25 and 26 of Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Internal borders in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 102 
Duration Grounds & Scope References 
Scope 
General scope -  ‘internal borders with Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, the Swiss 
Confederation, Italy and Spain, and at the air borders, for the duration of the state 
of emergency from 14 December 2015 to 26 February 2016, that was prolonged 
until 26 of July (notification of 27.05.2016)  
NB: reintroduction of border controls prolonged from the re-imposition initially 
linked to COP21, then prolongation was linked to Brussels attacks. Finally, the 
French authorities have re-started the procedure of notifications on 27 of May, 
2016, with a new foreseeable threat  due to UEFA Euro 2016 and Tour de France 
sporting events and inter-related terrorist threat.  
borders (Schengen Borders Code), Council 
document 8217/16,  Brussels, 26.04.2016. 
 French delegation (2016), Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the French 
internal borders in accordance with Articles 25 
and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on a 
Union Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council 
document 9506/16,  27.05.2016. 
GERMANY 
13.9.2015-
22.9.2015 
23.9.2015-
12.10.2015 
13.10.2015-
1.11.2015 
2.11.2015-
13.11.2015 
<60 days 
14.11.2015-
13.5.2016 
<180 days 
Legal basis 
Art. 25 SBC 2006 
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 
Article 29 (2) 
Reasons 
 ‘This action is urgently needed in view of the enormous influx of third-country 
nationals referred to above. We must know who is entering and staying in 
Germany. Further arrivals would endanger the public order and internal 
security […] Over the past weeks, there has been a great willingness in 
Germany to help. We must not wear out this good will. According to European 
law, the Federal Republic of Germany is not responsible for the large majority 
of these persons. The Common European Asylum System, including the Dublin 
process and the EURODAC regulations, continues to apply. This means that the 
responsible Member State must not only register those seeking protection, but 
must also process their applications and take measures to end their stay if their 
application for protection is rejected’ (notification 14.9.2015) 
 ‘The situation remains the same. The massive influx of third-country nationals 
continues unabated. For reasons of public safety and public order, a structured 
procedure, especially in terms of registration and vetting of third-country 
nationals, continues to be urgently necessary. Especially in view of the 
thousands of third-country nationals coming to Germany from crisis and conflict 
regions, we must avoid security deficits, wherever possible in practice and by 
 German delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the 
German internal borders in accordance with 
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document, 11988/15, 
14.09.2015. 
 German delegation (2015) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the German internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document, 12984/15, 
13.10.2015. 
 German delegation (2015) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the German internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
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the law, for the benefit of our citizens’ (prolongation notification 13.10.2015 – 
NB: dated 22.9.2015, received by Council SecGen 8.10.2015) 
 ‘The uncontrolled and massive influx of third-country nationals via the external 
borders that we are currently experiencing continues unabated. This and the 
fact that third-country nationals travel on within the Schengen area is not 
acceptable. I am now informing you that I intend to extend these internal 
border checks, depending on how the situation develops, on the basis of 
Articles 23 and 24 of the Schengen Borders Code. This is the only way to avoid, 
wherever possible in practice and by law, security deficits in the Schengen area 
for the benefit of our citizens’ (prolongation notification 13.10.2015 – NB dated 
9.10.2015, received by Council SecGen 12.10.2015) 
 ‘The Federal Republic of Germany continues to receive an unprecedented and 
uncontrolled influx of migrants seeking asylum. No other Member State of the 
European Union is affected to such a degree. This influx seriously affects 
Germany’s public order and internal security in various ways […] I would also 
like to reiterate that the situation in Germany mainly depends on the measures 
taken by the responsible Member States to protect the EU’s external borders. 
Unfortunately, I still have the impression that, despite European assistance, 
the necessary level of protection is not guaranteed. Moreover, transit countries 
within the Schengen area seem to be unable or unwilling to take the measures 
required by EU legislation to register and check each and every migrant. 
Especially with regard to persons who may have been radicalized in crisis and 
conflict regions, threats related to uncontrolled migration are obvious. Human 
smuggling and related crime have developed in a way that is not acceptable’ 
(prolongation notification 30.10.2015) 
 ‘No lasting or significant reduction in the numbers of third-country nationals 
entering German territory has occurred which would unable the suspension of 
temporary controls at the internal borders […] temporary border checks 
concentrated on the internal land borders between Germany and Austria 
continue to be an effective and necessary instrument to ensure orderly 
procedures at the border (including checking databases of wanted persons, 
photographing and fingerprinting those entering, denying entry to third-
country nationals who are not seeking protection and who entered the 
Schengen area illegally) to manage the influx of refugees and address aspects 
of public order and internal security. To prevent any security gaps, we have 
made further progress especially with regard to photographing and 
fingerprinting those entering Germany […] Together, we in Europe must 
succeed in significantly reducing and slowing the influx of refugees in order not 
Brussels, Council document, 12985/15, 
13.10.2015. 
 German delegation (2015) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the German internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25, and thereafter on the basis of 
Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document, 13569/15, 
30.10.2015. 
 German delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the German internal borders in accordance 
with Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document, 6048/16, 
12.02.2016. 
 German delegation (2016), Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the German internal borders in accordance 
with Articles 29(2) of Regulation (EU) No 
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code), Brussels, 
Council document 8930/16, 13.05.2016. 
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to place excessive demands on our citizens and to prevent resentment’ 
(prolongation notification 12.2.2016) 
 NB: ‘If the migration situation does not change significantly by May 2016, 
checks at the German borders will still be necessary. With this in mind, I am 
glad that the European Commission is now examining the application of the 
crisis mechanism pursuant to Article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code’ 
(prolongation notification 12.2.2016) 
Scope 
‘Germany’s Schengen land, air and sea borders as the situation requires […] The 
controls will initially be concentrated on the German-Austrian land border’ 
(notification 14.9.2015) 
MALTA 
9.11.2015-
31.12.2015 
<30 days 
Legal basis 
Article 23 et seq SBC 
Reasons 
 Valetta Conference on Migration and Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting and terrorist threat and smuggling of illegal migrants (European 
Commission)‘threat scenarios in international major events and also in the light 
of the continuous risk of Islamic terrorist illicit activities and attacks’ (initial 
notification, 16.10.2015 and subsequent prolongations) 
 ‘Threat scenarios in international major events and particularly in the light of 
the continuous risk of terrorist activities and attacks’ (report 16.12.2015) 
 ‘The situation with regard to the global terrorist threat, as well as in view of the 
fact that Malta was in the process of addressing a smuggling ring that was 
targeting Malta as a destination for illegal migrants travelling from other 
Schengen states, which had emerged from the controls carried out in the 
previous period where the controls were reintroduced in view of the Valletta 
Summit on Migration and the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) 
Meeting. The retention of border control was also deemed necessary wth a view 
to detecting any potential threats to other Member States. The Maltese 
government also took into account Malta’s proximity to Libya, where the 
 Maltese delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the Maltese 
internal borders in accordance with Article 23 
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across Schengen 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document 13129/15, 16.10.2015. 
 Maltese delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the Maltese 
internal borders in accordance with Article 23 
of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across Schengen 
borders (Schengen Borders Code) – change of 
dates. Brussels, Council document 13788/15, 
06.11.2015. 
 Maltese delegation (2015) Report on the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Maltese internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
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situation of instability facilitates the promulgation of extremist ideology across 
the territory’ (report 26.02.2016) 
Scope  
 Malta International Airport 
 Valletta Sea Passenger Terminal 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 15366/15, 
16.12.2015. 
 Maltese delegation (2016) Report on the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Maltese internal borders in accordance with 
Article 29 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 6514/16, 
26.2.2016 
NORWAY 
26.11.2015- 
06.12.2015 
(10 days) 
15.01.2016 
(60 days Art. 25) 
15.01.2016 – 
12.05.2016 
(120 days, Art. 24) 
12.05.2016 – 
11.06.2016 
(30 days, Art. 26) 
10.06.2016 
-11.11.2016 
(150 days ) 
 
Legal basis 
Articles 23 & 25 SBC 2006 (notification 25.11.2015) 
Article 25 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification 04.12.2015) 
Article 24 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification of 15.01.2016, 12.02.2016, 
15.03.2016, 14.04.2016) 
Article 26 SBC (prolongation notification of 12.05.2016) 
Article  29 (2) SBC (prolongation notification 10.06.2016) 
 
Reasons 
 ‘Norway is […] currently facing an unpredictable migratory flow, containing a 
mix of asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential criminals such as 
smugglers or traffickers of human beings, also including potential victims of 
crime […] also knowing that many of the migrants arriving to Norway have not 
been subject to border control upon arrival to the EU/Schengen territory, there 
is a need already at the internal borders to distinguish between the different 
categories of arriving migrants. Border control will help identifying the different 
categories of migrants, enabling adequate support and control procedures, i.e. 
registration, further identification and return of those in no need for protection 
 Norwegian delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the 
Norwegian internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, 14633/15, 25.11.2015 
 Norwegian delegation (2015) Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, 14996/15, 04.12.2015 
 Norwegian delegation (2015) Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
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[…] the current number of migrants arriving to Norway, and the consequences 
for Norwegian society’ (notification 25.11.2015) 
 ‘There has been a decrease in the number of migrants applying for asylum in 
Norway lately, but the number is still very high, and we still experience an 
uncontrolled and unpredictable influx of migrants. We thereby find the 
conditions and reasoning in […] letter of 25. November for reintroduction of 
border control still to be valid’ (prolongation notification 4.12.2015) 
 ‘There has been a further decrease in the number of migrants applying for 
asylum in Norway. The measures taken, including the reintroduction of internal 
border control at our sea borders, have had the desired effect. We have during 
this period been able to distinguish between the different categories of arriving 
migrants already on the internal border. Although there has been a significant 
decrease in the number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway, we fear 
that the situation may change rapidly again if we abolish the introduced internal 
border control’ (prolongation notification 21.12.2015). 
 ‘Since our letter 18 December 2015, there has been a further decrease in the 
number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway. Although there has been a 
significant decrease in the number of migrants applying for asylum in Norway, 
we fear that the situation may change rapidly again if we abolish the introduced 
internal border control.  We thereby find the conditions and reasoning in my 
letters dated 25, November and 18,December still to be valid’. Prolongation 
notification, 15.01.2016). 
 ‘Since our letter dated 14 January, there has been a further decreese in number 
of of asylum seekers in Norway. However, we fear that this might change if 
border controls are lifted. Furthermore, as explained in my letter  to 
Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos dated 28, January 2016, the Schengen 
external borders and the established migrant routes intra Schengen are not 
sufficiently controlled by the competent authorities at the moment, making 
illegal entry and secondary movements by unregistered migrants as a factor of 
concern.’ (prolongation notification 12.02.2016). 
 ‘Since our letter dated 12.02.2016, the number of asylum seekers arriving in 
Norway continues to be low. However, we fear that this might change if controls 
are lifted as migratory pressure at the external border remains significant.’ 
(prolongation notification 15.03.2016 and  the same reasons reiterated in 
prolongation notification 14.04.2016). 
 In 12.05.2016 prolongation notification the lines above are reiterated though 
it is added ‘It is also important to view situation in the Nordic countries as a 
whole, and it is  therefore for Norway to maintain the border controls along the 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, 15497/15, 21.12.2015.  
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance wit Article 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 5294/16, 
15.01.2016. 
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance wit Article 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 6043/16, 
12.02.2016. 
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance wit Article 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7122/16, 
15.03.2016. 
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance wit Article 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 7948/16, 
14.04.2016. 
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internal borders under Art.24 (NB. Council wrongly referred to new article 26 
instead 27).’ 
 
Scope 
‘The border control may extend to all internal borders, ie air, sea and land borders, 
whereby the specific border section and border crossing point are determined by 
the National Police Directorate. The reintroduced border control will initially focus 
on ports with ferry connections to Norway via internal borders’ (notification 
25.11.2015). 
In subsequent  notifications scope remains unclear as it is mentioned that ‘controls 
remain limited’ and also ‘based on a risk assessment’ and ‘with minimal impact on 
regular travelers’ though it is also suggested that ‘the border control may, however 
extend to all internal borders, i.e. air, sea, land borders, if necessary.’ In 
12.02.2016 notification mentioned that there have been no negative reactions from 
the public.’  
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance with Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document 8827/16, 12.05.2016.  
 Norwegian delegation (2016), Prolongation of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Norwegian internal borders in 
accordance with Article 29(2) of Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document, 10135/16, 10.06.2016. 
SLOVENIA 
17.9.2015-
26.9.2015 
27.9.2015-
16.10.2015 
<30 days 
Legal basis 
Article 25 SBC 2006 (notification 17.09.2015, prolongations - 25.09.2015, 
20.10.2015) 
Reasons 
 ‘The current situation involving uncontrollable migration flows in the region, 
coupled with the measures recently adopted by the neighbouring countries, 
including reinstated border controls at the internal borders, presents a serious 
threat to Slovenia’s national security […] The extent and intensity of border 
controls will therefore depend on the security situation and particularly the 
number of migrants coming from Hungary […] Slovenia sincerely hopes that all 
Member States, especially those at the external borders, will ensure 
appropriate level of border control in line with the Schengen standards and 
introduce adequate migration procedures to avoid having to apply this 
extraordinary measure at the internal borders’ (notification 17.9.2015) 
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the 
Slovenian internal borders in accordance with 
Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document, 12111/15, 
17.09.2015. 
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Prolongation of 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Slovenian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Internal borders in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 108 
Duration Grounds & Scope References 
 ‘Since the introduction of this measure [17.9.2015 reintroduction of border 
controls] the situation in the area of illegal migration has not changed 
significantly, nor have countries in the region introduced measures which would 
indicate that the situation would change’ (prolongation notice 25.9.2015) 
 ‘We have again carefully assessed the situation, taking into account all the 
relevant indicators, and it has been established that to continue with this 
extraordinary measure would no longer be necessary and justified’ (termination 
notification 20.10.2015) 
 
Scope 
‘Land internal border with the Republic of Hungary’ 
Reporting 
‘We have always taken into account the situation in our neighbourhood and in the 
region, especially measures taken by Austria and Hungary, but also other Member 
States, which could according to our assessments, have significant impact on the 
migration route and consequently on the increased pressure on this part of the 
Slovenian border. In addition, the existing trends, available data and risk analysis 
have been considered when adopting our measures. It was especially on this basis 
that we decided for the prolongation of the temporary internal border control after 
the initial 10 days […] we have assessed with great care the necessity and 
proportionality of such measure, bearing in mind at all times that the reintroduction 
of internal border controls is only a temporary measure of last resort […]’  
‘According to the available statistical data there was an overall increase of the illegal 
crossings at the internal borders during the first eight months of 2015 (compared 
to the same period of the previous year). The biggest increase (more than 300%) 
was in fact noted at the Slovenian-Hungarian land border. Already prior to the 
reintroduction of border controls numerous cases of illegal border crossings (mostly 
by citizens of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh) from Hungary towards Italy 
were identified. These experiences and the fact that almost simultaneously, on 16 
September 2015, Austria also reintroduced border controls at the Hungarian border 
led us to the reasonable conclusion that a significant part of migration flow could 
be diverted towards Slovenia. Taking all these circumstances into account it was 
Brussels, Council document, Council 
document, 12418/15, 25.09.2015. 
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Termination of 
the temporary reintroduction of border 
controls at the Slovenian internal borders in 
accordance with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document, 13170/15, 
20.10.2015. 
 Slovenian delegation (2015) Report on the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Slovenian internal borders in accordance 
with Article 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document, 14212/15, 
18.10.2015. 
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assessed that only compensatory measures would not be enough to efficiently 
control the migration flow’ 
Results: 5.852 checks of vehicles and 18.706 persons were checked, 35 persons 
were refused entry to Slovenia, in most cases because they were not in 
possession of a valid travel document, visa or residence permit. 138 hits in SIS and 
5 hits in Interpol databases, 218 ‘repressive measures’ issued, 13 cases of 
document fraud identified, 3 persons applied for international protection 
‘Although initially foreseen to be carried out at different most important 
communications for the cross-border traffic at this section of the border, the border 
control was later in fact carried out only at one of them. The control of vehicles and 
persons was carried out on a selective basis in accordance with the risk analysis. 
The railway communications were not part of the control’ 
(Report 18.10.2015) 
SWEDEN 
12.11.2015-
09.01.2016 
<60 days  
10.01.2016-
08.04.2016 
<90 days 
09.04.2016-
08.05.2016 
30 days 
09.05.2016-
07.06.2016 
30 days 
Legal basis 
Articles 23 & 25 SBC 2006 (notification 12.11.2015, prolongation 20.11.2015, 
11.12.2015, 18.12.2015, 07.01.2016) 
Articles 23 & 24 SBC 2006 (prolongation 08.02.2016, 08.03.2016, 08.04.2016) 
Articles 25 & 27 SBC 2006 (prolongation notification 04.05.2016) 
Article 29(2) SBC (prolongation notification 06.06.2016) 
Reasons 
 ‘Sweden is currently facing an unprecedented migratory flow. The flows are 
mixed and may include i.a. asylum seekers, economic migrants, potential 
criminals such as smugglers or traffickers of human beings, but also potential 
victims of crime. People now arriving in Sweden, not seeking to legalise their 
stay, constitute easy targets for perpetrators ready to abuse their vulnerable 
situation  […] The fact that the migratory flow are mixed creates great 
difficulties, whereby a reintroduction of border control at internal borders by 
way of identifying the different categories of persons, would facilitate the 
 Swedish delegation (2015) Temporary 
reintroduction of border controls at the 
Swedish internal borders in accordance with 
Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 562/2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 14047/15, 
12.11.2015. 
 Swedish delegation (2015) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 14383/15, 
20.11.2015. 
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08.06.2016-
11.11.2016 
180 days 
 
agency’s [Swedish Migration Agency] work […] The Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency […] reported that the migratory flows now lead to extreme and 
increasing challenges regarding the functionality of the Swedish society, which 
is one of the three goals of Swedish security. The agency points to severe 
strains on mainly housing, health care, schooling and social services, but also 
other areas vital to the functioning of the society […] As a consequence there 
is a need to already at the border, before the migrants disappear into the 
country or go into hiding, be able to distinguish between the different 
categories of people. The border control will help directing the different 
categories of persons to the correct services, be it the Swedish Migration 
Agency, the Swedish Police Authority, the social services or some other relevant 
service. It will also enable the prevention and detection of serious crime […] 
the possibility for immediately distinguishing between the various categories 
and identifying the persons will contribute to different services’ capacity to 
manage the people falling under their responsibility. In that way, border control 
will contribute to the functionality of the Swedish society and thereby to the 
goals of Swedish security’ (notification 12.11.2015) 
 ‘In its most recent situational picture, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
states that the challenges for a range of important services in Swedish society 
are likely to increase and the situation is likely to deter[iorate]’ (prolongation 
notification 20.11.2015, reiterated in prolongation notification 11.12.2015) 
 ‘The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency states that the challenges for a range 
of important services in Swedish society are great and the strained situation is 
likely to remain so for some time. The influx of asylum applicants in Sweden 
has decreased, but still remains very high, especially for this time of year’ 
(prolongation notification 18.12.2015) 
 ‘The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency states that the challenges for a range 
of important services in Swedish society are great and the strained situation is 
likely to remain so for some time. The influx of asylum applicants in Sweden 
has decreased, but still remains very high, especially for this time of year’ 
(prolongation notification 07.01.2016, same as 18.11.2015) 
 ‘Although the number of new asylum seekers has decreased, the effects from 
the unprecedented migratory pressure in the latter part of 2015 combined with 
the current influx, still makes the situation very challenging for many of the 
important services in Sweden’ (prolongation notification 08.02.2016, 
08.03.2016, 08.04.2016, 04.05.2016) 
 ‘On 12 May 2016, the Council of the European Union, based on the proposal of 
the European Commission, adopted a Council Implementing Decision setting 
out a Recommendation for temporary internal border control in exceptional 
 Swedish delegation (2015) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 15253/15, 
11.12.2015. 
 Swedish delegation (2015) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 15456/15, 
18.12.2015. 
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 23 and 25 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 5103/16, 
07.01.2016. 
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 5914/16, 
08.02.2016. 
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
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circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk. The 
Implementing Decision recommends Sweden to maintain proportionate 
temporary border control for a maximum period of six months’ (prolongation 
06.06.2016) 
Scope 
‘The border control may extend to all internal borders, including land-, sea- and air 
borders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing points are 
determined by the Swedish Police Authority. […] the control will initially focus on 
selected harbours in Police Region South and Police Region West as well as on the 
Öresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden. 
Unchanged since 12 November 2015, see below. 
 
with Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 6886/16, 
08.03.2016. 
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 23 and 24 of Regulation (EC) 
562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons 
across Schengen borders (Schengen Borders 
Code). Brussels, Council document 7716/16, 
08.04.2016. 
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 26 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 on 
a Union Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across Schengen 
borders (Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, 
Council document 8827/16, 12.05.2016. 
 Swedish delegation (2016) Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish  internal borders in accordance 
with Articles 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 on a Union Code on the rules 
governing the movement of persons across 
Schengen borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
Brussels, Council document 8667/16, 
04.05.2016. 
 Swedish delegation (2016), Prolongation of the 
temporary reintroduction of border controls at 
the Swedish internal borders in accordance 
with Article 29(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 
on a Union Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders 
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(Schengen Borders Code). Brussels, Council 
document 9865/16, 06.06.2016. 
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ANNEX 4. REPORT ON STAKEHOLDER DISCUSSION 
 
 
Report on Stakeholder discussion 
 
Venue: European Citizen Action Service 
Avenue de la Toison d’or 77, 1060 Brussels, 1st floor 
Date: 7 June 2016 
 
 
Introduction and background:  
 
The meeting started with a welcome speech by Assya Kavrakova, ECAS Director and Sergio 
Carrera, senior researcher at CEPS.  
 
It was followed by a presentation of the preliminary results of the study by Lina Vosyliūtė, 
researcher at CEPS. The study provides a policy and legal analysis of two main documents: 
the Schengen Borders Code and the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring mechanism and is 
based on a number of interviews conducted with experts of EU institutions and Permanent 
Representations of Member States. The stakeholder discussion was organised to verify if civil 
society organisations could play a role in these issues. 
 
The final study will include recommendations for decision-makers and will be presented to 
the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament on 12 July 2016. 
 
Part 1: Civil Society experience and positions in relation to free movement of 
persons, Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanisms (SEM) and 
reintroduction of internal borders 
 
The stakeholder discussion was moderated by Kenan Hadžimusić, Senior Manager at ECAS. 
The organisations presented their position on the Schengen agreement in the context of the 
current political developments and reintroduction of internal borders: 
 
Young European Federalists (JEF Europe): 
• JEF Europe is an organisation with 30,000 members promoting a federal Europe.  
• JEF works on Schengen on a policy level by issuing resolutions both on Schengen and 
free movement.  
• JEF is against the reintroduction of borders, unless needed for specific reasons. 
• Main campaign “Don’t touch my Schengen”:  
The key goal was to reach out to young people and involve them around the topic. 
The online campaign was implemented through ‘thunderclap’ and reached out to 1.5 
million people while the offline campaign took place in 25 cities. 
• JEF sent a letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and received 
an email of support for the campaign. The President of the European Parliament, 
Martin Schulz, and President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, have 
also reacted positively to the initiative. 
 
Milieu: 
• Milieu is a multi-disciplinary consultancy based in Brussels. 
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• Milieu has published several studies: Study on free movement of workers, FRA studies 
on border management, study on obstacles of free movement for families, etc.  
• Milieu has been also analysing Schengen from the point of view of consumer law. [The 
European Commission has been highlighting the importance of the shared economy 
and encouraging deregulation in order to foster more peer-to-peer transactions. 
Schengen is necessary for this shared economy so it is important to take into 
consideration the consumers perspectives.] 
• Regarding the migration crisis, it is important to reinforce the external borders in 
order to enjoy fully free movement internally. 
 
AEGEE: 
• AEGEE is a student organisation, striving for a democratic, diverse and borderless 
Europe. It has been working on free movement of persons since its launch. 
• AEGEE was amongst the first promoters of the creation of the Erasmus project.  
• AEGEE was the first to open up to Eastern Europe and has been addressing issues 
regarding visas.  
• AEGEE has issued policy papers regarding migration and the freedom of movement, 
mainly on how these issues have impacted the lives of young Europeans.  
• AEGEE also does advocacy work and implements projects around these topics. 
• AEGEE notices that the problems arising from this subject are mainly related to the 
lack of information and of knowledge on Schengen and on citizens (and human) rights.  
 
ESN: 
• ESN is a non-profit international student organisation, which works on international 
mobility of students.  
• The recent issues regarding Schengen have not had an impact on Erasmus students.  
 
ECAS: 
• ECAS is a European association which helps citizens exercise their rights in the EU 
and has been actively supporting the free movement of citizens for more than 20 
years.  
• ECAS runs Your Europe Advice (YEA) - a service which provides tailor-made legal 
advice to more than 22,000 EU citizens annually who  exercise their right of free 
movement in the EU and encounter difficulties. YEA has experienced a 9.4% increase 
in enquiries in 2015 compared to 2014, which is indicative of the growing number of 
problems associated with the practical implementation of the most cherished right by 
EU citizens. YEA is not a complaints mechanism, however, and does not register 
fundamental rights’ violations.  
• ECAS carries out advocacy activities at the EU level to support a better environment 
for EU citizenship rights.  
• ECAS strongly feels a need for more campaigns which focus on preserving the balance 
between fundamental rights, freedom and security. (eg. The Passenger Name Records 
(PNR), issue shows how data can today be widely shared for the sake of ‘security 
threats’). There is no clear definition of public security threats and this could lead to 
dangerous situations which Europe has already had to deal with in the past. 
• ECAS has noticed how Member States are becoming more ‘inventive’ when 
jeopardising EU rights.  
 
Personal experiences: 
 
The participants took the opportunity to share their personal experiences regarding the 
Schengen situation. Some of them have noticed clear violations of human rights and privacy 
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in border controls while travelling. For example, it is unacceptable to see how people with a 
more ‘southern’ physical appearance are heavily interrogated by authorities at borders. 
Furthermore, the question is on how efficient the controls are, as in some countries it is 
relatively easy to avoid controls by simply taking side roads. 
 
One participant highlighted that the main problem of the Schengen situation is the 
reinterpretation of certain articles of the legal framework which provide opportunities for 
political manoeuvres.  
 
Several policy-makers stated that people in Europe are increasingly buying into nationalist 
agendas. However, the youth organisations at the stakeholder discussion are challenging this 
statement. The campaign ‘Don’t touch our Schengen’ is a good example. 
 
Communication and information are key factors. There is common concern on what kind of 
information citizens receive on the Schengen situation and the migration situation. Hence, 
the focus should be on ways to increase citizens’ understanding of Schengen and of their 
rights as EU citizens (people do not understand their rights are being violated at border 
controls.)  
 
Further analysis should focus on who is targeted by these border controls under the current 
situation. ECAS mentioned how the questions from citizens have increased in the last year 
under YEA. It could be interesting to examine the questions/cases and examine what has 
changed.  
 
Part 2: Schengen Borders Code versus Dublin II Regulation 
 
This session was on relations and distinctions between the Schengen Border Code and the 
Dublin II regulation. Specific remarks include: 
 
• ECAS and ESN declared no position on this topic. They both deal with EU mobility 
rights more than migration issues. 
 
• AEGEE explained how the Dublin framework does not help the migration situation 
since it is just a way to ‘trap’ refugees in some Member States to keep the problem 
away.  
 
• JEF Europe is pushing EU institutions to reach a common asylum and migration policy 
in the EU.  
 
General remarks: 
 
• Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) agree that one big problem is the lack of 
information on the migration situation. Migration is badly perceived by the public 
because of the media, speeches by politicians with extremist views etc. Not only is it 
important for decision-makers to inform citizens in the right way about these people, 
but also one of the main duties of CSOs is to support the change of narrative on 
migration and counterbalance negative stereotypes.  
 
• CSOs are concerned about the integration of migrants in our societies and highlighted 
the need to foster education and awareness-raising in particular. The challenge is two-
fold: how to allow refugees to have access to the education system in Europe and, at 
the same time, how to educate European societies about refugees, tolerance etc.  
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• CSOs have highlighted that there is indirect support for refugees by the EU institutions 
more than direct support. For example, organisations working for refugees are being 
heavily funded by the EU, especially projects which involve the education of refugees 
on soft skills or hard skills.  
 
Part 3: Role of CSOs in the evaluation of the implementation of the Schengen 
agreement – should civil society take a more active role in the institutional 
framework of the SEM or play an independent watchdog role? 
 
CSOs think they should be both having a more active role in the SEM framework and having 
more of a watchdog and monitoring role. They proposed different ways to have a more active 
role on the Schengen agreement: 
 
• CSOs could work on a joint request to access documents in order to understand why 
Schengen-related documents are treated under the confidentiality rules and to get 
access to the information concerning the fundamental rights of citizens. 
• CSOs can request to participate in the Frontex Consultative Committee. 
• CSOs could enhance collaboration with the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) 
• Media campaigns to inform citizens about Schengen. 
• Creation of an online repository of relevant documents. This would facilitate access to 
information on the topic. 
• Collaboration with the organisers of the Schengen Watch, created by Jon Worth and 
supported by EMI, which is a collection of opinions/experiences by people at the 
borders.  
• Project on free legal aid to migrants in a language they understand. Access to 
information is the second important need after humanitarian aid. There are a lot of 
legal clinics around Europe who could collaborate.  
• CSOs could take part in monitoring the application of the Schengen acquis  
[One of the participants referred to a good example of a civic monitoring project 
implemented in the period 2010-2011. The project consisted in assessing the progress 
of Bulgaria and Romania’s preparation for joining the Schengen area, specifically on 
the implementation of the action plans of the two governments. The main objective 
was to push the governments to implement quality measures and inform citizens of 
both countries about the implementation of the acquis. Shadow civic reports were 
developed because the Minister of Interior in Bulgaria had agreed to be subject to 
monitoring and had granted CSOs access to information. Six independent CSO teams 
could assemble independent information with the primary goal of measuring 
implementation according to timeframe and objectives. More information: Progress 
Reports on the Accession of Bulgaria and Romania towards the Schengen Area. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
From the stakeholder discussion, the two main effects of the Schengen situation on citizens’ 
mobility are:  
 
1. The uncertainty of the impact on citizens’ rights, in particular free movement. 
2. The impact of the sharing of personal data as a tool to allegedly increase security (e.g. 
the impact of Passenger Name Records). 
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Surname Name Position Organisation 
Apert Jeremy Project Coordinator Erasmus Student Network (ESN) 
Carrera Sergio Senior Researcher  Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Erdelyiova Katarina 
Project and 
Communication 
Assistant 
 
Young European Federalists 
(JEF Europe) 
Hadžimusić Kenan  Senior Manager European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) 
Kavrakova Assya Director European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) 
Lironi Elisa Coordinator European Citizen Action Service (ECAS) 
Perez-Seoane Alvaro Oleart PhD Candidate 
Centre d'étude de la vie 
politique, Institut d'études 
européennes (ULB) 
Semenyak Maryana Network and Human Resources Director AEGEE Europe 
Silva Marta Legal Adviser Milieu 
Triantafyllakis Antonis Member AEGEE Europe 
Vosyliūtė Lina Researcher Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
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ANNEX 5. DEVELOPMENTS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ARTICLE 29 
 
Source: Authors
The Schengen Border Code (SBq application on invoking Article 29 SBC: 
Fl~~k nf Sc-h~een P.v A1ul'ltinTl Anrl Mnnitnrine mPC""h,.n-i<:n1 (SFM) fn11 
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Commission 
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Statement. • continue Internal 
from Greece • Border Controls 
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Roadrnap 
COM(2016) 120 
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Action Plan to meet 
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Article 16.1 of SEM 
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Greece 
Article 13 of 
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and Slovenia • under SBC 
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Prop05al for 
Council 
implementing 
: Statement 
from 
• Hungary 
Decision Draft Council 
COM(2016) 275 Implementing 
on Article 29 of SBC Decision on 
Article 29 of SBC 
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Internal Border 
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